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This dissertation focuses on the performance implications of acquisitions in high technology 
industries. I use this setting to understand what factors affect a firm’s ability to successfully 
acquire external technology to enhance its innovative productivity, decrease the time elapsed 
until the initial post-acquisition innovation utilizing the target firm’s knowledge, and to create 
shareholder value. In the three essays, I focus on how the overlap in the technological knowledge 
possessed by the target firm and the acquiring firm affect acquisition performance.  
The first essay of my dissertation submits that our current understanding of technological 
overlap is incomplete. I maintain that technological overlap is actually best viewed as two 
distinct constructs: target overlap, the proportion of the target’s knowledge base that the acquirer 
already possesses, and acquirer overlap, the proportion of the acquirer’s knowledge base 
duplicated by the target. Treating target and acquirer overlap as distinct concepts allows me to 
simultaneously incorporate three drivers: the acquirer’s absorptive capacity, knowledge 
redundancy, and organizational disruption due to potential conflict between the acquirer’s and 
target’s knowledge workers. 
The second essay addresses how different rationales for acquiring small technology firms 
affect the post-acquisition utilization of the target’s and the acquirer’s technological capabilities. 
I identify four general rationales that have previously been identified in the literature. I then 
identified two general characteristics of the four rationales that can assist researchers in 
empirically differentiated between the rationales: the technological relatedness between the 
target and the acquirer and the technological leader/laggard status of the acquirer. Through the 
identification of the two variables and how they relate to the four different rationales, I am able 
to explain prior conflicting results on whether the technological capabilities of the target and 
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acquirer are substitutive or complementary. I find that the target’s technological capabilities 
increase post-acquisition patenting and create more value when less technological overlap exists. 
On the other hand, the acquirer’s technological capabilities increase patenting and create more 
value when the acquirer is a technological leader. Further, acquirers benefit most when both little 
technological overlap is present and the acquirer is a technological leader. 
My third essay investigates the independent and interactive effects that geographic 
distance, crossing national borders, and technological overlap have on the time it takes the 
acquirer to utilize the pre-acquisition knowledge of the target in post-acquisition innovation. 
Further, I hypothesize that whether these factors facilitate or impede the acquirer’s ability to 
innovate expeditiously using the target’s pre-acquisition knowledge depends on whether the 
acquirer integrates the target’s knowledge with its own or rather the acquirer maintains target 
innovative autonomy. I show that the acquirer crossing national borders has a significantly 
greater impact on time compared to mere distance. Cross-border acquisitions lengthen the time to 
knowledge integrating innovations while cross-border acquisitions shorten the time to non-
integrating innovations. I also show that technological overlap facilitates knowledge integrating 
innovation while impeding non-integrating innovations. Further, I show that technological 
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In innovative industries, technological change is both rapid and frequent (Sarkar et al., 2006). 
While both incumbents and startups strive to innovate, past research provides evidence that much 
of the truly novel innovations originate in startups (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Pavitt, 
Robson, and Townsend, 1987). With internal R&D focusing on incremental innovations (Knott 
and Posen, 2009; Sorensen and Stuart, 2000; Tushman and Anderson, 1986) and corporate 
strategies focusing on specialization and the outsourcing non-core activities (Mayer, Somaya, 
and Williamson, Forthcoming), firms find themselves in competency traps (Levinthal and 
March, 1993). As a result technological acquisitions have become a popular complement to 
internal innovation, which allows firms to overcome the time compression diseconomies of 
internal innovation that are inherent to innovative industries (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). While 
many resources may not be available on strategic factor markets, technology, technological 
knowledge, and technological capabilities are available through the acquisition of small, 
technology firms (Barney, 1989; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). 
 While mergers and acquisitions have been the focus of much research throughout the 
history of economics, finance, accounting, and management research (see Haleblian et al. (2009) 
for a recent review of the literature on acquisitions), the acquisition of small technology firms 
has only become a major research phenomenon in the past decade (see Graebner, Eisenhardt, and 
Roundy (2010) for a review of the literature on technological acquisitions). Granstrand and 
Sjolander (1990) introduced the idea of a special external market for technology through the 
trading of small, technology-based firms. The literature has since taken off in line with the 
growth of the market for small technology firms (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Benson and 
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Ziedonis, 2009; Graebner, 2004, 2009; Karim, 2006, 2009; Karim and Mitchell, 2000; King, 
Slotegraaf, and Kesner, 2008; Makri, Hitt, and Lane, 2010; Paruchuri, Nerkar, and Hambrick, 
2006; Puranam, Singh, and Chaudhuri, 2009; Puranam, Singh, and Zollo, 2006; Puranam and 
Srikanth, 2007; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Schweizer, 2005; Uhlenbruck, Hitt, and Semadeni, 2006).  
 While the popularity of acquiring external technology through the market for corporate 
control has grown over the past two decades, many of these acquisitions continue to fail to meet 
the acquiring firm’s expectations (Graebner et al., 2010; King et al., 2008). While expectations 
of shareholder value creation remain the same, the acquisition and integration of the target firm’s 
technological knowledge and capabilities are the primary motivating factor behind technological 
acquisitions in contrast to cost and market synergies of non-technological acquisitions (Brush, 
1996; Seth, 1990)
1
. In this dissertation, I investigate the factors that affect the success of 
acquiring small technology firms.  
 With the literature on the acquisition of small technology firms in a relatively early stage, 
much of the research has only focused on a few success factors. The relatedness of the 
technological knowledge of the target firm and the acquiring firm, otherwise known as 
technological overlap, has received the most attention. Ahuja and Katila (2001) brought 
technological overlap to the forefront of the technological acquisitions literature with their 
finding of the inverted U-shape relationship between technological overlap and post-acquisition 
patenting intensity in the chemical industry. With Cloodt, Hagedoorn, and Van Kranenburg 
(2006) finding similar results in a study of aerospace and defense, computers and office 
                                                            
1
 While technological knowledge and capabilities are the primary motivation of acquisitions of 
small, technology firms, market power has been noted as a secondary motive or a primary 
motive for a minority of technological acquisitions. Market power has been recognized as an 
acquisition rationale in terms of entering nascent markets (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009) and 
foreign markets (Birkinshaw, Bresman, and Håkanson, 2000; Schweizer, 2005). 
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machinery, pharmaceuticals, and electronics and communications industries, technological 
overlap has become a recurring independent and control variable. In this dissertation, I advance 
the current state of knowledge regarding the performance implications of technological overlap 
in the acquisition of small technology firms. I address three measures of performance: 
shareholder value creation, quantity of post-acquisition knowledge creation, and time to post-
acquisition knowledge creation. In advancing our knowledge of technological overlap and 
technological acquisitions, I address the following research questions in the three essays: 
1. Does target overlap, i.e., how much of the target firm’s technology the acquiring firm 
knows (Ahuja and Katila, 2001), and acquirer overlap, i.e., how much of the acquiring 
firm’s technology the target firm knows, possess their own unique effects on acquisition 
performance? (Essay 1) 
2. Do the target firm’s and the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities contribute 
differently to post-acquisition knowledge creation and value creation depending on the 
rationale for acquiring the small technology firm? (Essay 2) 
3. How does distance (technological, geographic, and cultural) between the target firm and 
the acquiring firm impact the amount of time it takes the acquiring firm to utilize the 
target firm’s technological knowledge in post-acquisition innovation? (Essay 3) 
Table 1.1 displays the research questions addressed and the main variables included in the three 
essays. 
 While technological overlap has become a required variable in any study of technology 
acquisitions, there has been little advancement made in the conceptual construct. The most 
common conceptualization of the construct accounts for how much of the target firm’s 
technological knowledge the acquiring firm already knows (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt 
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et al., 2006; Kapoor and Lim, 2007). One alternative conceptualization of the construct was to 
simultaneously look at how much of the target the acquirer already knows and how much of the 
acquirer the target already knows which constituted a measure of common knowledge (Mowery, 
Oxley, and Silverman, 1998). More recently, Makri et al. (2010) differentiated between similar 
knowledge and complementary knowledge. In this dissertation, I advance the common 
conceptualization and measurement of technological overlap (Ahuja and Katila, 2001) by 
differentiating between target technological overlap and acquirer technological overlap. Target 
technological overlap equates to how much of the target’s knowledge the acquirer already knows 
which is equivalent to the traditional concept and measurement of technological overlap (Ahuja 
and Katila, 2001). On the other hand, acquirer technological overlap equates to how much of the 
acquirer’s knowledge the target already knows. In Essay 1, I focus on this differentiation and the 
effects that these two overlaps have on the relationship between the technological capabilities of 
the target and the acquiring firm and value creation for the acquiring firm’s shareholders. 
 Beyond the need to acquire new technology or technological capabilities, there are 
multiple micro-rationales for acquiring a small technology firm (Graebner et al., 2010). The lack 
of differentiation in the rationales for acquiring external technology can explain prior conflicting 
results on whether the target firm’s technological capabilities complement (e.g., Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006; Makri et al., 2010; Veugelers, 1997) or substitute (e.g., Blonigen and Taylor, 
2000; Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland, 1990; King et al., 2008) the technological capabilities of the 
acquiring firm. In Essay 2, I identify four general rationales from the literature: capability 
upgrading, strategic renewal, capability deepening, and capability diversification. I then identify 
two variables that I submit differ among the rationales: whether the acquiring firm is a 
technological leader or laggard and the level of target technological overlap. By utilizing these 
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two constructs, I incorporate the differentiation between potential absorptive capacity and 
realized absorptive capacity identified by Zahra and George (2002). Target technological overlap 
identifies the potential absorptive capacity in the acquisition which relates to the ability of the 
acquirer to acquire and assimilate the knowledge of the target firm while the acquirer’s 
technological capabilities identifies the realized absorptive capacity which relates to the ability of 
the acquirer to transform and exploit the knowledge of the target firm (Zahra and George, 2002). 
By identifying these two variables that can assist in differentiating among the four rationales, I 
am able to extend our knowledge about when acquiring a small technology firm benefits 
innovation and acquirer shareholder value creation. 
Knowledge creation has been the primary dependent variable in the limited amount of 
research focused on technological acquisitions
2
. In Essay 2, I connect knowledge creation 
(patenting) with acquirer shareholder creation which has been a neglected dependent variable in 
the technological acquisitions literature (Graebner et al., 2010). Connecting knowledge creation 
with shareholder value creation is a contribution of its own. Barney (1988) submitted that for an 
acquirer to create value for its shareholders it must be able to create inimitable, unique 
synergistic cash flows.  While all acquisitions possess this potential, the acquisitions of small 
technology firms possess unique empirical characteristics enabling the testing of the Barney 
(1988) proposition. Since by definition technological acquisitions are limited to small targets, 
many of the traditional synergies (e.g., cost and market synergies) are minimized enhancing the 
ability to measure the knowledge creation synergies. Therefore, in Essay 2, I am able to test the 
link between knowledge creation and value creation. 
                                                            
2
 Knowledge creation is a general term. Past studies have also used the term innovation or 
invention with the construct most often measured using patents (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Makri 
et al., 2010). 
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Since technology acquisitions occur due to the need to overcome the time compression 
diseconomies of internal innovation (Dierickx and Cool, 1989), the amount of time it takes the 
acquirer to utilize the target’s knowledge significantly affects the success of the acquisition. 
Similar to value creation, there has been little work in the technological acquisitions literature 
which has addressed time (Puranam et al., 2006). In Essay 3, I contribute to this important aspect 
of technological acquisitions. 
In consideration of acquiring, assimilating, transforming, and exploiting the knowledge 
of the target in a timely manner, we must consider the physical location of the target firm in 
relation to the acquiring firm. Outside of the acquisitions literature, studies have shown the 
difficulties in distant knowledge exchange (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993; Mowery 
and Ziedonis, 2001; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). With many technology acquisitions 
maintaining the autonomy of the target firm’s knowledge workers by maintaining its pre-
acquisition R&D facilities while still seeking coordinated innovation with the acquiring firm’s 
knowledge workers (Puranam, 2001), studying the effect that geographic distance has on the 
ability to utilize the target firm’s knowledge becomes quite relevant to the technological 
acquisitions literature. Similarly, whether the two firms domicile in the same nation also affects 
the ability to transfer knowledge (Freeman, 1995; Lam, 2003). But, as Puranam et al. (2009) 
have shown that technological overlap enhances communication, I investigate how increases in 
target technological overlap facilitates the acquisition of more geographically distant target 
firms. 
Another issue affecting the performance of technology acquisitions is that the acquiring 
firms expect the target knowledge workers to perform two distinct roles (Puranam, 2001). First, 
the acquiring firm expects the target firm knowledge workers to continue independent innovative 
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activities. Second, the acquiring firm expects the target firm knowledge workers to coordinate 
innovative activities with the acquiring firm knowledge workers. In Essay 3, I address how 
geographic distance and technological overlap possess different effects on the time it takes the 
acquiring firm to utilize the target firm’s knowledge depending on whether the knowledge is 
used in independent innovation or integrated innovation. This creates vital knowledge on 
whether a potential target firm is an appropriate target based on how the acquiring firm plans to 
utilize the target firm’s knowledge workers in conjunction with the geographic and technological 
proximity of the target firm to the acquiring firm. 
In conclusion, this dissertation advances the concept and measurement of the 
technological overlap construct and further investigates how it affects the performance of 
acquisitions of small technology firms with regards to shareholder value creation, knowledge 
creation, and the time it takes to create new knowledge using the target firm’s knowledge. The 
three essays show the importance of accounting for both target overlap and acquirer overlap, the 
rationale for acquiring the small technology firm, and the location of the target firm. 
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TABLE 
Table 1.1. Outline of the Three Essays 
Essay Research Question Dependent Variables Independent Variables 
Essay 1 – Technological 
Overlap, Technological 
Capabilities, and Resource 
Recombination in 
Technological Acquisitions 
Does target overlap and 
acquirer overlap possess their 
own unique effects on 
acquisition performance? 
1. Acquirer Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns 
2. Percentage change in patent 
intensity, 3-year pre- vs. 
post- (Appendix B) 
1. Target Technological 
Overlap 
2. Acquirer Technological 
Overlap 
Essay 2 – When do Firm 
Benefit from Acquiring 
External Technology? 
Do the target’s and the 
acquirer’s technological 
capabilities contribute 
differently to post-acquisition 
knowledge creation and value 
creation depending on the 
rationale for acquisition? 
1. Acquirer Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns 
2. Percentage change in patent 
intensity, 3-year pre- vs. 
post- 
1. Target Technological 
Overlap 
2. Acquirer Technological 
Capabilities 
Essay 3 – Technological 
Acquisitions, Distance, and 
Time Elapsed until the Initial 
Post-acquisition Innovation 
How does distance 
(technological, geographic, and 
cultural) between the target 
firm and the acquiring firm 
impact the amount of time it 
takes the acquiring firm to 
utilize the target firm’s 
technological knowledge? 
1. Amount of time elapsed 
until post-acquisition until 
1
st
 integrative innovation 





1. Target Technological 
Overlap 
2. Geographic Distance 




ESSAY 1: TECHNOLOGICAL OVERLAP, TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES, AND 
RESOURCE RECOMBINATION IN TECHNOLOGICAL ACQUISITIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Much of the foundational research on technological acquisitions examined the relationship 
between acquisition performance and the amount of overlap between the technological 
knowledge bases of the target firm and acquiring firm (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Graebner et al., 
2010; Kapoor and Lim, 2007). More recent research has extended the concept of technological 
overlap by investigating the effects that technological similarities and complementarities have on 
acquisition performance (Makri et al., 2010). In this study, I further extend the concept of 
technological overlap along two different dimensions.  
First, I extend technological overlap to encompass both target and acquirer overlap, 
which may be asymmetric. Most empirical constructions of technological overlap have measured 
what I call “target overlap”, the portion of the target’s knowledge already known by the acquirer 
(Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Kapoor and Lim, 2007).  However, acquisitions 
also vary in the degree to which the acquirer’s existing knowledge is duplicated by the target’s 
knowledge, what I call “acquirer overlap”.  In addition to identifying target overlap and acquirer 
overlap as conceptually and empirically distinct, I develop differential hypotheses regarding their 
effect on the creation or destruction of value in an acquisition. 
Second, while previous research has tested the direct effect of either technological 
overlap (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Kapoor and Lim, 2007; Makri et al., 2010) 
or technological capabilities on acquisition performance (King et al., 2008), I examine these 
factors jointly.  By doing so, I show how acquirer and target overlap affect the acquirer’s ability 
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to generate value post-acquisition from both its own technological capabilities and those it 
acquires from the target firm. 
My findings show that acquirer and target overlap affect value creation separately and 
jointly. High target overlap decreases the value created by the target’s technological resources 
due to knowledge redundancy.  High acquirer overlap diminishes the value created by the 
acquirer’s technological capabilities by exposing more of the acquirer’s knowledge workers to 
disruption and conflict with the target’s knowledge workers. Indeed, for many firms, the negative 
effects of high acquirer overlap exceed any value created from acquiring new technological 
resources and capabilities.  High acquirer overlap can also reduce the value created by the 
target’s technological capabilities, but only when target overlap is also high, leading to conflict 
rather than potential synergies.  
This study makes four primary contributions to the literature on technological 
acquisitions. First, it offers a conceptually and empirically more accurate and nuanced measure 
of technological overlap. Second, it applies that measure to show that target and acquirer overlap 
have distinct, but inter-related, impacts on the value created from the technological capabilities 
of the target and acquirer.  Third, it broadens the theoretical explanation of value creation in 
technological acquisitions by simultaneously incorporating three drivers: the acquirer’s 
absorptive capacity, knowledge redundancy, and exposure to organizational disruption due to 
conflict between the acquirer’s and target’s knowledge workers3. While individual papers have 
                                                            
3
 Cohen and Levinthal (1990: 128) define absorptive capacity as ‘an ability to recognize the 
value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends.’ A strict interpretation 
of this definition may have excessive knowledge redundancy decreasing the acquiring firm’s 
absorptive capacity in reference to the target firm as ‘new information’ decreases. In this 
dissertation, I interpret the definition in line with Ahuja and Katila (2001) as they differentiate 
between ‘an ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends’ (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990: 128) from the actual presence of new 
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discussed each driver in isolation, the separate measures of target overlap and acquirer overlap 
allows me to be able to consider them simultaneously and thus isolate the impact of each.  
Lastly, it extends the literature on technological acquisitions by studying acquirer shareholder 
value creation, which has been a neglected dependent variable in the technological acquisitions 
literature (Graebner et al., 2010).  Measuring shareholder value creation complements patent 
counts, the most common dependent variable (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Kapoor and Lim, 2007; 
Paruchuri et al., 2006), by capturing not only innovative productivity, but also innovative quality 
and novelty.  Further, shareholder value creation provides particularly useful insights into the 
determinants of the performance of technological acquisitions, since it reflects the degree to 
which the acquirer accomplished the raison d'être of such acquisitions, creating unique resource 
recombinations from the two firms’ capabilities (Barney, 1988). 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
In innovative industries, technological change is both rapid and frequent (Sarkar et al., 2006). 
While both incumbents and startups strive to innovate, past research provides evidence that much 
of the truly novel innovations originate in startups (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Pavitt et al., 
1987). As a result, technological acquisitions have become a popular complement to internal 
innovation, allowing firms to overcome the time compression diseconomies of internal 
innovation inherent in the rapid and frequently changing technologies of innovative industries 
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Accordingly, technological acquisitions have become an important 
stream in the broader acquisitions literature (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Benson and Ziedonis, 
2009; Capron and Mitchell, 2009; Graebner, 2004, 2009; Kapoor and Lim, 2007; Makri et al., 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
information. According to Ahuja and Katila (2001: 201), increases in knowledge redundancy 
between the acquiring firm and target firm does not decrease absorptive capacity but decreases 
the benefits of absorptive capacity. 
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2010; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 2009; Puranam et al., 2006; Puranam and Srikanth, 
2007; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Schweizer, 2005).  
Barney (1988) argued that acquirers can capture economic value by creating novel 
recombinations from their resources and capabilities and those of the target. More recent 
research provides evidence that the pursuit of such novel recombinations motivates many 
acquisitions (Karim and Mitchell, 2000; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999).    
The resource-based view of firm growth (Barney, 1988; Penrose, 1959) suggests three 
factors influence the degree to which a given acquisition will succeed in creating value: the 
target’s technological capabilities, the acquirer’s technological capabilities, and the overlap 
between the two (technological overlap).  The technological capabilities of the target and of the 
acquirer each represent fungible resources that can potentially be recombined.  However, the 
greater the overlap between the target and acquirer, the fewer the opportunities for novel 
recombination exist.  Consideration of these factors leads to the straightforward prediction that 
an increase in the technological capabilities of the target and/or acquirer, or a decrease in the 
overlap between their capabilities, will increase the value created by the acquiring firm ceteris 
paribus.  
Prior studies have been generally consistent with this prediction. However, the 
measurement of technological overlap in existing research obscures important contingencies that 
determine the potential to create or even lose value post-acquisition.  Prior studies have 
measured technological overlap as the amount of the target’s knowledge base that the acquirer 
already knows (Ahuja and Katila, 2001), the sum of the technological overlap from both firms 
(Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996; Mowery et al., 1998), or subsumed technological overlap 
in a more coarse grained measure of resource overlap represented by product lines and product 
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categories (Karim, 2006; Karim and Mitchell, 2000). I propose that target and acquirer overlap 
each possess a unique effect on the acquirer’s ability to create value from the target’s and the 
acquirer’s technological capabilities.  Incorporating each separately allows me to be able to 
separate the effects of absorptive capacity, knowledge redundancy and post-acquisition conflict 
in a way prior studies have not been able to accomplish.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates four idealized combinations of target overlap and acquirer overlap.  
The shaded area represents technological overlap, that is, knowledge common to both target and 
acquirer. The non-shaded areas represent knowledge unique to the acquirer or target.   
I begin by considering the impact of target overlap.  When target overlap is low 
(Quadrants 1 and 2), a large proportion of the target’s knowledge is new to the acquirer and there 
are many opportunities for novel combinations of the target’s knowledge and the acquirer’s 
knowledge. However, the acquirer may not be able to realize these novel recombinations.  The 
acquirer needs a minimum level of absorptive capacity to successfully identify, value, assimilate, 
and commercialize the recombinative possibilities of the target’s technological resources (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990).  Since much of the target’s knowledge is unfamiliar to the acquirer, the 
acquirer will have a diminished ability to understand the technological resources and capabilities 
of the target and will be unable to extract maximal value from the target’s technological 
capabilities (cf. Mowery et al., 1998). 
When target overlap is high (Quadrants 3 and 4), the acquirer has a greater ability to 
understand and absorb the target’s knowledge.  However, since much of the target’s knowledge 
is redundant to knowledge the acquirer already possessed, there are fewer possibilities to create 
novel recombinations of the target’s and acquirer’s technological knowledge.   Indeed, the 
increase in knowledge redundancy not only decreases the possible number of novel 
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recombinations that can be made using the newly acquired technological knowledge; it may also 
decrease the novelty and quality of those recombinations (Makri et al., 2010). 
In summary, when target overlap is low, there are many opportunities for novel 
recombinations, but the acquirer lacks the absorptive capacity to recognize and execute them.   
The technological resources of the target are largely wasted.  When target overlap is high, the 
acquirer has the necessary absorptive capacity, but knowledge redundancy means there are few 
novel recombinations available.  The target’s technological capabilities offer few opportunities to 
create value.  
Thus, the effects of absorptive capacity and knowledge redundancy on the ability of the 
acquirer to generate value from the technological resources of the target vary in opposite 
directions as target overlap changes.  Since theory provides no guidance to which effect will 




Hypothesis 1a: An increase in target technological overlap will positively affect the 
impact the target’s technological capabilities will have on abnormal returns.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: An increase in target technological overlap will negatively affect the 
impact the target’s technological capabilities will have on abnormal returns. 
 
I hypothesize that acquirer technological overlap, which this study is the first to examine, affects 
the value created by both the acquirer’s and the target’s technological capabilities. Increased 
acquirer overlap is associated with increased routine disruption and conflict between the 
                                                            
4
 I contrast the hypotheses, which address the moderating effect of target overlap on the 
relationship between technological capabilities and value creation, to the non-linear relationship 
proposed found in studies of the direct effects of technological overlap on acquisition 
performance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Kapoor and Lim, 2007).  I explore this 
point at greater length in the Discussion section.  
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knowledge workers of the target and acquirer, a recognized source of value destruction in the 
acquisitions literature (Mirvis, 1985; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 2006). 
When acquirer overlap is low (Quadrants 1 and 3), there is little basis for conflict arising 
post-acquisition.  Since the overlapping knowledge represents a small portion of the acquirer’s 
knowledge base, few of the acquiring firm’s knowledge workers will find themselves in 
competition with the target’s knowledge workers.  Rather, supplementing the acquirer’s 
capabilities with complementary capabilities of the target can generate novel recombinations. 
Since both workforces can benefit from being associated with these new recombinations, there is 
incentive for cooperation, setting the stage to increase the value of both the acquirer’s and the 
target’s technological capabilities. 
In contrast, as acquirer overlap increases, represented by a move from the left two 
quadrants to the right two quadrants in Figure 2.1, more of the acquirer’s knowledge workers are 
redundant to, rather than complementary to, the target’s knowledge workers.   As the two groups 
have similar expertise, they are likely to find themselves competing for limited resources in an 
already established capability of the acquirer rather than supplementing each other in order to 
build a new capability. 
As the firm seeks to resolve this internal competition, it is often the target’s workforce 
that is reconfigured (Capron, Dussauge, and Mitchell, 1998; Capron, Mitchell, and 
Swaminathan, 2001; Capron and Pistre, 2002; Karim, 2006).  The resulting loss of social status 
and centrality on the part of the target’s innovators is one of the most significant drivers of lost 
technological productivity post-acquisition (Paruchuri et al., 2006).  It often leads to increased 
turnover among the target’s workers (Krishnan, Miller, and Judge, 1997), which is highly 
damaging to knowledge transfer after the acquisition (Ranft and Lord, 2000).   
16 
Sometimes, however, it is the acquirer’s employees that bear the brunt of post-acquisition 
reorganization.  This is particularly likely to be the case when the acquirer intends to upgrade or 
substitute their present capabilities with the superior capabilities of the target (Karim, 2006), as 
would be suggested by a firm acquiring a target that duplicates many of its existing capabilities, 
rather than relying on internal development to expand its capabilities (Capron and Mitchell, 
2009; Helfat, 1994; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). 
Whichever group of employees is ultimately most affected by the acquisition, employees 
are likely to resist the acquisition for fear of its potential negative effects on their careers 
(Greenwood, Hinings, and Brown, 1994; Walsh, 1988, 1989). Such resistance is well 
documented as a source of acquisitions failing to meet their expectations (Blake and Mouton, 
1985; Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999).  Employee resistance 
impedes the ease of communication and post-acquisition interaction between the knowledge 
workers, which is critical for the successful creation of novel recombinations using the acquirer’s 
and target’s technological capabilities. 
In summary, an increase in acquirer overlap means that more of the acquirer’s entrenched 
knowledge workers face the risk of their knowledge being made redundant by the acquisition and 
thus have an incentive to resist the integration of the target’s knowledge workers.  The resulting 
conflict increases the likelihood of turnover, and the resulting loss of knowledge, for both the 
target and acquirer and makes successful recombination of the acquirer’s and target’s 
technological capabilities more difficult.  Thus, I expect increases in acquirer overlap to increase 
conflict leading to a decrease in the acquirers ability to extract value from the target’s and the 
acquirer’s technological capabilities. This leads to the second and third hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 2: An increase in acquirer technological overlap will negatively affect the 
impact the target’s technological capabilities will have on abnormal returns. 
 
Hypothesis 3: An increase in acquirer technological overlap will negatively affect the 
impact the acquirer’s technological capabilities will have on abnormal returns. 
 
METHODS 
Data and Sample 
The sample consists of technological acquisitions obtained from SDC Platinum’s Mergers and 
Acquisitions database from 1995 to 2004. 1995 is the first year that an acquisition meeting the 
criteria appears in the SDC database.  Using 2004 as the end date allowed me to be able to 
construct the patent citation-based independent variables. I initially identified acquisitions as 
technological acquisitions if both acquirer and target were classified as “high tech” firms in SDC 
Platinum’s M&A database.  
I limited the sample to firms listed as manufacturing firms by SIC codes 20-39 to allow 
for comparisons with previous technological acquisition research (Puranam et al., 2009; 
Puranam et al., 2006; Puranam and Srikanth, 2007). I limited the acquisitions to those where the 
target has less than 500 employees at the time of the acquisition. This is consistent with the U.S. 
Small Business Administration definition of a small business and prior studies on technological 
acquisitions (Granstrand and Sjolander, 1990; Puranam et al., 2009; Puranam et al., 2006; 
Puranam and Srikanth, 2007). It also creates greater confidence that the motive behind the 
acquisition was for technology and not for market power. I limited the sample to acquisitions by 
public firms to allow for the construction of the dependent variable from an event study. I 
included only acquisitions for which 100% of the target is acquired. This eliminated partial 
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acquisitions and acquisitions of targets for which the acquirer already owned a stake. I also 
eliminated divestitures to eliminate any effect on the firms’ returns due to greater negotiation 
power by the targets’ parents. Lastly, I limited the sample to deals greater than $50 million, since 
small deals may have no effect on the acquirer’s share price. To ensure that all of the acquisitions 
were technologically motivated, I searched news articles and newswires using LexisNexis and 
eliminated all acquisitions that were clearly not technologically motivated (Ahuja and Katila, 
2001; Ranft and Lord, 2000). I also eliminated all acquisitions where the target did not possess 
any patents to allow for the independent variable construction. After implementing these filters, 
the final sample consists of 97 acquisitions involving 73 different acquirers.  
Measures 
Dependent variable. I used the event study method to construct the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) of the acquirers, that is, acquiring firm’s stock market reaction to the announcement of the 
acquisition (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). This methodology has been extensively used to 
evaluate the value created from an acquisition in the management literature (Arikan and Capron, 
2010; Capron and Pistre, 2002; Goranova, Dharwadkar, and Brandes, 2010; Kim and 
Finkelstein, 2009; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). I used daily returns 
for the acquirers and the equally-weighted market returns, which I obtained both from the CRSP 
database. I used equally-weighted market returns since they possess a greater degree of 
correlation with security returns than value-weighted returns, which creates more precise 
estimators allowing for enhanced detection of abnormal returns (Peterson, 1989). I used an 
estimation window of 250 days from 51 days prior to the announcement to 300 days prior and an 
event window of 3 days from 1 day prior to the announcement to 1 day after. A 3 day window 
allows for differences in the timing of the announcement and the release of the announcement in 
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the press (Peterson, 1989). To ensure that there were no confounding events, I searched 
LexisNexis for every acquirer and eliminated any acquisitions for which there was a 
confounding event within a 5-day event window. I used Scholes-Williams coefficients to 
calculate the CARs, which corrects for the bias created from thin and nonsynchronous security 
trading in the market model (Scholes and Williams, 1977).  
As advocated by McWilliams and Siegel (1997), I first tested for a significant difference 
in the abnormal returns, which confirms that I captured the abnormal returns from the 
acquisitions. The cumulative abnormal returns are significantly different from zero at the 0.001 
level; therefore, I am confident that I captured the stock market’s responses to the acquisitions. 
Of the 97 acquisitions in the sample, 35 have a positive CAR while 62 have a negative CAR.  
Independent Variables. The variables acquirer technological overlap and target technological 
overlap refer to the degree to which the knowledge bases of the two firms overlap. To calculate 
the overlap measures, I begin by determining each firm’s knowledge base. Consistent with 
definitions of a firm’s knowledge base as “the distinct elements of knowledge with which the 
firm has revealed a relationship” (Kim and Kogut, 1996) or the set of knowledge with which the 
firm has “demonstrated familiarity with, or mastery of” (Ahuja and Katila, 2001), I follow prior 
work (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Kapoor and Lim, 2007) and include two 
components in each firm’s knowledge base. First, I include the firm’s own patents, since they 
represent knowledge the firm created. Second, I include patents cited by the firm’s patents, since 
“By creating a patent that builds on these prior patents, the firm provides evidence that the 
knowledge contained in those past patents is a part of the firm’s knowledge set.” (Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001:202). To ensure that I am capturing knowledge that was still relevant at the time of 
the acquisition, I include patents with an application date in the seven years prior to the 
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acquisition announcement, as Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson  (1993) found that citations 
dramatically decrease 7 years after the application date. 
Combining these two components for the target and eliminating any duplication 
generates the target’s knowledge base. Doing the same for the acquirer generates the acquirer’s 
knowledge base. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the area inside Kt equals the target’s knowledge 
base while the area inside Ka equals the acquirer’s knowledge base. Area R, the intersection of Kt 
and Ka, equals the portion of the target and the acquirer’s knowledge bases that is redundant. The 
technological overlap variables, which range from 0 to 1, are then calculated as follows: 
Acquirer technological overlap = R / Ka    (1) 
Target technological overlap = R / Kt    (2) 
 where 
Ka = the number of unique patents in the acquirer’s knowledge base, which consists of 
the acquirer’s patents and patents cited by the acquirer’s patents in the seven years prior 
to the acquisition announcement date, 
Kt = the number of unique patents in the target’s knowledge base, which consists of the 
target’s patents and patents cited by the target’s patents in the seven years prior to the 
acquisition announcement date, and 
R = redundancy in knowledge bases, the number of patents in the intersection of the 
acquirer and target’s knowledge bases. 
For technological capabilities, I constructed the variables acquirer technological 
capabilities and target technological capabilities. I constructed these variables as citation 
weighted patent counts of the seven years prior to the acquisition announcement (Trajtenberg, 
1990), measured as follows: 
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              (3) 
where 
       
  
Cil = the number of forward citations received by patent l for firm i, 
         
 
nit = the number of patents issued during year t for firm i. 
I dated the patent counts by their application date, which controlled for differences among the 
patents in the time it took to be granted (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Henderson and Cockburn, 
1996; Trajtenberg, 1990). I chose seven years to be confident that I captured most of the 
innovative technology that represented the current technological capabilities of the acquirer and 
the target (Trajtenberg, 1990). As a robustness check, I constructed variables for the firms’ 
cumulative prior five years and a total accumulation of prior patents. The seven-year 
accumulation has a correlation of 0.959 with the five-year accumulation and a 0.909 with the 
total accumulation for the target firms. The seven-year accumulation has a correlation of 0.986 
with the five-year accumulation and a 0.9603 with the total accumulation for the acquiring firms. 
With the high correlations between the five- and seven-year accumulations, I used the seven-year 
accumulation to be more conservative in making sure I captured all relevant unique 
technological capabilities that a firm possesses. 
Control variables. I constructed two variables to control for acquirer specifics. First, I 
constructed the variable acquisition experience. Acquisition experience has been found to create 
benefits (Bruton, Oviatt, and White, 1994; Fowler and Schmidt, 1989; Zollo and Singh, 2004), to 
create a burden (Kusewitt Jr, 1985), and to have no effect (King et al., 2004; Lahey and Conn, 
1990). Acquisition experience counts the number of acquisitions the acquirer completed in the 
five years prior to the acquisition. I limited the acquisition experience to five years due to 
empirical evidence that shows depreciation in the knowledge gained from managerial experience 
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(Sampson, 2005). I also constructed the variable relative market share to control for market 
dominance of the acquirer. 
 I included two variables to control for industry differences. First, I included a dummy 
variable, pharma, set to one if the acquirer is in the pharmaceutical/biotech industry. I included 
this variable since past research has found unique characteristics of the acquisition process 
between pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms (Kalaitzandonakes, 2000; Schimmelpfennig, 
King, and Naseem, 2003; Schweizer, 2005). I also constructed a four-firm industry concentration 
ratio at the SIC 3-digit classification using Compustat called 4-firm concentration ratio.  
 I included two variables that control for the size of the two merging firms.  To ensure that 
the results are not driven merely by the relative size of the firm’s knowledge bases, I constructed 
the variable relative size (knowledge bases), which is the number of knowledge elements in the 
target’s knowledge base divided by the number of elements in the acquirer’s knowledge base. I 
also constructed the variable relative size (employees) as the log of the relative size of the target 
to acquirer in terms of their number of employees.   
 I included two variables to control for transaction specifics. From the SDC Platinum 
M&A database, I included the percent of the transaction paid in stock called %stock. I also 
included the value of the transaction called transaction value (100 millions) which controls for 
the monetary size of the acquisition. 
 Finally, I included two variables to control for the timing of the acquisition. I construct 
two dummy variables called pre-1998 and post-2000. Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) found that 
acquirer shareholders valued acquisitions in the internet industry lower after the stock market 
correction in the year 2000. I also included a dummy for acquisitions occurring before 1998 to 
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control for differences in shareholder valuation at different stages of the technological 
acquisition wave that started in the early 1990s. 
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2.1 contains the descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables. The correlation 
between acquirer overlap and target overlap is only 0.23, supporting the contention that they are 
separate constructs. Although two correlations are above 0.50, relative size (employees) with 
acquirer technological capabilities and relative size (employees) with relative market share, the 
maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) analyses in models 1-4 is 4.41, well below the critical 
value of 10.  Model 5 contains multiple interactions with acquirer overlap and consequently a 
higher VIF (12.28).  I therefore supplement model 5 with alternative models that do not rely on 
interaction variables.   
Models 
I ran three separate analyses of the data to test the hypotheses. I used OLS regression and 
estimated robust White-Huber standard errors to correct for potential heteroskedasticity in all 
three of the analysis.  First, I tested the hypotheses by interacting the technological overlap 
variables with the technological capabilities variables. This analysis provides initial support for 
the hypotheses, although multicollinearity greatly affected the final model. In the second 
analysis, I avoided interaction terms by splitting the sample by target overlap at the median to 
test Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b, and then splitting the sample by acquirer overlap at the 
median to test Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3. This allowed for me to be able to test for 
differences in the technological capabilities coefficients using a Wald test. In the third analysis, I 
split the sample at the medians of both target overlap and acquirer overlap, creating four 
subsamples that correspond to the four quadrants of Figure 2.1.  I then ran separate regressions 
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for each quadrant and tested for differences in the technological capabilities coefficients using a 
Wald test.  
RESULTS 
Analysis I 
In the first analysis of the hypotheses, I tested the moderating effects of target overlap and 
acquirer overlap by interacting each with acquirer and target technological capabilities. As 
reported in Table 2.2, model 1 includes all of the variables without any of the interaction 
variables. Subsequent models add individual interaction terms, with model 5 containing the 
complete set of interactions.  Consistent with resource-based view expectations, target 
technological capabilities create value while counter to expectations, acquirer technological 
capabilities destroy value.  
 I find modest support for Hypothesis 1b over Hypothesis 1a. The interaction between 
target technological capabilities and target overlap is negative in both models in which it is 
included, but is only significant in model 2. 
 Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 focus on the negative effects of acquirer overlap. The 
interaction between target technological capabilities and acquirer overlap is negative and 
significant in model 3, which supports Hypothesis 2. The interaction between acquirer 
technological capabilities and acquirer overlap is negative and significant in model 4, which 
supports Hypothesis 3.  Unsurprisingly, given the high multicollinearity when all of the 
interactions were included, none of the interactions were significant in model 5. 
Analysis II 
Table 2.3 reports the results of the second analysis, in which I tested the moderating effects of 
target overlap and acquirer overlap separately. I did this by testing Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 
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1b with the sample split at the target overlap median and then testing Hypothesis 2 and 
Hypothesis 3 with the sample split at the acquirer overlap median.
5
  
Models 6 and 7 display the results for the test of Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b. At 
low levels of target overlap (model 6), the coefficient for target technological capabilities 
coefficient is positive and significant.  At high levels of target overlap (model 7), the coefficient 
for target technological capabilities coefficient is negative, but not significantly different from 
zero. A Wald test comparing the coefficient for target technological capabilities across the 
models confirms that it is significantly greater at low levels of target overlap than at high levels 
(p = 0.012). Confirming the results of the first analysis, hypothesis 1b is supported over 
hypotheses 1a. 
 Models 8 and 9 report the results of splitting the sample at the median of acquirer overlap 
to test Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3.  Unlike in analysis I, hypothesis 2 is not supported.  The 
coefficient for target technological capabilities is not significant for either low (model 8; β = 
0.013, p = 0.227) or high (model 9; β = 0.006, p = 0.571) acquirer overlap.  Additionally, the 
coefficients do not differ significantly from each other (p = 0.428).  Analysis III, reported below, 
provided additional insights into this result. 
Consistent with expectations for Hypothesis 3, the coefficient for the acquirer’s 
technological capabilities is significantly (p = 0.004) less when acquirer overlap is high (model 
9; β = -0.031, p = 0.003) than when it is low (model 8; β = -.004, p = 0.552). An increase in 
acquirer overlap negatively affects the impact the acquirer’s technological capabilities have on 
abnormal returns. 
 
                                                            
5
 As detailed below, the results are robust to splitting the sample at other levels. 
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Analysis III 
For the final test of the hypotheses, I split the sample into the four quadrants of Figure 2.1. I did 
this by splitting the sample at the medians of the acquirer and target overlaps. The regression 
results can be found in Table 2.4 while the Wald test results can be found in Table 2.5.   
Testing Hypothesis 1a and 1b requires two comparisons of the coefficient for target 
technological capabilities: quadrant 1 versus quadrant 3 and quadrant 2 versus quadrant 4.  A 
Wald test shows that the coefficient is significantly (p = 0.080) greater in quadrant 1 (low target 
overlap/low acquirer overlap; β = 0.025, p = 0.044) than in quadrant 3 (high target overlap/low 
acquirer overlap; β = 0.008, p = 0.443).  Similarly, the coefficient is significantly (p = 0.008) 
higher in quadrant 2 (low target overlap/high acquirer overlap; β = 0.025, p = 0.150) than in 
quadrant 4 (high target overlap/high acquirer overlap; β = -0.009, p = 0.351).  Thus, regardless of 
the level of acquirer overlap, the target’s technological capabilities coefficient indicates that 
more value creation occurs when the target overlap is low than when it is high.  Consistent with 
both prior analyses, this result supports Hypothesis 1b over Hypothesis 1a.  
Testing hypothesis 2, which proposes that an increase in acquirer technological overlap 
negatively affects the value created by the target’s technological capabilities, requires two 
comparisons of the coefficient for target technological capabilities: quadrant 1 versus quadrant 2 
and quadrant 3 versus quadrant 4.  A Wald test shows that the coefficient is not significantly (p = 
0.991) greater in quadrant 1 (low target overlap/low acquirer overlap; β = 0.025, p = 0.044) than 
in quadrant 2 (low target overlap/high acquirer overlap; β = 0.025, p = 0.150). On the other hand, 
the coefficient is significantly (p = 0.073) higher in quadrant 3 (high target overlap/low acquirer 
overlap; β = 0.008, p = 0.443) than in quadrant 4 (high target overlap/high acquirer overlap; β =  
-0.009, p = 0.351).   
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This more fine-grained analysis helps explain the lack of support for Hypotheses 2 in 
Analysis II.  The impact of acquirer overlap on the value created by the target’s technological 
capabilities is contingent on the level of target overlap.  When target overlap is high, there is a 
negative impact as predicted.  When target overlap is low, there is no impact. I discuss this 
interesting finding in the discussion section. 
Testing Hypothesis 3, which proposes that an increase in acquirer technological overlap 
negatively affects the value created by the acquirer’s technological capabilities, also involves 
comparing quadrant 1 versus quadrant 2 and quadrant 3 versus quadrant 4.  A Wald test shows 
that the coefficient is significantly (p = 0.078) greater in quadrant 1 (low target overlap/low 
acquirer overlap; β = 0.007, p = 0.757) than in quadrant 2 (low target overlap/high acquirer 
overlap; β = -0.028, p = 0.183). Similarly, the coefficient is significantly (p = 0.000) greater in 
quadrant 3 (high target overlap/low acquirer overlap; β = 0.011, p = 0.426) than in quadrant 4 
(high target overlap/high acquirer overlap; β = -0.034, p = 0.012). I thus find strong support for 
Hypothesis 3. Acquirer technological capabilities have a more negative impact on value at higher 
levels of acquirer overlap. This effect exists at both low and high levels of target overlap.  
Robustness Tests 
I ran robustness tests for analysis II by splitting the sample at different levels of target and 
acquirer overlap to alleviate any concerns about the results being driven by the choice of using 
the median to split the sample. For the robustness regressions, I split the sample at the 33
rd
 
percentile and the 66
th
 percentile for target overlap to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b and for acquirer 
overlap to test Hypotheses 2 and 3.  
 Panel A in Table 2.6 displays the robustness test results for Hypothesis 1b. I find support 
for Hypothesis 1b when the sample is split at either the 33
rd
 percentile or the 66
th
 percentile of 
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target overlap. Panel B in Table 2.6 displays the robustness test results for Hypotheses 2 and 3. 
The results are consistent with analysis II in that acquirer overlap does not significantly affect the 
impact that the target technological capabilities have on value creation at either split. This is not 
surprising since I found in analysis III that acquirer overlap only negatively affects the acquirer’s 
ability to extract value from the target’s technological capabilities when there is also high target 
overlap.  The results for Hypothesis 3 remain substantively robust.  Under all three splits, the 
value created from acquirer technological capabilities is higher when acquirer overlap is low. 
The difference is significant (p = 0.0181) when the sample is split at the 33
rd
 percentile of 
acquirer overlap and marginally insignificant when the sample is split at the 66
th
 percentile (p = 
0.109).  
 I also ran the analyses with abnormal returns using a 5-day event window, which 
provides the advantage of capturing any value change outside the 3-day event window due to 
information leakage at the cost of more opportunity for confounding events. The results using the 
5-day window are substantively the same as the 3-day window presented in the analyses above.  
 The hypotheses and results are summarized in Table 2.7. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study advances our understanding of the performance of technological acquisitions by 
incorporating the interaction of the level of technological overlap and the amount of 
technological capabilities possessed by the target and acquirer. In doing so, it makes four 
primary contributions. 
First, it theoretically and empirically advances the concept of technological overlap by 
showing that target overlap and acquirer overlap are separate constructs and need not be 
symmetric.  Doing so complements other work (Makri et al., 2010) that takes a more multi-
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dimensional view of technological overlap.  I submit that the idea of asymmetric knowledge 
overlap across partners is also applicable to alliances, extending insights generated by examining 
overlap as a symmetric attribute of an alliance (e.g., Mowery et al., 1996, 1998). 
Distinguishing target and acquirer overlap enables the paper’s second contribution, by 
simultaneously considering the impact of overlap (both target and acquirer) and technological 
capabilities (again, both target and acquirer) on acquisition performance.  This study is the first 
paper of which I am aware to do so.  One of the paper’s key insights, that target overlap and 
acquirer overlap have distinct effects on the acquirer’s ability to create value from combining the 
target’s and the acquirer’s technological capabilities, comes directly from this advance. 
The study’s third contribution is to broaden the theoretical explanation of value creation 
in technological acquisitions by simultaneously incorporating three drivers: the acquirer’s 
absorptive capacity, knowledge redundancy, and exposure to organizational disruption due to 
conflict between the acquirer’s and target’s knowledge workers. While individual papers have 
discussed each driver in isolation, the separate measures of target overlap and acquirer overlap 
allows me to be able to consider them simultaneously and thus isolate the impact of each.  Three 
useful insights flow from this contribution. 
The first insight comes from the finding that, when target overlap is high, knowledge 
redundancy decreases an acquirer’s ability to derive value from a target’s technological 
capabilities, but when target overlap is low, there does not seem to be negative impact from a 
lack of absorptive capacity.  This finding suggests that acquiring managers may be better able to 
recognize what they do not know than recognize what they know too well. Complementing 
Coff’s (2002) finding that potential acquirers are more likely to withdraw an acquisition when 
there is little knowledge overlap between the target and the acquirer, I expect management to 
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only follow through on acquisitions with foreseen synergies
6
.  However, in pursuit of those 
potential synergies, they may get tunnel vision and not recognize excessive knowledge 
redundancy and its potential value destroying effects. 
The second insight regards the precedents and consequences of conflict between 
knowledge workers of the acquirer and target.  High acquirer overlap has a negative effect on the 
acquirer’s ability to extract value from the target’s technological capabilities only when there is 
simultaneously high target overlap.  As target overlap decreases, the target’s knowledge workers 
bring greater amounts of new knowledge with them into the acquisition.  Although much of the 
acquirer’s knowledge is redundant, if it can be coupled with non-redundant knowledge from the 
target, the target’s knowledge workers have much to offer the acquirer allowing for synergy 
realization, which will provide an interactive productive working environment instead of one of 
conflict and competition. With increases in target overlap leading to less new knowledge brought 
in from the target, there is not as much room for complementarities and synergy realization. 
Without potential for complementarities between the two firms’ knowledge workers, the 
redundancies visibly emerge in the workplace leading to a more competitive, hostile 
environment. 
The third insight contrasts the effects of knowledge redundancy and conflict.  Knowledge 
redundancy from high target overlap reduces the value created from the target’s technological 
capabilities, but conflict caused by high acquirer overlap can actually lead to a loss of value from 
the acquirer’s own capabilities.  Indeed, calculating the combined effect of target and acquirer 
                                                            
6
 While I focused on absorptive capacity in building the hypotheses, information asymmetries is 
another line of theorizing for the effects of low target overlap. Following Coff (2002), low target 
overlap leads to greater information asymmetries.  In the context of value creation, the acquirer 
may be more likely to overvalue the target’s resource and capabilities leading to a negative 
impact on acquirer value creation as target overlap decreases. The results do not suggest that low 
target overlap leads to overpayment. 
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capabilities according to the results reported in Table 2.5 shows that, for an acquisition with 
mean levels of target and acquirer capabilities, the value lost from the acquirer’s technological 
capabilities exceeds the gains from the target’s technological capabilities when acquirer overlap 
is high (quadrants 2 and 4). For example, while the target’s technological capabilities coefficient 
is positive in quadrant 2 (low target overlap/high acquirer overlap), the negative impact that the 
acquirer’s capabilities possess destroys all value created by the target’s capabilities leading to 
value destruction on average. Consistent with Capron and Mitchell (2009), firms seem to be 
more efficient at acquiring technologies that are more dissimilar to their own as conflict arises if 
the firms possess similar technological capabilities.  Managers considering acquiring a company 
with knowledge overlapping much of their own must recognize that such acquisitions are not 
only unlikely to generate value, but they may also reduce the value of the acquirer’s pre-existing 
knowledge.  
The paper’s fourth contribution is to extend the literature on technological acquisitions by 
studying shareholder value creation as an outcome.  Although relatively neglected as a dependent 
variable (Graebner et al., 2010), shareholder value creation provides theoretical and managerial 
insights.  It is a direct measure of the degree to which the managers of the acquiring firm have 
accomplished their ultimate goal of generating shareholder value by acquiring small 
technological firms.  It complements studies of post-acquisition invention productivity, usually 
measured as patent counts (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Kapoor and Lim, 2007; 
Makri et al., 2010; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam and Srikanth, 2007).  In particular, it suggests 
that the low innovation quantity observed in acquisitions with low target overlap may conceal an 
offsetting increase in the novelty and quality of innovations generated in such acquisitions.  In 
this regard, it helps confirm Makri et al.’s (2010) finding that less quantity can be accompanied 
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with greater quality when lower similarity and greater complementarity exists between the 
acquirer and target. 
While the impact the capabilities of the target and acquirer have on shareholder value 
creation decreases as overlap increases, the differences in the intercepts of the subsamples 
suggest that overall value creation may be greater with greater levels of overlap. In Table 2.3 the 
intercept is significantly positive in both high target overlap and high acquirer overlap 
subsamples while both low overlap subsamples are significantly negative. In Table 2.4 the 
intercept is significantly positive for the subsample with both high target and high acquirer 
overlap while the other three subsample intercepts are not significantly different from zero. 
Therefore, there are probably other factors significantly impacting shareholder value creation in 
high overlap acquisitions that are beyond the scope of this chapter. This finding does create an 
interesting line of future enquiry as to why these high overlap acquisitions are creating greater 
overall value while the target and acquirer technological capabilities are negatively impacting 
shareholder value. 
I would like to highlight two areas I believe are particularly promising directions for 
future research.  First, differentiating acquisitions by their levels of target and acquirer overlap 
ties into the ongoing discussion of the motives for acquisition. Both Karim and Mitchell (2000) 
and Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) similarly identify two distinct motives for acquisitions. 
Karim and Mitchell (2000) refer to “resource extension” versus “resource deepening” while 
Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) refer to “economies of fitness” versus “economies of sameness”. 
Within this essay’s scheme, as represented by Figure 2.1, quadrant 1 (low target overlap/low 
acquirer overlap) represents the “resource extension” or “economies of fitness” motive. The 
acquiring firms are purchasing targets that possess many unique technological capabilities which 
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can extend (Karim and Mitchell, 2000) or complement (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999) their own 
capabilities. Quadrant 4 (high target overlap/high acquirer overlap) represents the “resource 
deepening” or “economies of sameness” motive. The acquiring firm purchases capabilities that it 
is not only quite familiar with but also make up a greater portion of its own capabilities. When I 
compare the value the acquirer is able to extract from the target’s and its own technological 
capabilities, I find that the target’s technological capabilities create significantly more value in 
quadrant 1 and the acquirer’s technological capabilities destroy significantly more value in 
quadrant 4.  This finding is consistent with Larsson and Finkelstein’s (1999) results in that an 
increase in the complementarity between the acquirer and target increased the probability of 
synergy realization. An interesting extension of Karim and Mitchell (2000) and Larsson and 
Finkelstein (1999) would be to identify the motives for the acquisitions taking place in quadrants 
2 and 3 of Figure 2.1. 
 The second area for future research would help address the primary limitation of the 
study.  While I was able to build upon a large theoretical literature and rich empirical findings in 
developing the hypotheses, I did not directly observe the underlying mechanisms.  Having 
established the relationship between overlap, capabilities and acquisition performance, I hope 
future work will examine its micro foundations.  In particular, it would be helpful to see how the 
levels of acquirer and target overlap influence the probability of employee departing from the 
target and, especially, the acquiring firm (cf. Karim, 2006). The same observation could be 
undertaken for asset divestitures at different levels of acquirer and target overlap.  
 In conclusion, I have shown that technological overlap in an acquisition is better thought 
of as two technological overlaps, one describing the knowledge set of the target firm and the 
other the knowledge set of the acquiring firm.  The two overlaps have distinct, but inter-related, 
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effects on the degree to which the acquirer creates—or destroys—value from its own 
technological capabilities and those of the target.  The findings suggest that the two overlaps 
drive value creation or destruction through distinct causal mechanisms: the creation of absorptive 
capacity, knowledge redundancy and the generation of post-acquisition disruption and conflict. 
These mechanisms have different theoretical implications and require different managerial 
responses, which this study has taken the initial steps to explore. I hope others will use this study 
as a foundation to expand on that exploration. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 





mean s.d. min max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. CAR -0.03 0.09 -0.34 0.23
2. Pre-1998 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.04
3. Post-2000 0.43 0.50 0 1.00 -0.11 -0.22
4. Transaction value (100 million) 5.11 8.06 0.50 56.58 -0.18 -0.07 -0.06
5. Pharma 0.37 0.49 0 1 -0.08 -0.20 0.15 0.04
6. % stock 0.66 0.45 0 1 -0.20 0.01 -0.34 0.20 0.00
7. Relative size (employees) -2.95 2.00 -7.32 0.95 -0.30 -0.18 0.07 0.09 -0.03 0.25
8. Relative size (knowledge bases) 0.58 2.40 0.00 22.90 0.24 -0.05 0.10 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.30
9. 4-firm concentration ratio 0.41 0.10 0.31 0.95 0.17 0.12 -0.14 -0.02 -0.43 -0.06 -0.02 -0.08
10. Acquisition experience 5.70 8.87 0 53 0.14 -0.04 -0.14 0.25 -0.19 0.07 -0.42 -0.10 0.23
11. Relative market share 0.06 0.09 0.0001 0.41 0.19 0.13 0.02 -0.12 0.02 -0.20 -0.73 -0.12 -0.09 0.18
12. Target technological overlap 0.17 0.24 0 1 0.02 -0.09 0.04 0.30 -0.01 -0.13 -0.06 -0.11 -0.01 0.17 0.05
13. Acquirer technological overlap 0.04 0.08 0 0.4 -0.05 -0.11 0.03 0.06 0.22 0.17 0.33 0.07 -0.15 -0.21 -0.25 0.26
14. Target technological capabilities 4.92 1.65 0.69 8.94 0.09 0.10 -0.13 0.11 0.04 0.03 -0.10 0.10 -0.23 0.06 0.24 0.19 0.15
15. Acquirer technological capabilities 7.15 2.25 0 10.43 0.00 0.14 -0.14 0.06 -0.19 -0.22 -0.59 -0.40 -0.04 0.37 0.47 0.23 -0.31 0.33
a
 Correlations equal to or greater than .20 are significant at the .05 level.
Variables
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Table 2.2. OLS regression analysis of complete sample 
 
Dependent variable = CAR (3-day window)
Target technological overlap 0.020 0.204 * 0.017 0.037 0.141
(0.57) (1.69) (0.50) (1.04) (1.08)
Acquirer technological overlap 0.051 0.042 0.941 *** 0.665 ** 0.715 **
(0.32) (0.28) (3.71) (2.59) (2.00)
Target technological capabilities 0.008 0.012 ** 0.011 ** 0.011 ** 0.014 **
(1.47) (2.14) (2.15) (2.11) (2.28)
Acquirer technological capabilities -0.011 ** -0.011 ** -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(2.02) (2.09) (1.61) (1.45) (1.57)
Target technological capabilities   x -0.037 * -0.023
            target technological overlap (1.67) (0.96)
Target technological capabilities   x -0.182 *** -0.064
            acquirer technological overlap (3.03) (0.32)
Acquirer technological capabilities   x -0.138 ** -0.081
            acquirer technological overlap (2.53) (0.53)
Transaction value (100 million) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.95) (0.89) (0.99) (1.02) (0.96)
Pharma -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011
(0.81) (0.71) (0.69) (0.65) (0.60)
% stock -0.035 ** -0.032 * -0.031 * -0.030 * -0.029 *
(2.17) (1.96) (1.98) (1.91) (1.81)
Relative size (employees) -0.025 *** -0.027 *** -0.021 *** -0.021 *** -0.022 ***
(3.74) (4.04) (3.25) (3.27) (3.34)
Relative size (knowledge bases) 0.011 *** 0.010 *** 0.010 *** 0.011 *** 0.010 ***
(5.84) (5.64) (5.70) (5.85) (5.55)
4-firm concentration ratio 0.124 0.128 0.145 0.145 0.146
(1.24) (1.27) (1.46) (1.46) (1.45)
Acquisition experience 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.11) (0.24) (0.12) (0.08) (0.07)
Relative market share -0.109 -0.136 -0.090 -0.100 -0.113
(1.13) (1.40) (0.94) (1.06) (1.16)
Pre-1998 -0.031 -0.031 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030
(1.11) (1.11) (1.00) (1.03) (1.02)
Post-2000 -0.031 * -0.031 * -0.023 -0.026 -0.025
(1.82) (1.82) (1.42) (1.59) (1.57)
Intercept -0.071 -0.097 -0.107 * -0.107 * -0.121 *
(1.09) (1.36) (1.72) (1.68) (1.75)
Observations 97 97 97 97 97
F-statistic 20.01 *** 14.47 *** 25.02 *** 24.26 *** 18.74 ***
R-squared 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(5)(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Dependent variable = CAR (3-day window) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Acquirer technological overlap 0.901 0.205
(1.29) (0.83)
Target technological overlap 0.078 0.057
(0.30) (1.59)
Target technological capabilities 0.016 ** -0.005 6.27 ** H1b 0.013 0.006 0.63 H2
(2.16) (0.73) (0.01) (1.43) (0.81) (0.43)
Acquirer technological capabilities -0.004 -0.020 * -0.004 -0.031 *** 8.25 *** H3
(0.68) (1.79) (0.60) (3.24) (0.00)
Transaction value (100 million) -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.35) (1.46) (0.65) (0.51)
Pharma 0.020 -0.063 * 0.025 -0.057 **
(0.68) (1.82) (0.63) (2.21)
% stock -0.039 * -0.018 -0.030 -0.019
(1.77) (0.72) (1.22) (0.75)
Relative size (employees) -0.032 *** -0.027 ** -0.027 ** -0.024 **
(2.91) (2.40) (2.23) (2.13)
Relative size (knowledge bases) 0.013 *** -0.050 0.013 *** -0.014
(4.19) (1.28) (3.55) (0.62)
4-firm concentration ratio 0.333 * -0.220 ** 0.317 * -0.191
(1.94) (2.09) (1.82) (1.51)
Acquisition experience -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003 ***
(0.48) (0.91) (0.43) (2.91)
Relative market share -0.355 -0.070 -0.309 0.051
(1.61) (0.71) (1.34) (0.46)
Pre-1998 0.044 -0.042 ** -0.008 -0.015
(1.03) (2.05) (0.19) (0.48)
Post-2000 -0.025 -0.048 * -0.024 -0.037 *
(1.05) (1.78) (0.97) (1.74)
Intercept -0.255 *** 0.223 ** -0.239 ** 0.201 **
(2.83) (2.14) (2.29) (2.22)
Observations 48 49 48 49
F-statistic 33.84 *** 2.97 *** 25.48 *** 8.79 ***
R-squared 0.47 0.42 0.43 0.42
Robust t statistics in parentheses; p-values in paretheses for chi-square statistics














Quadrant from Figure 1
Target overlap
Acquirer overlap
Dependent variable = CAR (3-day window)
Target technological capabilities 0.025 ** 0.025 0.008 -0.009
(2.25) (1.55) (0.79) (0.97)
Acquirer technological capabilities 0.007 -0.028 0.012 -0.034 **
(0.32) (1.42) (0.83) (2.94)
Transaction value (100 million) -0.003 0.001 -0.002 *** -0.003
(0.35) (0.60) (5.49) (1.15)
Pharma 0.070 -0.012 -0.006 -0.087
(0.88) (0.31) (0.28) (1.49)
% stock 0.043 0.022 -0.030 * -0.029
(0.30) (0.41) (2.02) (0.50)
Relative size (employees) -0.053 -0.012 -0.006 -0.029 *
(1.45) (0.79) (0.34) (1.92)
Relative size (knowledge bases) 0.020 -0.028 0.032 -0.017
(1.54) (0.71) (0.19) (0.21)
4-firm concentration ratio 0.574 -0.044 -0.148 -0.487 *
(1.43) (0.25) (0.69) (2.14)
Acquisition experience 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.004
(0.48) (0.25) (0.25) (1.43)
Relative market share -0.713 0.346 -0.370 -0.121
(0.83) (1.49) (1.06) (0.52)
Pre-1998 0.054 -0.040 -0.031
(0.99) (1.21) (1.18)
Post-2000 -0.018 -0.030 -0.035 -0.023
(0.29) (0.78) (1.42) (0.78)
Intercept -0.610 -0.009 -0.044 0.463 **
(1.25) (0.05) (0.50) (2.26)
Observations 25 24 24 24
F-statistic 10.62 *** 2.10 5.75 *** 6.96 ***
R-squared 0.58 0.40 0.55 0.61
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Low
—































































































chi-square = 3.06 
 
p-value = 0.0801 
chi-square = 7.04 
 




chi-square = 3.10 
 
p-value = 0.0783 
H3 
chi-square = 13.23 
 
p-value = 0.0003 
H2 
chi-square = 0.00 
 
p-value = 0.9913 
H2 
chi-square = 3.22 
 
p-value = 0.0729 
Q1 Q2 
Q3 Q4 
    * p < .10 
  ** p < .05 
*** p < .01 
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A. Robustness tests for Hypothesis 1
Wald test          
p -value
Low         
Target 
Overlap






33 64 0.33 0.0270 0.0052
48 49 median 0.0641 0.0123
64 33 0.66 0.1492 0.0167











33 64 0.33 0.0005 0.1014 0.0186
48 49 median 0.0034 0.4283 0.0241
64 33 0.66 0.0136 0.8903 0.1085
Sample size
Percentile        
of Split
Sample size
Percentile       
of Split
Wald test                                    
p -value
Sample Split at 
Target 
Overlap =   




Table 2.7. Summary of hypotheses and results. 
Hypotheses Analysis I Analysis II Analysis III 
Hypothesis 1a: An increase in target technological overlap will 
positively affect the impact the target’s technological capabilities 
will have on abnormal returns. 
Not supported Not supported Not supported 
Hypothesis 1b: An increase in target technological overlap will 
negatively affect the impact the target’s technological capabilities 
will have on abnormal returns. 
Supported Supported Supported 
Hypothesis 2: An increase in acquirer technological overlap will 
negatively affect the impact the target’s technological capabilities 
will have on abnormal returns. 
Supported Not supported 
Partial 
support 
Hypothesis 3: An increase in acquirer technological overlap will 
negatively affect the impact the acquirer’s technological capabilities 
will have on abnormal returns. 
Supported Supported Supported 
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A = Acquirer’s technological knowledge base;  
























































  TARGET    ACQUIRER 
44 
CHAPTER 3 
ESSAY 2: WHEN DO FIRMS BENEFIT FROM ACQUIRING EXTERNAL 
TECHNOLOGY? 
INTRODUCTION 
While technological acquisitions have recently become a much researched phenomenon among 
management scholars (for a review see Graebner et al., 2010), scholars have yet to take into 
account the different rationales for externally acquiring technology into their empirical analyses. 
Karim and Mitchell (2000) made an initial contribution to identifying rationales for technological 
acquisitions with their differentiation between resource extension and resource deepening 
acquisitions. While Karim and Mitchell (2000) and Karim (2006) show that acquiring firms 
execute post-acquisition reorganization differently with different acquisition rationales, current 
research still gives insufficient attention to rationales when investigating acquisition 
performance. 
 I submit that we must consider the rationale for the technological acquisition as the lack 
of differentiation can explain prior conflicting results on whether the target firm’s technological 
capabilities complement (e.g., Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Makri et al., 2010; Veugelers, 
1997) or substitute (e.g., Blonigen and Taylor, 2000; Hitt et al., 1990; King et al., 2008) the 
technological capabilities of the acquiring firm. I maintain that both findings are correct but 
require qualifications. The target firm’s and the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities either 
complement or substitute each other depending on the rationale for the acquisition. Karim (2006) 
finds evidence that how the acquiring firm redeploys, reorganizes, and divests the assets of the 
target firm and the acquiring firm depends on the rationale for the acquisition. The fact that 
different rationales entail different utilizations of the target firm’s and acquiring firm’s 
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capabilities means that empirically testing a sample of acquisitions with mixed rationales can 
lead to misleading results.  
To address this concern, I extend Karim and Mitchell’s (2000) resource extension and 
resource deepening rationales by identifying four general rationales for externally acquiring 
technology. While identifying specific rationales may not be feasible due to information 
availability, I submit that by looking at whether the acquiring firm is a technological leader or 
laggard and the degree of overlap between the technological knowledge of the target firm and the 
acquiring firm researchers can obtain a general understanding of the rationale driving the 
acquisition. I identify four general rationales from the literature and link these rationales to the 
acquiring firm’s technological capabilities and technological overlap: strategic renewal 
(technological laggard/low technological overlap), capability upgrading (technological laggard/ 
high technological overlap), capability diversification (technological leader/low technological 
overlap), and capability deepening (technological leader/high technological overlap).  
I further synthesize theory and develop hypotheses about the differential effects the 
technological capabilities of the target firm and acquiring firm have on acquisition performance 
depending on whether the acquirer is a technological leader or laggard and the amount of 
technological overlap present. I build hypotheses through a resource-based view with emphasis 
on the creation of novel resource recombinations (Galunic and Rodan, 1998; Kogut and Zander, 
1992). I conduct dual analyses of acquisition performance, linking increases in post-acquisition 
innovative performance with acquirer value creation. I find that the target firm’s technological 
capabilities have a greater positive impact on the creation of novel resource recombinations 
when there is less technological overlap between the target firm and the acquiring firm. I also 
find that the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities have an increasingly positive impact on 
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the creation of novel resource recombinations as the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities 
increase. Further, I find that the acquiring firm creates more shareholder value from the 
capabilities of the target firm and the acquiring firm when there is less technological overlap 
between the target firm and the acquiring firm and when the acquiring firm is a technological 
leader. Finally, and most importantly, I find that an acquiring firm must be technologically 
capable for shareholders to value the acquisition of external technology.  
 I make five primary contributions to the literature on technological acquisitions. First, I 
theoretically advance the conceptual understanding of technological acquisitions by identifying 
four different general rationales for externally acquiring technology. Second, I synthesize theory 
that explains when the technological capabilities brought into an acquisition create value for the 
acquiring firm by creating novel resource recombinations. Third, I show that the capabilities of 
the target firm and the acquiring firm can be either complementary (Larsson and Finkelstein, 
1999; Makri et al., 2010) or substitutive (King et al., 2008) depending on the rationale for the 
acquisition. By differentiating the rationales by the acquirer’s capabilities and target overlap, I 
show that the target firm’s and the acquiring firm’s capabilities are more complementary in 
acquisitions with characteristics suggesting a capability diversification rationale, but substitutive 
in other acquisitions especially those with characteristics suggesting a capability upgrading 
rationale. Fourth, I provide evidence that on average not all acquiring firms lose value from 
acquisitions as much of the prior literature reports. I find that it is only the technological laggards 
that destroy value for their shareholders when undertaking acquisitions. This aligns with recent 
findings that the diversification discount occurs because of technological laggards diversifying 
(Miller, 2004). Finally, I provide evidence linking the creation of novel resource recombinations 
and acquirer value creation supporting Barney’s (1988) argument that the acquiring firm can 
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only capture the value created from an acquisition when unique, inimitable synergistic cash 
flows exist.  
RATIONALES FOR TECHNOLOGICAL ACQUISITIONS 
Since research on technological acquisitions has garnered attention from various perspectives in 
the management literature (cf.  Graebner et al., 2010), the need to take a more in-depth account 
of the rationales for the external acquisition of technology arises. Unfortunately, researchers have 
yet to account for differences in rationales when studying the performance of technological 
acquisitions. I submit that there are underlying differences in the utilization of the target firm’s 
and the acquiring firm’s technological resources and capabilities among the different rationales 
that create differential performance implications.  
 To understand the differential performance implications for different rationales, we must 
first recognize the differences in the characteristics of the acquisitions. First, I account for the 
degree of overlap between the technological knowledge of the target firm and the acquiring firm. 
By accounting for the technological overlap, we understand whether the acquiring firm attempts 
to extend and diversify its current technological capabilities or rather deepen and strengthen its 
current technological capabilities (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Karim and Mitchell, 2000; 
Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999).  
Second, I account for whether the acquiring firm is a technological leader or laggard. By 
accounting for the acquiring firm’s technological leader/laggard status, we gain an understanding 
of not only the acquiring firm’s need to externally acquire new technological resources and 
capabilities but also the acquiring firm’s ability to benefit from combining the capabilities of the 
target firm with its own capabilities.  
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By simultaneously considering both the level of technological relatedness and whether 
the acquiring firm is a technological leader or laggard, I submit that researchers are better able to 
understand which of the four general rationales identified in the technological acquisitions 
literature is driving the acquisition: strategic renewal, capability upgrading, capability 
diversification, and capability deepening. Figure 3.1 gives a visual representation of where these 
four rationales occur relative to each other. As seen in Figure 3.1, I do not constrain the four 
rationales to their respective quadrants as I am not arguing that the rationales are mutually 
exclusive of each other.  
Strategic Renewal 
Strategic renewal as a rationale for acquiring new technology means that the acquiring firm not 
only aims to extend its current technological capabilities by acquiring a technologically 
dissimilar firm, but also aims to transform the firm’s core technological strategy through the use 
of the target firm’s technological capabilities. Agarwal and Helfat (2009: 282) define strategic 
renewal as follows: 
“Strategic renewal includes the process, content, and outcome of refreshment or 
replacement of attributes of an organization that have the potential to substantially affect 
its long-term prospects.” 
A key part of this definition for strategic renewal technological acquisitions is the, “replacement 
of attributes of an organization that have the potential to substantially affect its long-term 
prospects.” Therefore, strategic renewal driven acquisitions should derive more post-acquisition 
benefit from the target firm’s technological capabilities rather than from the acquiring firm’s 
technological capabilities. 
Strategic renewal acquisitions are likely to be characterized by technological dissimilarity 
between the target firm and acquiring firm and by the acquiring firm being a technological 
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laggard. Strategic renewal acquisitions are one of two types of acquisition rationales I discuss 
that falls within Karim and Mitchell’s (2000) ‘resource extension’ acquisitions.  
Capability Upgrading 
The rationale behind capability upgrading acquisitions is that the acquiring firm becomes unable 
to compete with its current technological capabilities and therefore acquires a target firm to 
upgrade its current technological capabilities. Though much of the acquisitions literature 
suggests that target firms are the ones who have their resources experimented with through 
reconfiguration and recombination (Capron et al., 1998; Capron et al., 2001; Capron and Pistre, 
2002; Karim, 2006), this is not always the case. Karim (2006) finds that acquiring firms 
reconfigure their own internal units into the newly acquired firm more often than previously 
thought. Karim (2006: 816) explains this finding as follows: 
“…an argument that is more likely and consistent with evoking radical change is that a 
firm is purposefully trying to change some of the practices of a poor performing 
internally developed unit. This assumes that the target possesses some routines or 
intangible assets that the acquiring firm would like to absorb and spread within its 
organization.” 
 
The capability upgrading rationale acquisitions are likely to be characterized by 
technological laggard acquiring firms that already possess a great amount of the target firms’ 
technological knowledge. Capability upgrading acquisitions are one of two types of rationales 
that I discuss that falls within Karim and Mitchell’s (2000) ‘resource deepening’ acquisitions.  
Capability Diversification 
Capability diversification acquisitions align best with the traditional ‘resource extension’ 
acquisitions (Karim and Mitchell, 2000) and the resource-based view of firm growth (Penrose, 
1959). Capability diversification acquisitions are likely characterized by technological leader 
acquiring firms that acquire technologically less related target firms. Technological leaders find 
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that they possess slack resources for which they can redeploy in new markets by combining their 
capabilities with those of the target firm.  
Capability diversification acquisitions create new opportunities for path breaking change 
as do strategic renewal acquisitions except firms conducting capability diversification 
acquisitions only plan to diversify into new technological domains and not completely overhaul 
their technological trajectory as with strategic renewal acquisitions. Therefore, capability 
diversification driven acquisitions should derive benefit from both the target firm’s and the 
acquiring firm’s technological capabilities. 
Capability Deepening 
Capability deepening acquisitions closely relate to Karim and Mitchell’s (2000) ‘resource 
deepening’ acquisitions. These acquisitions are likely characterized by technological leader 
acquiring firms that acquire technologically related firms. 
While both incumbents and startups strive to innovate, past research provides evidence 
that much of the truly novel innovations originate in startups (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; 
Pavitt et al., 1987). As a result, technological acquisitions have become a popular complement to 
internal innovation allowing firms to overcome the time compression diseconomies of internal 
innovation (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). For example, Cisco prefers to acquire technology through 
acquisition rather than through internal development when the development time exceeds six 
months (Aguilera and Dencker, 2004). Since the firms that undertake capability deepening 
acquisitions are already technology leaders in the same technological domain as the target firm, 




THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Technological acquisitions have the potential to create value through the recombination of the 
technological resources and capabilities of the target firm and the acquiring firm (Galunic and 
Rodan, 1998; Kogut and Zander, 1992). As far back as Schumpeter (1934) and Penrose (1959), 
recombinations of resources and capabilities have been the foundation of innovation. More 
recent research provides evidence that the pursuit of novel recombinations is the driving force 
that motivates many technological acquisitions (Karim and Mitchell, 2000; Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999). In addition Barney (1988) maintains that the ability of the acquiring firm to 
capture value created from an acquisition depends on its ability to create novel resource 
recombinations. Therefore, I use a resource-based lens to analyze the acquiring firm’s ability to 
create shareholder value by creating novel recombinations of the target firm’s and the acquiring 
firm’s technological resources and capabilities. The theoretical model underlying the hypotheses 
can be found in Figure 3.2. 
 In building the hypotheses from the theoretical model, I create hypotheses that are split 
into two analyses. The first pertains to how the two drivers, technological overlap and the 
acquiring firm’s technological capabilities, affect the ability of the acquiring firm to create novel 
resource recombinations (percentage change in post-acquisition patenting intensity) using the 
target firm’s and the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities. The second recognizes that the 
four general rationales are characterized by different make-ups of the two drivers, and, therefore, 
I hypothesize about differential acquirer value creation from the technological capabilities of the 





Technological overlap signals the amount of potential novel resource recombinations possible 
from the pooling of the target firm’s and the acquiring firm’s technological resources. Each 
acquisition contains a given set of possible novel resource recombinations. As the overlap 
between the technological resources of the target firm and the acquiring firm increases, the 
number of novel recombinations possible in that particular acquisition’s set decreases. Therefore, 
if we compare two different acquisitions with identical quantities of technological resources in 
the two target firms and the two acquiring firms but with different levels of technological 
overlap, the acquisition with less technological overlap will possess a greater number of novel 
resource recombinations in its set. Further, the technological capabilities of the target firm and 
the acquiring firm will have a greater impact on creating resource recombinations as 
technological overlap decreases as there will be more opportunities for the post-acquisition firm 
to capitalize on the technological capabilities. This leads to the first set of hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Given that the acquiring firm is a technological laggard, the target firm’s 
technological capabilities will possess a greater impact on the percentage change in 
post-acquisition patenting intensity when there is less technological overlap.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: Given that the acquiring firm is a technological leader, the target firm’s 
technological capabilities will possess a greater impact on the percentage change in 
post-acquisition patenting intensity when there is less technological overlap. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Given that the acquiring firm is a technological laggard, the acquiring 
firm’s technological capabilities will possess a greater impact on the percentage change 
in post-acquisition patenting intensity when there is less technological overlap. 
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Hypothesis 1d: Given that the acquiring firm is a technological leader, the acquiring 
firm’s technological capabilities will possess a greater impact on the percentage change 
in post-acquisition patenting intensity when there is less technological overlap. 
 
At the same time, we must also consider the technological capabilities of the acquiring 
firm as not all firms possess equal ability to create novel resource recombinations. As the 
technological capabilities of the acquiring firm increases, we should also expect an increase in 
the creation of novel recombinations from the set of possible novel resource recombinations in 
that particular acquisition. Acquiring firms with greater technological capabilities have greater 
realized absorptive capacity enabling them to better transform and exploit the acquired 
knowledge of the target firm with its own (Zahra and George, 2002). This leads to the second set 
of hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Given low technological overlap, the target firm’s technological 
capabilities will possess a greater impact on the percentage change in post-acquisition 
patenting intensity when the acquiring firm is a technological leader rather than a 
laggard. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Given high technological overlap, the target firm’s technological 
capabilities will possess a greater impact on the percentage change in post-acquisition 
patenting intensity when the acquiring firm is a technological leader rather than a 
laggard. 
 
Hypothesis 2c: Given low technological overlap, the acquiring firm’s technological 
capabilities will possess a greater impact on the percentage change in post-acquisition 
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patenting intensity when the acquiring firm is a technological leader rather than a 
laggard. 
 
Hypothesis 2d: Given high technological overlap, the acquiring firm’s technological 
capabilities will possess a greater impact on the percentage change in post-acquisition 




I now address how technological overlap and the technological leader/laggard status of the 
acquiring firm gives us an understanding of how differential novel resource recombination 
creation among the four general rationales leads to differential value creation. Following 
Barney’s (1988) logic, the potential for resource recombination creation should contribute to 
differential value creation since the ability of the acquiring firm to capture value in an acquisition 
depends on its ability to create unique, inimitable future cash flows. 
Due to less overlap between the technological knowledge of the target firm and the 
acquiring firm, both strategic renewal and capability diversification rationales have greater 
resource recombination possibilities than capability upgrading and capability deepening 
rationales. The technological capabilities should create more value in capability diversification 
acquisitions compared to the capability deepening acquisition due to the potential for truly novel 
and high quality innovations from the recombination of the complementary resources (Makri et 
al., 2010).  
With strategic renewal acquisitions, the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities are not 
nullified or discarded, but redirected towards a new technological trajectory. The acquisition of a 
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firm that possesses technological knowledge not present in the acquiring firm’s knowledge base 
jumpstarts the acquiring firm’s capabilities which allows it to compete in the new technological 
domain. When considering the post-acquisition cooperation of knowledge workers in 
technological laggard firms, conflict and productivity loss may be more prevalent in capability 
upgrading driven acquisitions since there will be less possibilities for creating complementarities 
due to the high technological overlap (Paruchuri et al., 2006; Sears and Hoetker, 2012). 
Therefore, I expect the technological capabilities to create more value in strategic renewal 
acquisitions compared to capability upgrading acquisitions.  
Since both technological overlap and the technological capabilities of the acquiring firm 
affect the creation of novel resource recombinations, I separately test the effect that technological 
overlap possesses when the acquiring firms are technological laggards and when the acquiring 
firms are technological leaders. This allows me to be able to isolate the effect that technological 
overlap has on the ability of the acquiring firm to create shareholder value from the target firm’s 
and its own technological capabilities. This leads to the third set of hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Given that the acquiring firm is a technological laggard, the target firm’s 
technological capabilities will create more shareholder value for the acquiring firm on 
average when there is less technological overlap. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Given that the acquiring firm is a technological leader, the target firm’s 
technological capabilities will create more shareholder value for the acquiring firm on 
average when there is less technological overlap. 
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Hypothesis 3c: Given that the acquiring firm is a technological laggard, the acquiring 
firm’s technological capabilities will create more shareholder value for the acquiring 
firm on average when there is less technological overlap. 
 
Hypothesis 3d: Given that the acquiring firm is a technological leader, the acquiring 
firm’s technological capabilities will create more shareholder value for the acquiring 
firm on average when there is less technological overlap. 
 
Due to the greater technological capabilities of the acquiring firm, both capability 
diversification and capability deepening rationales have greater potential to actually create novel 
resource recombinations from their given set of resource recombination possibilities compared to 
capability upgrading and capability deepening rationales. For example, if we could hold the 
number of resource recombinations possible in an acquisition’s set of possible recombinations 
constant, we would expect the number of resource recombinations actually created to increase 
with increases in the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities. Therefore, ceteris paribus, 
increases in the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities should increase the value derived 
from the target firm’s and the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities. 
Differentiating among the value creation in the four rationales goes beyond the size of the 
of the recombination sets. ‘Replacement’ of particular routines, resources, and/or capabilities 
motivate strategic renewal driven acquisitions (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009). The technological 
capabilities should then create more value in capability diversification acquisitions compared to 
the strategic renewal acquisitions since much of the prior strategic importance of the acquiring 
firm’s technological capabilities will become less relevant post-acquisition in strategic renewal 
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acquisitions. On the other hand, capability diversification acquisitions create value from 
integrating the capabilities of both the target firm and the acquiring firm. 
Capability upgrading acquisitions will also face difficulties creating value from 
recombining the resources of the target firm and acquiring firm. Potential conflict (Paruchuri et 
al., 2006; Sears and Hoetker, 2012) and routine disruptions (Puranam and Srikanth, 2007) will 
further disadvantage capability upgrading acquisitions compared to capability deepening. 
Therefore, I predict that the technological capabilities of the target firm and the acquiring firm 
will create more value in capability deepening acquisitions compared to capability upgrading 
acquisitions.  
In developing the second set of hypotheses, I separately test the effect that the 
technological leader/laggard status possesses when there are low levels of technological overlap 
and when there are high levels of technological overlap. This allows me to be able to isolate the 
effect the technological leader/laggard status of the acquiring firm has on its ability  to create 
shareholder value from the target firm’s and its own technological capabilities. This leads to the 
fourth set of hypotheses:   
 
Hypothesis 4a: Given low technological overlap, the target firm’s technological 
capabilities will create more shareholder value for the acquiring firm on average when 
the acquiring firm is a technological leader rather than a laggard. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Given high technological overlap, the target firm’s technological 
capabilities will create more shareholder value for the acquiring firm on average when 
the acquiring firm is a technological leader rather than a laggard. 
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Hypothesis 4c: Given low technological overlap, the acquiring firm’s technological 
capabilities will create more shareholder value for the acquiring firm on average when 
the acquiring firm is a technological leader rather than a laggard. 
 
Hypothesis 4d: Given high technological overlap, the acquiring firm’s technological 
capabilities will create more shareholder value for the acquiring firm on average when 
the acquiring firm is a technological leader rather than a laggard. 
 
By incorporating the previous two sets of hypotheses, I expect acquisitions that possess 
characteristics that suggest a capability diversifying acquisitions to create the most value. 
Capability diversifying acquisitions benefit more from possessing greater potential for novel 
resource recombinations compared to capability upgrading and capability deepening acquisitions 
due to less technological overlap. Capability diversifying acquisitions also benefit more from a 
greater ability to identify and create novel recombinations from their given set of potential 
recombinations compared to strategic renewal acquisitions due to the acquiring firm being a 
technological leader. Capability diversifying acquisitions should also be less susceptible to 
conflict between the knowledge workers of the target firm and acquiring firm as each brings their 
own unique capabilities to the post-acquisition firm. Therefore, the acquiring firm should be able 
to benefit from both the target firm’s capabilities and its capabilities.  
According to Barney’s (1988) conditions for the acquiring firm to appropriate value, 
capability diversification acquisitions should create the most value. With both strategic renewal 
and capability upgrading rationales, the acquiring firm does not possess the technological 
capabilities needed to create unique recombinations that allow it to appropriate value. With 
capability deepening acquisitions, the target firm and acquiring firm do not possess resources 
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different enough to be able to create unique recombinations. This leads to bidding wars for the 
target firm where the target firm ends up capturing most of the synergistic value created. This 
leads to the fifth set of hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 5a: Acquisitions characterized by simultaneous low technological overlap 
and the acquirer being a technological leader will create the most amount of value when 
summing the value created from both the target firm’s technological capabilities and the 
acquiring firm’s technological capabilities. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: Acquisitions characterized by simultaneous low technological overlap 
and the acquirer being a technological leader will create the greatest amount of overall 
value appropriated by the acquiring firm. 
 
I expect capability upgrading acquisitions to create the least amount of value or more 
likely destroy the most amount of value as research has consistently shown that acquiring firms 
lose value on average in acquisitions. Capability upgrading acquisitions not only have a smaller 
given set of recombination possibilities due to greater technological overlap but also consist of 
technological laggard acquiring firms that are less able to identify and create novel resource 
recombinations. As these acquiring firms have been unable to develop sufficient technological 
capabilities internally in the past, shareholders will have little reason to believe they will 
successfully manage the target firm’s technological resources and capabilities. Given Barney’s 
(1988) argument, any technological synergistic value to be created in capability upgrading 




Hypothesis 6a: Acquisitions characterized by simultaneous high technological overlap 
and the acquirer being a technological laggard will create the least amount of value 
when summing the value created from both the target firm’s technological capabilities 
and the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities. 
 
Hypothesis 6b: Acquisitions characterized by simultaneous high technological overlap 
and the acquirer being a technological laggard will create the least amount of overall 
value appropriated by the acquiring firm. 
 
METHODS 
Data and Sample 
The analysis consists of two parts: patenting intensity and value creation using cumulative 
abnormal returns. Since constructing cumulative abnormal returns requires additional constraints 
compared to constructing patenting variables, the sample for the analysis of abnormal returns is a 
subset of the full sample used for testing effects on patenting intensity. 
The sample consists of technological acquisitions obtained from SDC Platinum’s 
Mergers & Acquisitions database from 1994 to 2004. The year 1994 is the first year that an 
acquisition appears in the SDC database after implementing all constraints while I chose 2004 as 
the end date to allow for the construction of the patenting intensity dependent variable. The 
acquisitions are initially identified as technological acquisitions if both the acquiring firm and 
target firm are classified as ‘high tech’ firms in SDC Platinum’s M&A database.  
 I further took the following steps to create the sample. I limited the sample to firms listed 
as manufacturing firms by SIC codes 20-39 to allow for comparisons with previous 
technological acquisition research (Puranam et al., 2009; Puranam et al., 2006; Puranam and 
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Srikanth, 2007). I limited the acquisitions to those where the target firm had less than 500 
employees at the time of the acquisition. This criterion is both consistent with the U.S. Small 
Business Administration definition of a small business and with prior studies on technological 
acquisitions (Granstrand and Sjolander, 1990; Puranam et al., 2009; Puranam et al., 2006; 
Puranam and Srikanth, 2007). This also allows for me to be more confident that market power 
did not motivate the acquisition. I also eliminated partial acquisitions and acquisitions of target 
firms for which the acquiring firm already owns a stake. To ensure that all of the acquisitions are 
technological in nature, I searched news articles and newswires using LexisNexis and eliminated 
acquisitions that were clearly not technological in nature (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). I also 
eliminated all acquisitions where the target firm does not possess any patents to allow for the 
independent variable construction. The final sample for the patenting intensity analysis consists 
of 246 acquisitions. 
I further filtered the sample for the analysis using cumulative abnormal returns. I 
removed divestitures to eliminate any effect on the firms’ returns due to greater negotiation 
power by the target firm’s parent. I eliminated any acquisition where there was a confounding 
event (public announcement) surrounding the event window. Lastly, I limited the sample to deals 
greater than $50 million since small deals may have no effect on the acquiring firm’s share price. 
After filtering the original sample of firms, I was left with a final sample consisting of 97 
acquisitions. 
Dependent Variables 
Percentage change in patenting intensity. I constructed the variable, percentage change in 
patenting intensity, to measure the percentage change in novel resource recombination creation 
from the pre-acquisition period to the post-acquisition period. I calculate this variable by 
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subtracting the count of patents applied for and later granted by the target firm and the acquiring 
firm combined in the three-year window prior to the acquisition from the count of patents 
applied for and later granted by the post-acquisition firm in the three-year window following the 
acquisition. I then divided this number by the count of the number of patents applied for and 
granted by the target firm and acquiring firm combined in the three-year window prior to the 
acquisition. The formula is as follows: 
Percentage change in patenting intensity  
(       )
    
⁄    (1) 
Acquirer cumulative abnormal returns. To measure value creation, I used the event study 
method to construct the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of the acquiring firms, that is, the 
acquiring firm’s stock market reaction to the announcement of the acquisition (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 1997). I used daily acquiring firm returns and equally-weighted market returns, which I 
obtained from the CRSP database. I used equally-weighted market returns since they possess a 
greater degree of correlation with security returns than value-weighted returns, which creates 
more precise estimators allowing for enhanced detection of abnormal returns (Peterson, 1989). I 
used an estimation window of 250 days from 51 days prior to the announcement to 300 days 
prior. I used an event window from one day prior to the announcement to one day after. The 
three day window allows for differences in the timing of the announcement and the release of the 
announcement in the press (Peterson, 1989). To ensure no confounding events, I searched 
LexisNexis for every acquiring firm and eliminated any acquisitions for which there was a 
confounding event within a five day event window. I used Scholes-Williams coefficients to 
calculate the CARs which corrects for the bias created from thin and nonsynchronous security 
trading (Scholes and Williams, 1977). The complete method implemented in calculating 
acquiring firm CAR can be found in Appendix A. 
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Independent Variables 
Technological capabilities. For technological capabilities, I constructed the variables, acquirer 
technological capabilities and target technological capabilities. I constructed these variables as 
citation weighted patent counts of the seven years prior to the acquisition announcement 
following Trajtenberg (1990). A citation weighted patent count is an appropriate measure for 
technological capabilities as the count not only takes into account the firm’s ability to innovate 
but also accounts for the quality of the innovations by incorporating the number of forward 
citations of each patent. I measured the technological capabilities as follows: 
Technological capabilities ∑ (∑ (     )
   
   ) 
 
       (2) 
where 
       
 
Cil = the number of forward citations received by patent l for firm i, 
        
 
nit = the number of patents issued during year t for firm i. 
I dated the patent counts by their application date which controls for differences among 
the patents in the time from application to granting (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1996; Trajtenberg, 1990). I chose seven years to be confident that I captured most of 
the innovative technologies that represent the current technological capabilities at the time of the 
acquisition as Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) found that citations dramatically 
decrease seven years after the application date. As a robustness check, I constructed variables for 
the firms’ cumulative prior five years and a total accumulation of prior patents. The seven-year 
accumulation has a correlation of 0.959 with the five-year accumulation and a 0.909 with the 
total accumulation for the target firms. The seven-year accumulation has a correlation of 0.986 
with the five-year accumulation and a 0.9603 with the total accumulation for the acquiring firms. 
With the high correlations between the five- and seven-year accumulations, I used the seven-year 
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accumulation to be more conservative in making sure I captured all relevant unique 
technological capabilities. 
For technological overlap, I constructed the variable, target technological overlap, which 
represents the percentage of the target firm’s knowledge base that the acquiring firm possesses in 
its knowledge base. I constructed the knowledge bases in line with Ahuja and Katila (2001). A 
firm’s knowledge base is a count of the number of unique elements of knowledge where I 
defined an element of knowledge as either a firm’s patent or a patent cited by one of the firm’s 
patents. By aggregating these elements of knowledge and eliminating all duplicates, I arrived at a 
firm’s knowledge base. In constructing the knowledge bases, I included patents with an 
application date in the seven years prior to the acquisition announcement. A seven-year window 
allows me to be confident that I captured the knowledge that the firms possessed that were still 
relevant at the time of the acquisition (Jaffe et al., 1993). 
 
Control Variables 
I constructed the variable, acquirer technological overlap, following the method outlined above 
for target technological overlap except that I measured the proportion of the acquiring firm’s 
knowledge base that is a part of the target firm’s knowledge base instead of the proportion of the 
target firm’s technological knowledge base that is a part of the acquiring firm’s knowledge base. 
Sears and Hoetker (2012) showed that technological overlap can be asymmetric and that target 
overlap and acquirer overlap can affect acquisition performance differently.  
I constructed the variable acquisition experience. Acquisition experience has been found 
to create benefits (Bruton et al., 1994; Fowler and Schmidt, 1989; Zollo and Singh, 2004), to 
create a burden (Kusewitt Jr, 1985), and to have no effect (King et al., 2004; Lahey and Conn, 
1990). Acquisition experience counts the number of acquisitions the acquiring firm completed in 
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the five years prior to the acquisition. I limited the acquisition experience to five years due to 
empirical evidence that has shown depreciation in the knowledge gained from managerial 
experience (Sampson, 2005).  
I included three variables that control for the size of the acquisition. I constructed the 
variable relative size (employees) as the log of the relative size of the target firm to acquiring 
firm in terms of their number of employees. I also construct the variable relative size (knowledge 
bases) which is the number of knowledge elements in the target firm’s knowledge base divided 
by the number of elements in the acquiring firm’s knowledge base.  
I controlled for the industry of the acquisitions. I created dummy variables for each 
industry at the 2-digit SIC level for the analysis on patenting intensity. For the analysis on CAR, 
instead of including all dummy variables, I only included the variable pharma which is a dummy 
variable for acquisitions in the biotech/pharmaceutical industry. I only included the pharma 
dummy for the following reasons. First, the analysis on CAR suffered the limitation of small 
sample sizes. By only including the pharma variable, I was able to minimize the number of 
degrees of freedom used. Second, the sole use of pharma was sufficient for the analysis as the 
other industry dummies were not statistically significant. 
I further included four control variables exclusively for the analysis on CAR. First, I 
included the variable % of stock which measures the percent of the transaction that was paid for 
with acquirer stock. Second, I constructed the variable relative market share to control for 
market dominance of the acquiring firm. Third, I construct an acquiring firm four-firm industry 
concentration ratio at the SIC 3-digit classification level using Compustat called 4-firm 
concentration ratio. I also included the variable transaction value which is the value of the 
acquisition scaled to 100 million. Transaction value provided two control benefits. First, it 
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provided a control for the overall size in value of the acquisition. Second, it was able to partially 
control for the abnormal returns being driven by overpayment since including premium paid 
would eliminate too many acquisitions from the sample due to missing data. 
Finally, for the patenting analysis, I included the variable pre-acquisition patenting.  This 
variable controlled for the quantity in patenting activity of the two merging firms as this will 
affect the quantity of post-acquisition patenting necessary to create a significant percentage 
change. The variable is calculated as a count of the patents applied for in the immediate three 
years prior to the acquisition by the target firm and the acquiring firm combined that were 
eventually granted. 
Methods of Analyses 
To test the hypotheses for both percentage change in patenting intensity and value creation, I 
split the sample into four subsamples by the level of target technological overlap and the 
acquirer’s technological capabilities. For the change in patenting subsamples, I split the sample 
into four subsamples including the 50 most extreme acquisitions for each subsample. This allows 
there to be less of an arbitrary split as no acquisition would switch to a different subsample by a 
minimal change of value in where I choose to split the sample. That means that there is a buffer 
of acquisitions in between the four subsamples in the patenting analysis. For the cumulative 
abnormal returns subsamples, I split the full sample at the median of acquirer technological 
capabilities to distinguish between leaders and laggards and then I split the sample at target 
technological overlap. By splitting the sample into these four subsamples, I am able to test for 
differences in abnormal returns among the subsamples which tests Hypotheses 5b and 6b. I also 
run OLS regressions for each of the subsamples. To test for differences in the impact of the 
target’s and the acquirer’s technological capabilities on the percentage change in patenting 
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intensity, I run Wald tests on significant differences in the coefficients of the four subsample 
OLS results which tests Hypotheses 1 and  2. To test for differences in value contributed by the 
capabilities among the four subsamples, I multiply the values of the target and acquirer 
capabilities variables by their respective coefficients from the four separate regressions. I then 
calculate the average value contributed by the target’s capabilities and by the acquirer’s 
capabilities for each of the four subsamples. I then test for differences in the average value 
contributed by the target’s and the acquirer’s technological capabilities among the four 
subsamples which tests Hypotheses 3 and 4. To test Hypotheses 5a and 6a, I use a Wald test to 
test for significant differences in the sum of value created by both the target’s and the acquirer’s 
technological capabilities. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 contains the descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables. Panel A contains the 
variables used in the analysis of patenting intensity. Panel B contains the variables used in the 
analysis of CAR. From looking at the correlations for the patenting analysis, there are three 
correlations that are above 0.50 which includes relative size (employees) with acquirer 
technological capabilities and acquirer technological capabilities with pre-acquisition patenting 
intensity, and relative size (employees) with pre-acquisition patenting intensity. For the CAR 
analysis, there are also two correlations that are above 0.50 which include both relative market 
share and acquirer technological capabilities with relative size (employees). I ran variance 
inflation factor (VIF) analyses on all the models and none of the variables have VIFs high 
enough to create concern. I also did not find that the coefficients jumped around with changes in 
model specifications which signals multicollinearity (Echambadi and Hess, 2007). Therefore, I 
am confident that multicollinearity did not significantly affect the results. 
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 The mean relative size (knowledge bases) is 0.55 (0.58) for the patenting (CAR) analysis 
which shows that on average the knowledge base of the target firm is 55% (58%) of the size of 
the acquiring firm. The non-logged mean relative size (employees) is 0.40 (0.22) for the 
patenting (CAR) analysis which shows that on average the target firm is about 40% (22%) of the 
size of the acquiring firm (by number of employees). The capabilities sizes are consistent with 
the relative sizes. Target technological capabilities have a mean and standard deviation that is 
less than the acquiring firms’ in both the full sample and the value creation sample. The 
correlation between target firm and acquiring firm technological capabilities is 0.24 in Panel A 
and 0.33 in Panel B which indicates that the acquiring firm possesses a greater amount of 
technological capabilities in most acquisitions. The mean target technological overlap is 0.16 in 
Panel A and 0.17 in Panel B while the medians are approximately 0.05 for the data in Panel A 
and 0.06 for the data in Panel B. 
RESULTS 
Patenting Intensity Analysis 
Table 3.2 presents the regression results for the four patenting subsamples. Panel A and Panel B 
in Table 3.4 present the results of the Wald tests on the significant differences among the 
capabilities coefficients. 
 Panel A of Table 3.4 displays the impacts that the target’s technological capabilities have 
on the percentage change in patenting intensity. The high overlap/laggard coefficient is negative 
and the only coefficient that is significantly different from zero. Comparing the impacts, the high 
overlap/laggard subsample is also significantly less than the low overlap/laggard subsample and 
the high overlap/leader subsample. This provides support for Hypotheses 1a and 2b.  
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The low overlap/laggard subsample coefficient is marginally significantly greater than 
the low overlap/leader coefficient (p = 0.101). While the directions is opposite of what I 
hypothesize, the logic for why the low overlap/laggard subsample is greater provides support for 
the typology. Strategic renewal acquisitions rely greatly on the knowledge of the target firm for 
its new strategic direction while capability diversification acquisitions utilize the target’s 
knowledge as part of a peripheral strategy. Therefore, the target should have a significantly 
greater impact on post-acquisition innovation in strategic renewal acquisitions compared to 
capability diversification acquisitions. 
 Panel B of Table 3.4 displays the impacts that the acquirer’s technological capabilities 
have on the percentage change in patenting intensity. The low overlap/laggard subsample is 
significantly less than the other three subsamples. This provides support for Hypothesis 2c, but 
runs contrary to Hypothesis 1c. With strategic renewal acquisitions relying more heavily on the 
target’s knowledge rather than the acquirer’s knowledge, it is not too unexpected for the low 
overlap/laggard subsample coefficient to have a weaker impact on post-acquisition invention 
compared to the high overlap/laggard subsample.  
 The capabilities of the acquirers have the greatest impact on the percentage change in 
patenting intensity when the acquirer is a technological leader. The coefficient is only 
significantly greater than zero for the high overlap/leader subsample. Further, the high 
overlap/leader coefficient is marginally significantly greater than the high overlap/laggard 
subsample (p = 0.161). 
Value Creation Analysis 
The value creation analysis investigates the differential value creation by the target firm’s and 
the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities. Table 3.3 presents the regression results for the 
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four subsamples. Table 3.4 presents the results for the Hypotheses 3a-3d, 4a-4d, 5a, 5b, 6a, and 
6b.  
 Panel C of Table 3.4 displays the value created from the target firm’s technological 
capabilities. The target firm’s technological capabilities create more value when there is low 
technological overlap between the target firm and the acquiring firm. This result holds for both 
technological leaders and technological laggards. Therefore, Hypotheses 3a and 3b are both 
supported.  
Contrary to Hypotheses 4a and 4b, the target firm’s technological capabilities create more 
value when the acquiring firm is a technological laggard. This result holds for both low and high 
levels of technological overlap. Though these results are contrary to Hypotheses 4a and 4b, they 
do lend support to the proper identification of the general rationales. Since the target firm’s 
technological capabilities will play a much greater role of importance in the future success of the 
technological laggard acquiring firms, it is not too surprising that shareholders value the target 
firm’s capabilities more in acquisitions with characteristics suggesting strategic renewal and 
capability upgrading rationales. 
 Panel D of Table 3.4 displays the value created from the acquiring firm’s technological 
capabilities. Similar to the target firm’s technological capabilities, the acquiring firm’s 
capabilities also create more value when there is less technological overlap. This holds true for 
both technological leaders and laggards. Therefore, both Hypotheses 3c and 3d are supported. 
Supporting Hypotheses 4c and 4d, the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities create more 
value when the acquiring firm is a technological leader. This finding holds true with both low 
and high levels of technological overlap. 
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 Panel E of Table 3.4 displays the results for value creation from combining the target 
firm’s and the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities. As creating technological synergies 
motivate many technological acquisitions, testing for differences in value creation from both the 
target firm’s and the acquiring firm’s capabilities combined indicates which rationales may 
benefit more from technological synergies. The low overlap/leader subsample acquisitions create 
the most value from combining the target firm’s and the acquiring firm’s technological 
capabilities while the high overlap/laggard subsample acquisitions create the least amount of 
value and actually destroy value. These results provide support for Hypotheses 5a and 6a. The 
value created from the combined technological capabilities in the low overlap/laggard and high 
overlap/leader subsamples were not significantly different from each other. 
 Panel F of Table 3.4 displays the results for the tests of significant differences in acquirer 
cumulative abnormal returns. While the low overlap/leader subsample has the greatest abnormal 
return, it is only significantly greater than the high overlap/laggard subsample, which provides 
partial support for Hypothesis 5b. While the high overlap/laggard subsample has the lowest 
abnormal return, it is only significantly less than the low overlap/leader and high overlap/leader 
subsamples which provides strong partial support for Hypothesis 6b. An interesting finding is 
that both laggard subsamples significantly lose value while both leader subsamples do not 
significantly lose or create value. Therefore, the results show that on average only technological 
laggards destroy value when acquiring technology on the external market. 
 Table 3.5 presents a summary of the hypotheses and results. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This research study maintains that there are four main rationales for acquiring external 
technology and that the rationales have different implications for novel resource recombination 
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creation and therefore, acquirer shareholder value creation. I submit that by taking into account 
whether the acquirer is a technological leader or laggard and how technologically related the 
target is to the acquirer, we gain an understanding of the rationale for the acquisition and the 
performance implications. 
The analysis of differential impacts on novel resource recombination creation from the 
capabilities of the target and acquirer does not provide as clear a picture as does the value 
creation analysis, but the analysis does provide some evidence of differences. The patenting 
intensity variable points toward the target’s technological capabilities possessing a greater 
impact when the rationale is for strategic renewal or capability deepening. The target firm will 
possess greater influence in the strategic renewal acquisitions while the acquiring firm is better 
able to use the target’s knowledge in new knowledge creation in capability deepening 
acquisitions since the target firm is quite similar to the acquiring firm and the acquirer possess 
great knowledge creation capabilities. 
 The results of the acquirer’s technological capabilities impact on patenting intensity are 
much clearer. As hypothesized, the results show that technological leaders are better able to 
create novel resource recombinations using their own technological capabilities following an 
acquisition. An interesting finding is that while the low overlap/laggard subsample created some 
of the greatest benefit from the target’s technological capabilities the acquirer’s technological 
capabilities hindered the creation of novel resource recombinations. This is consistent with what 
we would expect from strategic renewal acquisitions. They discard the old while leaning on the 
new. 
 The analysis of differential value contribution gives a clear picture of when the target’s 
technological capabilities create more value. The target’s technological capabilities create more 
73 
value when they are less technologically related to the acquirer’s capabilities. These results align 
with the literature on resource recombinations (Galunic and Rodan, 1998; Kogut and Zander, 
1992) and innovative complementarities (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Makri et al., 2010). An 
interesting finding is that only in the low overlap/leader subsample are the target coefficients 
positive. This indicates that investors do not value externally acquiring technology when there is 
a high degree of technological relatedness between the target and acquirer. The market possibly 
foresees integration complications between the knowledge workers of the target and the acquirer 
in resource deepening acquisitions as Capron and Mitchell (2009) find acquisitions are less 
successful with greater similarities in technology.  
 The results for value contribution from the acquirer’s technological capabilities also 
contribute to our understanding in which rationales the acquirer’s capabilities contribute more 
value. The empirical results show that only technology leaders create value from their own 
technological capabilities in an acquisition. Both strategic renewal and capability upgrading 
rationales entail acquiring new technological capabilities that will play a major role in the post-
acquisition firm. Therefore, the market discounts the acquirer’s technological capabilities when 
technological laggards acquire new capabilities.  
 Since the results show that value creation from the target’s technological capabilities does 
not guarantee that value will be created from the acquirer’s technological capabilities too, we 
need to consider the value created from the combination of the target’s and the acquirer’s 
technological capabilities. This analysis investigates the synergistic value creation from 
combining the target’s and the acquirer’s technological capabilities. As hypothesized, I find that 
the low overlap/leader subsample creates the most value. Capability diversification acquisitions 
benefit both from a greater possible quantity of novel resource recombinations due to less 
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technological overlap and from the acquirer being better able to identify and create novel 
resource recombinations. This finding is also consistent with Barney (1988) as capability 
diversification acquisitions possess the greatest opportunity for creating novel resource 
recombinations unforeseen by the market and inimitable by competitors.  
The combined resources also create value in the low overlap/laggard and high 
overlap/leader subsamples while the high overlap/laggard subsample actually destroys value on 
average. The interesting part of testing the target and acquirer separately is that while both the 
low overlap/laggard and high overlap/leader subsamples create synergistic value from combining 
their capabilities, the high overlap/leader subsample creates value from the acquirer’s capabilities 
and the low overlap/laggard subsample creates value from the target’s capabilities. Considering 
the corresponding rationales, capability deepening acquisitions enhance the value of the 
acquirer’s capabilities by acquiring state-of-the-art technology that would take the acquirer too 
long to develop in-house. As mentioned above, Cisco prefers to acquire similar firms when the 
technology the target possesses will require more than six months for Cisco to internally develop 
(Aguilera and Dencker, 2004). When Cisco acquires a small technology firm, its technology 
becomes more valuable with the absorption of the target’s technology. On the other hand, 
strategic renewal acquisitions enhance the value of the target’s capabilities by bringing its own 
flailing technology to a new market and technological domain. With capability upgrading, the 
acquirer does not have sufficient capabilities to either enhance the target’s capabilities or take 
advantage of the capabilities that they acquire from the target to enhance their own capabilities 
which leads to value destruction. 
Acquirer shareholders’ ultimate concern is whether the acquisition creates value or 
destroys value. While research on acquisitions consistently finds that acquirers lose value, the 
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results show that only technological laggards destroy shareholder value. This carries implications 
for management. If the firm cannot develop successful technology internally, then the market 
will not value it trying to externally acquire technology. This finding aligns with Miller’s (2004) 
finding that the diversification discount is caused by technological laggards diversifying into new 
markets. 
The dual analysis of patenting intensity and value creation allows for comparison of the 
theoretical model that resource recombination relates to value creation. The results provide 
minimal evidence that the target’s impact on resource recombination aligns with the value 
contributed by the target’s technological resources. The target’s technological capabilities drive 
both increased novel resource recombination and value creation in the low overlap/laggard 
subsample. The alignment of resource recombination creation and value creation is better 
evidenced with the acquirer’s technological capabilities. The technological leaders possess a 
greater impact on resource recombination creation and value creation. 
This study is not without its limitations. The main limitation is the inability to observe the 
rationale of the acquisitions. Further, the study does not observe the resource recombination 
process. While patents do provide empirical evidence of combining prior knowledge, I was 
unable to observe the reorganization and integration of capabilities that a survey study would be 
able to observe. These limitations do provide opportunities for future research to take a look 
inside the integration process to observe how different rationales lead to different resource 
utilizations. 
In conclusion, I make the following contributions. I find that acquirers create more value 
from the target’s technological capabilities when the target is less technologically related to the 
acquirer and from their own technological capabilities when they are technological leaders. I find 
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that acquirers create the most value from combining the technological capabilities of the target 
and the acquirer when the acquisition possesses characteristics suggesting a capability 
diversification rationale and acquirers actually destroy value from combining the technological 
capabilities of the target and the acquirer when the acquisition possesses characteristics 
suggesting a capability upgrading rationale. I also provide evidence linking resource 
recombination creation and acquirer value creation which Barney (1988) initially proposed. 
Finally, and most importantly, I find that an acquirer must be technological capable for 
shareholders to value the acquisition of external technology. If a firm is a technological laggard, 
the market does not value it externally purchasing new capabilities. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 







A. Variables included in the analysis on post-acquisition patenting (n =246)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1. % ∆ in patenting intensity 0.19 1.14 -1 11.19
2. Target technological capabilities
a 4.59 1.65 0.69 8.94
3. Acquirer technological capabilities
a 6.89 2.24 0 10.99
4. Target technological overlap 0.16 0.23 0 1
5. Acquirer technological overlap 0.03 0.08 0 0.73
6. Relative size of knowledge bases 0.55 1.99 0.0001 22.90
7. Relative size of number of employees
a -2.72 2.08 -8.39 3.50
8. Acquisition experience 5.70 9.00 0 54
9. Pre-acquisition 3-year patent count 171.62 316.09 1 2862
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Post-acquisition 3-year patent count
2. Target technological capabilities
a 0.0388
3. Acquirer technological capabilities
a 0.1083 0.2359*
4. Target technological overlap -0.0058 0.1774* 0.2708*
5. Acquirer technological overlap -0.0483 0.2194* -0.2270* 0.3120*
6. Relative size of knowledge bases -0.0384 0.1063 -0.4303* -0.1256* 0.0636
7. Relative size of number of employees
a -0.1807* -0.0066 -0.6370* -0.1390* 0.2291* 0.2617*
8. Acquisition experience 0.1351* 0.0789 0.4238* 0.1971* -0.1701* -0.1102 -0.4723*
9. Pre-acquisition 3-year patent count 0.0174 0.0558 0.5491* 0.2930* -0.1523* -0.1282* -0.5117* 0.4066*
78 
Table 3.1. Continued. 
 
B. Variables included in the analysis on cumulative abnormal returns (n =97)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1. Cumulative abnormal returns -0.03 0.09 -0.34 0.23
2. Target technological capabilities
a
4.92 1.65 0.69 8.94
3. Acquirer technological capabilities
a
7.15 2.25 0 10.43
4. Target technological overlap 0.17 0.24 0 1
5. Acquirer technological overlap 0.04 0.08 0 0.40
6. Acquisition experience 5.70 8.87 0 53
7. Transaction value 5.11 8.06 0.50 56.58
8. Relative size of number of employees
a
-2.95 2.00 -7.32 0.95
9. Relative size of knowledge bases 0.58 2.40 0.00 22.90
10. % of stock 0.66 0.45 0 1
11. 4-firm concentration ration 0.41 0.10 0.31 0.95
12. Acquirer relative market share 0.06 0.09 0.0001 0.41
13. Pharma 0.37 0.49 0 1
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Cumulative abnormal returns
2. Target technological capabilities
a
0.0876
3. Acquirer technological capabilities
a
0.0013 0.3330*
4. Target technological overlap 0.0163 0.1868 0.2336*
5. Acquirer technological overlap -0.049 0.1519 -0.3136* 0.2606*
6. Acquisition experience 0.1431 0.0623 0.3705* 0.1716 -0.2109*
7. Transaction value -0.1795 0.1088 0.0582 0.2982* 0.0562 0.2538*
8. Relative size of number of employees
a
-0.2985* -0.1017 -0.5944* -0.0633 0.3290* -0.4242* 0.0902
9. Relative size of knowledge bases 0.2351* 0.0969 -0.3977* -0.1077 0.067 -0.1013 -0.0627 0.2965*
10. % of stock -0.1997* 0.0314 -0.2179* -0.1328 0.1652 0.0679 0.1959 0.2450* 0.017
11. 4-firm concentration ration 0.1736 -0.2320* -0.0429 -0.0108 -0.1506 0.2283* -0.0249 -0.0207 -0.0805 -0.0641
12. Acquirer relative market share 0.1851 0.2410* 0.4694* 0.0502 -0.2460* 0.1796 -0.1176 -0.7250* -0.1226 -0.2011* -0.0873











Target technological capabilities 0.033 -0.213 * -0.163 0.182
(0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.24)
Acquirer technological capabilities -0.116 0.186 0.563 0.703 *
(0.11) (0.16) (0.44) (0.40)
Target technological overlap -0.348 5.371 0.572
(0.68) (6.34) (0.95)
Acquirer technological overlap -1.309 -134.444 -7.385 ***
(1.72) (153.64) (2.56)
Relative size (knowledge bases) -0.040 0.702 5.132 1.879
(0.04) (0.50) (4.95) (2.61)
Relative size (employees) -0.149 * -0.044 -0.074 0.080
(0.08) (0.16) (0.12) (0.15)
Acquisition experience -0.029 0.011 0.040 ** 0.005
(0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01)
Pre-acquisition patenting -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Industry dummies
Intercept -0.078 -0.619 -3.849 -6.657 *
(0.66) (0.89) (3.03) (3.69)
Observations 50 50 50 50
F-statistic 2.34 ** 3.59 *** 1.57 1.99 *
R-squared 0.34 0.25 0.29 0.25
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1











laggard laggard leader leader
% ∆ in patenting in 3-years pre- vs. post-acquisition 

















Target technological overlap low high low high
Acquirer leader/laggard laggard laggard leader leader
Dependent variable = CAR Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Target technological capabilities 0.0184 -0.0031 0.0060 -0.0257*
(0.0139) (0.0386) (0.0053) (0.0128)
Acquirer technological capabilities -0.0040 -0.0291 0.0237** 0.0196
(0.0160) (0.0274) (0.0098) (0.0271)
Target technological overlap 1.3322 0.0745 0.2667 -0.0457
(0.9926) (0.1472) (0.4438) (0.0474)
Acquirer technological overlap 0.9410 0.0567 -25.1351* 2.3689**
(0.9652) (0.4537) (13.6634) (0.8237)
Acquisition experience -0.0112 0.0038 0.0040** 0.0018**
(0.0079) (0.0338) (0.0014) (0.0008)
Transaction value -0.0085** -0.0002 0.0046** -0.0017**
(0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0016) (0.0007)
Relative size of number of employees -0.0602*** -0.0239 0.0075 -0.0478**
(0.0175) (0.0411) (0.0085) (0.0177)
Relative size of knowledge bases 0.0172** -0.0080 0.9792* 0.1315
(0.0062) (0.1010) (0.5367) (0.2457)
% of stock -0.0605 0.0264 -0.0174 -0.0052
(0.0499) (0.1415) (0.0228) (0.0223)
4-firm concentration ration 0.4384** 0.0400 0.4871*** -0.6034**
(0.1730) (0.3094) (0.1543) (0.2136)
Acquirer relative market share 0.4420 0.8892 -0.0287 -0.2096
(0.5846) (1.3089) (0.1589) (0.1312)
Pharma 0.0726 -0.0302 0.0347 -0.1141***
(0.0406) (0.0812) (0.0289) (0.0284)
Intercept -0.3735** 0.0471 -0.4783*** 0.0081
(0.1421) (0.2666) (0.1306) (0.1544)
Observations 24 24 24 25
F-statistic 28.17*** 2.06 3.00** 25.44***
R-squared 0.84 0.31 0.56 0.74
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
81 









































































0.033 - 0.213* 






Table 3.4. Continued. 
 
E. Mean value created from target and acquirer capabilities   F. Cumulative Abnormal Returns 





















































Table 3.5. Summary of hypotheses and results. 
Hypotheses Results 
Hypothesis 1a: Given that the acquiring firm is a technological laggard, the target firm’s technological 
capabilities will possess a greater impact on the percentage change in post-acquisition patenting intensity 
when there is less technological overlap. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 1b: Given that the acquiring firm is a technological leader, the target firm’s technological 
capabilities will possess a greater impact on the percentage change in post-acquisition patenting intensity 
when there is less technological overlap. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 1c: Given that the acquiring firm is a technological laggard, the acquiring firm’s technological 
capabilities will possess a greater impact on the percentage change in post-acquisition patenting intensity 
when there is less technological overlap. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 1d: Given that the acquiring firm is a technological leader, the acquiring firm’s technological 
capabilities will possess a greater impact on the percentage change in post-acquisition patenting intensity 
when there is less technological overlap. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 2a: Given low technological overlap, the target firm’s technological capabilities will possess a 
greater impact on the percentage change in post-acquisition patenting intensity when the acquiring firm is a 





Table 3.5. Continued. 
Hypothesis 2b: Given high technological overlap, the target firm’s technological capabilities will possess a 
greater impact on the percentage change in post-acquisition patenting intensity when the acquiring firm is 
a technological leader rather than a laggard. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2c: Given low technological overlap, the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities will 
possess a greater impact on the percentage change in post-acquisition patenting intensity when the 
acquiring firm is a technological leader rather than a laggard. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2d: Given high technological overlap, the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities will 
possess a greater impact on the percentage change in post-acquisition patenting intensity when the 
acquiring firm is a technological leader rather than a laggard. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 3a: Given that the acquiring firm is a technological laggard, the target firm’s technological 
capabilities will create more shareholder value for the acquiring firm on average when there is less 
technological overlap. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3b: Given that the acquiring firm is a technological leader, the target firm’s technological 
capabilities will create more shareholder value for the acquiring firm on average when there is less 
technological overlap. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3c: Given that the acquiring firm is a technological laggard, the acquiring firm’s technological 




Table 3.5. Continued. 
Hypothesis 3d: Given that the acquiring firm is a technological leader, the acquiring firm’s technological 
capabilities will create more shareholder value for the acquiring firm on average when there is less 
technological overlap. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 4a: Given low technological overlap, the target firm’s technological capabilities will create 
more shareholder value for the acquiring firm on average when the acquiring firm is a technological leader 
rather than a laggard. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 4b: Given high technological overlap, the target firm’s technological capabilities will create 
more shareholder value for the acquiring firm on average when the acquiring firm is a technological leader 
rather than a laggard. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 4c: Given low technological overlap, the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities will create 
more shareholder value for the acquiring firm on average when the acquiring firm is a technological leader 
rather than a laggard. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 4d: Given high technological overlap, the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities will 
create more shareholder value for the acquiring firm on average when the acquiring firm is a technological 
leader rather than a laggard. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 5a: Acquisitions characterized by simultaneous low technological overlap and the acquirer 
being a technological leader will create the most amount of value when summing the value created from 
both the target firm’s technological capabilities and the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities. 
Supported 
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Table 3.5. Continued. 
Hypothesis 5b: Acquisitions characterized by simultaneous low technological overlap and the acquirer 
being a technological leader will create the greatest amount of overall value appropriated by the acquiring 
firm. 
Partial support 
Hypothesis 6a: Acquisitions characterized by simultaneous high technological overlap and the acquirer 
being a technological laggard will create the least amount of value when summing the value created from 
both the target firm’s technological capabilities and the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 6b: Acquisitions characterized by simultaneous high technological overlap and the acquirer 
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ESSAY 3: TECHNOLOGICAL ACQUISITIONS, DISTANCE, AND TIME ELAPSED 
UNTIL THE INITIAL POST-ACQUISITION INNOVATION 
INTRODUCTION 
In innovative industries, technological change is both rapid and frequent (Sarkar et al., 2006). 
With internal R&D focusing on incremental innovations (Knott and Posen, 2009; Sorensen and 
Stuart, 2000; Tushman and Anderson, 1986) and corporate strategies focusing on specialization 
and the outsourcing of non-core activities (Mayer et al., Forthcoming), firms find themselves in 
competency traps (Levinthal and March, 1993). Further, evidence suggests that much of the truly 
novel innovations originate in startups (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Pavitt et al., 1987). As a 
result, technological acquisitions have become a popular complement to internal innovation, 
therefore, allowing firms to overcome the time compression diseconomies of undertaking ‘crash’ 
R&D programs by internalizing existing stocks of know-how (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). In this 
paper, I address the effects that geographic distance, technological overlap, and whether the 
acquiring firm and the target firm domicile in different countries have on the amount of time it 
takes the post-acquisition firm to innovate utilizing the target firm’s pre-acquisition 
technological knowledge.  
While a significant amount of research has investigated the independent effects that 
technological overlap (e.g., Mowery et al., 1996, 1998; Szulanski, 1996), geographic distance 
(e.g., Jaffe et al., 1993; Mowery and Ziedonis, 2001; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003), and 
crossing national borders (e.g., Bresman, Birkinshaw, and Nobel, 1999; Teece, 1977) have on 
knowledge transfer,  little has been done on their interactive effects, and even fewer studies have 
been conducted on their interactive effects in the context of acquisitions (cf. Phene, Tallman, and 
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Almeida, 2010). I make two main advancements in this stream of research. First, I investigate the 
independent and interactive effects that technological overlap, geographic distance, and cross-
border acquisitions have on the amount of time it takes the acquiring firm to utilize the target 
firm’s pre-acquisition technological knowledge in post-acquisition innovation. Second, I show 
that whether these factors facilitate or impede the acquiring firm’s ability to the overcome time 
compression diseconomies of internal innovation through acquisition depends on how the 
acquiring firm utilizes the target firm’s technological capabilities. 
Acquisitions differ in the post-acquisition utilization of the target firm’s resources and 
capabilities (Karim, 2006; Puranam and Srikanth, 2007; Sears, 2011). Some post-acquisition 
innovations integrate the knowledge of the target firm with that of the acquiring firm in building 
new knowledge for which I term ‘integrative innovation’  (Almeida, Song, and Grant, 2002). 
Other post-acquisition innovations do not integrate and thus maintain innovative autonomy in the 
target firm for which I term ‘independent innovation’ (Puranam et al., 2009)7. 
I submit that technological overlap, geographic distance, and cross-border acquisitions 
affect the amount of time that elapses until the first post-acquisition integrative innovation and 
the first post-acquisition independent innovation differently. While technological overlap 
facilitates communication which benefits integrative innovation, communication facilitation can 
actually impede independent innovation when the acquiring firm excessively intervenes into the 
target firm’s innovative activities. Similarly, geographic distance and cross-border acquisitions 
create communication problems for integrative innovation while they create a buffer between the 
acquiring firm and the target firm that maintains target autonomy, therefore, minimizing target 
                                                            
7
 In independent innovations, the target firm’s knowledge may or may not be combined with the 
acquiring firm’s knowledge later on in the product development process. For example, an 
independent innovation’ could be combined with the acquiring firm’s knowledge in commercial 
products or in higher order knowledge through modular design. 
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firm disruption. Further, I argue that technological overlap can attenuate the impediments to 
communication that geographic distance and cross-border acquisitions create in integrative 
innovation and also attenuate the benefits that geographic distance and cross-border acquisitions 
create by maintaining target firm autonomy for independent innovation. 
I find that crossing national borders has a greater impact compared to geographic distance 
on the time elapsed until the initial post-acquisition innovation in both integrative innovation and 
independent innovation
8
. While I find that cross-border acquisitions take a longer amount of time 
to create an integrative innovation compared to domestic acquisitions, technological overlap 
attenuates the negative effect of crossing national borders. On the other hand, I find that cross-
border acquisitions take a shorter amount of time to create the first independent innovation 
compared to domestic acquisitions. I also find evidence that technological overlap impedes 
independent innovation while I find no evidence that technological overlap significantly interacts 
with either geographic distance or cross-border acquisitions with independent innovation. 
The paper makes the following contributions. First, I integrate the effects that geographic 
distance, cross-border acquisitions, and technological overlap have on intra-firm knowledge 
flows. While each of these have received extensive attention in prior research, there has been 
little research that integrates these effects in the same study and even fewer, if any, that have 
focused on their interactive effects within acquisitions. Second, I show that whether and how 
technological overlap, geographic distance, and cross-border acquisitions affect the time it takes 
to post-acquisition innovation utilizing the target firm’s pre-acquisition knowledge depends on 
the type of innovation, integrative or independent. Third, I show that acquisitions do not suffer 
the same intensity of frictions in knowledge flows that market mechanisms and spillovers incur 
                                                            
8
 All empirical analyses control for the technological capabilities of both the target and acquiring 
firms and for pre-acquisition innovations utilizing the target firm’s knowledge. 
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from geographic distance. Rather, knowledge flows are impeded by the knowledge residing in 
different national contexts. I further show that technological overlap can provide a commonality 
in the sources of knowledge that can attenuate these difficulties. Fourth, the study provides 
implications for target firm selection. When considering whether to acquire a specific target firm, 
this study shows that the acquiring firm should jointly consider where the target firm is 
geographically located and how related the target firm’s technological knowledge is to its own. 
Lastly, the study emphasizes that management must understand how they plan on utilizing the 
target firm’s knowledge prior to the acquisition to properly consider the implications of 
geographic and technological distance on post-acquisition innovation. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
While technological acquisitions occur in order for the acquiring firm to benefit from the 
technological knowledge or capabilities of the target firm, not all technological acquisitions 
utilize the knowledge of the target in the same manner. In this paper I differentiate between two 
methods of target knowledge utilization for post-acquisition innovation: integrative innovation 
and independent innovation. Integrative innovations integrate the knowledge of the target firm 
with that of the acquiring firm in building new knowledge during the post-acquisition innovation 
process (Almeida et al., 2002). Independent innovations do not integrate the knowledge and thus 
maintain innovative autonomy in the target firm (Puranam et al., 2009).  
 While the two types of innovation are distinct, acquisitions are not limited to choosing 
one or the other. For example from Puranam (2001: 141), Mario Mazzola, Chief Development 
Officer at Cisco, stated, ‘We do not think it is necessary for the R&D team(s) to be together. 
Actually we would encourage them to continue development independently, but co-operate and 
communicate with our R&D/manufacturing people.’ Since many acquiring firms will seek to 
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develop both integrative innovations and independent innovations, it is important to understand 
the differential effects that technological overlap and the physical location of the target firm have 
on integrative innovation and independent innovation. 
In this section, I build hypotheses regarding the independent and interactive effects that 
technological overlap, geographic distance, and cross-border acquisitions have on the time it 
takes the post-acquisition firm to utilize the target firm’s pre-acquisition knowledge in post-
acquisition innovations. First, I hypothesize about their effects on integrative innovation. Then, I 
hypothesize about their effects on independent innovation. 
Integrative Innovation 
There has been a plethora of research that has shown that knowledge flows dissipate with 
geographic distance (e.g., Cameron, 1996; Jaffe et al., 1993). Empirical findings even suggest 
that geographic distance disadvantages knowledge transfer when firms use market mechanisms, 
such as licensing, (Mowery and Ziedonis, 2001) or alliances (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). I 
submit that the difficulties in knowledge transfer attributed to geographic distance in licensing 
and alliances also negatively affect acquisitions. 
Acquisitions that integrate the knowledge of the target firm and the acquiring firm rely 
heavily on knowledge exchange. First, the need to integrate the target firm’s knowledge with the 
acquiring firm’s knowledge calls for reciprocal interdependence (Thompson, 1967) or mutual 
adjustment (Tushman and Nadler, 1978) which requires greater coordination (Galbraith, 1973, 
1977). Second, the dynamic environment of innovative industries creates greater uncertainty 
which requires even greater levels of communication (Tushman and Nadler, 1978). With the 
enhanced need for knowledge exchange, the acquiring firm must consider the factors facilitating 
or impeding communication. 
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While recent technological advancements in electronic communication have eased distant 
communication, knowledge integration still requires frequent face-to-face interaction (Bresman 
et al., 1999). Almeida, Phene, and Grant (2003) captured the importance of face-to-face meetings 
in their interviews with National Semiconductor and Siemens where they found that electronic 
mail must be supplemented with on-site visits. Bresman et al. (1999) also found that enhanced 
communication and increased frequency in visits and meetings increased knowledge transfer. 
Further, Porter (1990) noted that geographic proximity enables more frequent face-to-face 
meetings that help build trust which Graebner (2009) found crucial for the success of an 
acquisition of a technological firm.  
In line with this logic, geographically proximate interactions increase the acquiring firm’s 
ability to integrate the target firm’s knowledge with its own (Puranam and Srikanth, 2007). With 
increases in geographic distance, the post-acquisition firm encounters difficulties coordinating 
through mutual adjustment. The further the distance between the target firm and the acquiring 
firm, the more difficult it will be for the acquiring firm to conduct frequent on-site visits. These 
communication and coordination difficulties are further enhanced due to differences in time 
zones. The culminating difficulties in attaining mutual adjustment between the target firm and 
the acquiring firm lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The amount of time that elapses until the initial post-acquisition integrative 
innovation increases with increases in geographic distance. 
 
 Beyond geographic distance, a post-acquisition firm encounters difficulties in integrative 
innovation when the two firms domicile in different countries. Cross-border acquisitions 
encounter additional impediments to knowledge transfer beyond mere geographic distance 
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(Björkman, Stahl, and Vaara, 2007; Child, Faulkner, and Pitkethly, 2001; Sears, Aguilera, and 
Dencker, 2012). When considering cross-border acquisitions, we must recognize the different 
environmental contexts for which the knowledge resides (Lam, 2006; Phene, Fladmoe-Lindquist, 
and Marsh, 2006; Williams, 2007). Williams (2007: 869) stated that, ‘context dependence arises 
because knowledge integrates components of knowledge—such as people, personal networks, or 
information—which vary between settings.’ Further, Argote and Ingram (2000) noted that 
compatibility between the components of knowledge is necessary for effective knowledge 
transfer. 
 While Saxenian (1994) found that work practices, culture, and technical terminology are 
unique to particular regions, the national systems of innovation literature stresses that countries 
possess their own unique characteristics (Freeman, 1995; Kneller, 2003). Bartholomew (1997) 
explained that the impediments to cross-border knowledge transfer are due to the embeddedness 
of knowledge transfer mechanisms in national contexts while Lane, Salk, and Lyles (2001) 
argued that cultural compatibility is a necessary condition for intra-firm knowledge absorption. 
Further, Lam (2006) proposed that there are taken-for-granted assumptions and common rules 
specific to countries that facilitate knowledge transfer that can also impede knowledge transfer 
when crossing borders that do not share these taken-for-granted assumptions and common rules. 
 Combing the difficulties of geographic distance with the additional difficulties of 
knowledge residing in different national contexts, cross-border acquisitions encounter great 
obstacles to integrating the knowledge of the target firm with that of the acquiring firm. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2. The amount of time that elapses until the initial post-acquisition integrative 
innovation increases with the acquisition being a cross-border acquisition rather than a 
domestic acquisition. 
 
  Contrary to the effects of geographic distance and cross-border acquisitions, 
technological overlap facilitates knowledge exchange. Common knowledge between the 
acquiring firm and the target firm is a prerequisite for communication (Demsetz, 1988; Grant, 
1996b) and intra-firm knowledge absorption (Lane et al., 2001). At a minimum, a common 
language is necessary for communication (Grant, 1996a, 1996b).  
Technological overlap provides common vocabulary, conceptual knowledge, and 
experience between the knowledge workers of the target firm and the acquiring firm which drive 
efficient communication (Grant, 1996a). In the absence of technological overlap, Szulanski 
(1996) found intra-organizational knowledge transfer exceedingly hindered. In their studies on 
alliances, Mowery et al. (1996, 1998) found that greater technological overlap facilitated inter-
firm knowledge transfer. Beyond knowledge transfer, knowledge similarities increase inter-firm 
learning (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998), and lead to greater intra-firm intangible resource sharing 
(Tsai, 2000). 
 Technological overlap also creates an ability to merge the innovative routines of the 
target firm and the acquiring firm through efficient communication. In order to merge routines in 
integrative innovation, the firms must possess the “ability to receive and interpret a stream of 
incoming messages from other members and from the environment" (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 
100). Grant (1996a) noted that this level of communication is necessary to reach routines of 
mutual adjustment that enable knowledge integration. Technological overlap should then 
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enhance the acquiring firm’s ability to expeditiously create integrative innovations. This leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3. The amount of time that elapses until the initial post-acquisition integrative 
innovation decreases with increases in technological overlap. 
 
While geographic distance and cross-border acquisitions hinder a firm’s ability 
expeditiously create integrative innovations, technological overlap attenuates the communication 
and coordination difficulties that arise from great geographic distance through the creation of 
rich communication channels (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). Technological overlap creates a 
common technological language that facilitates distant communication (Puranam et al., 2009). 
Puranam et al. (2009: 317) explain the advantages of ‘common ground’, 
‘…if the common ground between interdependent individuals contains significant levels 
of shared knowledge about how the interdependent technological subsystems work, then 
the need for formal coordination mechanisms such as those associated with structural 
integration should decrease. Such common ground could exist, for instance, when the 
engineers have been working in the same technological domains prior to the acquisition.’ 
Consistent with this argument, Tallman and Phene (2007) found that technological similarities 
have a greater impact on facilitating international knowledge flows compared to mere inter-
cluster knowledge flows.  
Not only does technological overlap create rich communication channels by providing a 
common technical language, but it also means that the knowledge workers of the two firms share 
common experiences and behavioral norms that facilitate knowledge exchange (Grant, 1996a). 
That is, when geographic distance prohibits frequent on-site visits that will allow the knowledge 
workers to physically demonstrate how the knowledge can be integrated, common experiences 
and behavioral norms eases the need to physically demonstrate the procedures for knowledge 
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integration. In support of this argument, Almeida et al. (2003) find that shared behavioral norms 
facilitate cross-border knowledge transfer.  
The target firm needs to be either technologically or geographically proximate to allow 
for successful integration. Phene et al. (2006) find that technologically dissimilar external 
knowledge possesses a greater probability of contributing to break through innovations when it 
resides in the same national context as the recipient firm while international knowledge 
possesses a greater probability of leading to break through innovations when the knowledge is 
more technologically similar. If the knowledge is neither technologically nor geographically 
proximate, then the knowledge does not significantly impact the probability of creating break 
through innovations (Phene et al., 2006). With respect to the findings of Phene et al. (2006), I 
submit that for sufficient communication to exist to not only create breakthrough innovations but 
also expeditiously innovate either geographic proximity or technological proximity must exist. 
This leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4. Increases in technological overlap weaken the positive relationship 
between geographic distance and the amount of time that elapses until the initial post-
acquisition integrative innovation. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Increases in technological overlap weaken the positive relationship 
between cross-border acquisitions and the amount of time that elapses until the initial 
post-acquisition integrative innovation. 
 
Independent Innovation 
With independent innovation, the target firm continues its innovative activities independent of 
the acquiring firm’s innovative activities. The acquiring firm then integrates the target firm’s 
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knowledge at the product level or at a higher integrative level of knowledge building. On the 
other hand, the acquiring firm may not integrate the target firm’s knowledge at all. Since 
knowledge integration does not take place, the acquiring firm should focus on minimizing the 
interruptions in the innovative activities of the target firm by maintaining its autonomy. 
 The same forces that impede integrative innovation, geographic distance and cross-border 
acquisition, help preserve the autonomy of the target firm which facilitates efficient independent 
innovation. On the other hand, technological overlap which facilitates integrative innovation now 
decreases the ability of the target firm to remain operationally autonomous, therefore, impeding 
independent innovation. 
 The problem of maintaining target autonomy arises from the acquiring firm’s need to 
possess a non-trivial amount of control over the innovative activities of the target firm. 
Transaction costs economics explains technological acquisitions as a phenomenon of asset 
specificity with respect to the innovative activities of the target firm (Williamson, 1985). By 
taking the assumption that control rights drive the transaction out of the market into corporate 
control, we must expect the acquiring firm will selectively intervene in the innovative activities 
of the target. Selection intervention occurs when management exercises forbearance when 
intervention provides no net gain but exercises fiat when intervention provides net gains 
(Williamson, 1985). The acquiring firm’s management will have incentives to intervene in the 
operations of the target firm if the acquiring firm’s management believes it possesses superior 
knowledge since the management’s performance (hence incentives) are linked to the innovative 
outcomes of the target firm.  
While mechanisms may be undertaken to alleviate excessive intervention (Foss, Foss, 
and Vázquez, 2006), much research maintains that selective intervention is not possible (e.g., 
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Foss, 2003; Graebner, 2009; Williamson, 1988). The enhanced problems of selective 
intervention arise from the acquiring firm believing it possesses superior knowledge or decision 
making capabilities regarding the target firm’s operations. Foss (2003: 342) noted the following 
about managers’ tendencies to excessively intervene, 
‘…robust findings in experimental psychology show the presence of a systematic 
overconfidence bias in judgment; that is, people tend to trust their own judgments more 
than is “objectively” warranted. Managers are not exceptions to this bias, perhaps quite 
the contrary. The presence of the overconfidence bias in the judgments that underlie 
managerial decision making is likely to aggravate the problem of selective intervention, 
because it produces additional meddling in subordinates’ decisions.’ 
 
 While geographic proximity facilitates interaction and communication, geographic 
distance provides the autonomy that the target firm needs to maintain its pre-acquisition 
innovative productivity. Evidence shows that workers interact less when there is greater 
geographic distance between them (Allen, 1977). The inability for frequent on-site visits and the 
limitations of technological communications (Almeida et al., 2003) create a gap in the 
knowledge that the acquiring firm management possesses regarding the innovative activities of 
the target firm. As Foss (2003) added that ignorance reduces the probability of selective 
intervention, we should expect the increased gap in knowledge between the target firm and the 
acquiring firm arising from geographic distance (Almeida et al., 2003) will decrease the 
probability of selective intervention. 
With fewer interactions, there will be fewer opportunities for the acquiring firm to 
intervene in the target firm’s innovative activities. Further, with the innovative activities under 
the control of the target firm, the target firm will not only better utilize its pre-acquisition 
knowledge but also be better able to create new knowledge (Miles et al., 1997). Therefore, 
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greater geographic distance should advantage the acquiring firm in creating independent 
innovations. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 6. The amount of time that elapses until the initial post-acquisition 
independent innovation decreases with increases in geographic distance. 
 
The greater the distance in information, the more likely the manager is not going to 
intervene (Foss et al., 2006). Beyond mere geographic distance, cross-border acquisitions create 
enhanced obstacles to selective intervention. With knowledge residing in different national 
contexts (Bartholomew, 1997; Lane et al., 2001; Williams, 2007), there will be greater 
knowledge asymmetries between the target firm and the acquiring firm. Therefore, the acquiring 
firm’s management is less likely to perceive that it possesses superior knowledge compared to 
that of the target firm. Further, with the additional costs of international knowledge transfer  
(Teece, 1977), acquiring firms are likely to delegate the decision rights to the target firm in 
independent innovations (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). Rugman and Verbeke (2003) noted that 
the excessive cross-border communication costs deter excessive intervention. Therefore, cross-
border acquisitions should advantage the acquiring firm in creating independent innovations by 
maintaining target firm autonomy. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 7. The amount of time that elapses until the initial post-acquisition 
independent innovation decreases with the acquisition being a cross-border acquisition 
rather than a domestic acquisition. 
 
 While technological overlap facilitates knowledge transfer which benefits integrative 
innovation, technological overlap also leads to the acquiring firm meddling in the target firm’s 
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operations which impedes independent innovation. Hansen (1999) argued that increases in 
connectedness threatens the autonomy of the target firm through enhanced ‘red tape’. Similarly, 
Weick (1976) submitted that organizational units that are not tightly linked face less interference 
and disruption from constraints imposed by organizational systems.  
Foss et al. (2006) emphasized that the optimal level of decision delegation (autonomy) to 
the target firm occurs when the incremental benefits of the knowledge specialization of the target 
firm equals the incremental costs of loss of control for the acquiring firm. Technological overlap 
can negatively affect the acquiring firm’s perception of the optimal level of decision delegation 
(autonomy) given to the target firm. First, technological overlap decreases the perceived benefit 
of the specialized (non-overlapping) technological knowledge of the target firm. Second, 
technological overlap increases the perceived costs of the loss of control as the acquiring firm 
will have a heightened sense that it possesses superior knowledge to that of the target firm. 
While management may believe that they can maintain autonomy in the target firm, 
technological overlap increases the possibility of the acquiring firm intervening when the optimal 
decision delegate the decision rights to the target firm.  
Therefore, greater technological overlap should disadvantage the acquiring firm in 
expeditiously creating independent innovations. This leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 8. The amount of time that elapses until the initial post-acquisition 
independent innovation increases with increases in technological overlap. 
 
 While geographic distance and cross-border acquisitions decrease the probability of 
excessive intervention, I now argue that technological overlap attenuates the benefits of 
autonomy that accompanies geographic distance and cross-border acquisitions. The argument put 
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forth above with regard to technological overlap facilitating knowledge integration now supports 
the increased likelihood of the acquiring firm selectively intervening. The common vocabulary, 
conceptual knowledge, and experience held between the target firm and the acquiring firm which 
drive efficient communication also reduce target firm autonomy (Grant, 1996a). Similarly, the 
‘common ground’ (Puranam et al., 2009) arising from greater technological overlap which 
facilitates distant knowledge integration will increase the probability that the acquiring firm 
management will believe that they possess superior knowledge leading to selective intervention 
(Foss, 2003). Further, the ease in communication should reduce the costs of selective 
intervention. In summary, holding geographic distance constant, increases in technological 
overlap will reduce the costs and hurdles of knowledge transfer, therefore, reducing the 
incentives for the acquiring firm to not selectively intervene. This leads to the final of 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 9. Increases in technological overlap weaken the negative relationship 
between geographic distance and the amount of time that elapses until the initial post-
acquisition independent innovation. 
 
Hypothesis 10. Increases in technological overlap weaken the negative relationship 
between cross-border acquisitions and the amount of time that elapses until the initial 
post-acquisition independent innovation. 
 
METHODS 
Data and Sample 
The sample consists of technological acquisitions obtained from SDC Platinum’s Mergers & 
Acquisitions database that occurred between 1994 and 2004. The year 1994 is the first year that 
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an acquisition appears in the SDC database after implementing all constraints while I chose 2004 
as the end date to allow for the construction of the variables using patents. The acquisitions were 
initially identified as technological acquisitions if both the acquiring firm and target firm were 
classified as ‘high tech’ firms in SDC Platinum’s M&A database.  
 I further took the following steps to create the sample. I limited the sample to firms listed 
as manufacturing firms by SIC codes 20-39 to allow for comparisons with previous 
technological acquisition research (Puranam et al., 2009; Puranam et al., 2006; Puranam and 
Srikanth, 2007). I limited the acquisitions to those where the target firm had less than 500 
employees at the time of the acquisition. This criterion is both consistent with the U.S. Small 
Business Administration definition of a small business and with prior studies on technological 
acquisitions (Granstrand and Sjolander, 1990; Puranam et al., 2009; Puranam et al., 2006; 
Puranam and Srikanth, 2007). This also allowed me to be more confident that market power and 
cost synergies did not motivate the acquisition. To ensure that all of the acquisitions were 
technological in nature, I searched news articles and newswires using LexisNexis and eliminated 
acquisitions that were not technological in nature (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). I also eliminated all 
acquisitions where the target firm did not possess any patents to allow for the variable 
construction. The final sample for the patenting intensity analysis consists of 246 acquisitions 
with 185 distinct acquiring firms. 
Dependent Variables 
I constructed two dependent variables that measure the amount of time elapsed until the first 
post-acquisition integrative innovation and the amount of time elapsed until the first post-
acquisition independent innovation. The acquisitions in the sample fall into one of four types: 1) 
does not patent using pre-acquisition knowledge of the target firm (94 acquisitions), 2) only 
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patents using pre-acquisition knowledge of the target firm that is not integrated with the 
acquiring firm’s pre-acquisition knowledge (only independent innovations; 75 acquisitions), 3) 
only patents using pre-acquisition knowledge that is integrated with pre-acquisition knowledge 
of the acquiring firm (only integrative innovations; 10 acquisitions), and 4) patents both 
independent innovations and integrative innovations (68 acquisitions).  
 The variable integrative innovation measures the amount of time that passed post-
acquisition until the post-acquisition firm filed an eventually granted patent that cites both a pre-
acquisition target firm patent and a pre-acquisition acquiring firm patent. I used the ‘effective 
date’ given by SDC as the date that the acquisition is finalized and, therefore, day zero in the 
count until the first integrative innovation. I used a seven-year pre-acquisition window for the 
target firm and acquiring firm patents that are to be recombined post-acquisition since Jaffe et al. 
(1993) found that citations dramatically decrease seven years after the application date. 
Therefore, I am more confident that I captured most relevant pre-acquisition technology of the 
target firm and the acquiring firm. If the post-acquisition firm did not file a granted patent by 
December 31, 2009, the acquisition was right-censored. 
 The variable independent innovation measures the amount of time that passed post-
acquisition until the post-acquisition firm filed an eventually granted patent that cites a pre-
acquisition target firm patent but does not cite a pre-acquisition acquiring firm patent. I 
constructed this measure in line with the construction of integrative innovation. 
Independent Variables 
I created the variable, geographic distance, which measures the distance in miles between the 
acquiring firm and the target firm. For the location of the firms, I obtained the zip codes from 
SDC’s M&A database. I reviewed articles pertaining to the acquisitions from LexisNexis to 
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confirm the zip codes provided by SDC. When an article provided information about a particular 
SBU of the acquiring firm being merged with the target firm that did not match the zip code 
provided by SDC, I used the zip code of the SBU to be merged with the target firm. I then used 
the zip codes to obtain the latitude and longitude coordinates for each firm. With the latitude and 
longitude coordinates, I applied spherical geometry to calculate the geographic distance. 
Following previous studies (Ragozzino and Reuer, 2011; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Stuart and 
Sorenson, 2003), I used the Great Circle distance formula: 
geographic distance = r × arcos[sin(latitudeacq) × sin(latitudetgt) +    
    cos(latitudeacq) × cos(latitudetgt) ×  
cos(longitudetgt − longitudeacq)], 
where r is the radius of the earth in miles (i.e., r = 3,963 miles). I transformed the latitudes and 
longitudes into radians for the calculation. I then scaled geographic distance by 1000 for 
coefficient size purposes. 
 Next, I constructed the variable, cross-border dummy. This variable equals one if the 
acquiring firm and the target firm were located in different countries. When the acquiring firm’s 
headquarters was located in a different country, but the SBU that was to be merged with the 
target firm was located in the same country as the target firm, the variable equals zero, not one. 
The sample consists of 61 cross-border acquisitions. 
For technological overlap, I constructed the variable, target technological overlap, which 
represents the percentage of the target firm’s knowledge base that the acquiring firm possessed in 
its knowledge base. I constructed the knowledge bases in line with Ahuja and Katila (2001). A 
firm’s knowledge base is a count of the number of unique elements of knowledge where I 
defined an element of knowledge as either a firm’s patent or a patent cited by one of the firm’s 
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patents. By aggregating these elements of knowledge and eliminating all duplicates, I arrived at a 
firm’s knowledge base. In constructing the knowledge bases, I included patents with an 
application date in the seven years prior to the acquisition ‘effective date’. Similar with the 
dependent variable, I used a seven-year window to be confident that I captured the knowledge 
that the firms possessed that was still relevant at the time of the acquisition (Jaffe et al., 1993). 
 
Control Variables 
I constructed the variable, acquirer technological overlap, following the method outlined above 
for target technological overlap except that I measured the proportion of the acquiring firm’s 
knowledge base that is a part of the target firm’s knowledge base instead of the proportion of the 
target firm’s knowledge base that is a part of the acquiring firm’s knowledge base. Sears and 
Hoetker (2012) showed that technological overlap can be asymmetric and that target overlap and 
acquirer overlap possess their own unique effects on acquisition performance.  
To control for the technological capabilities of the target firm and the acquiring firm, I 
constructed the variables, acquirer technological capabilities and target technological 
capabilities. I constructed these variables as citation weighted patent counts of the seven years 
prior to the acquisition announcement following Trajtenberg (1990) using the application date of 
each patent. A citation weighted patent count is an appropriate measure for technological 
capabilities as the count not only takes into account the firm’s ability to innovate but also 
accounts for the quality of the innovations by incorporating the number of forward citations of 
each patent. 
I constructed the variable acquisition experience. Acquisition experience has been found 
to create benefits (Bruton et al., 1994; Fowler and Schmidt, 1989; Zollo and Singh, 2004), to 
create a burden (Kusewitt Jr, 1985), and to have no effect (King et al., 2004; Lahey and Conn, 
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1990). Acquisition experience counts the number of acquisitions the acquiring firm completed in 
the five years prior to the acquisition. I limited the acquisition experience to five years due to 
empirical evidence that has shown that managerial experience depreciates quickly (Karim, 2009; 
Sampson, 2005).  
I included two variables that control for the acquisition size. I constructed the variable 
relative size (employees) as the log of the relative size of the target firm to the acquiring firm in 
terms of the number of employees. I also constructed the variable relative size (knowledge bases) 
which is the number of unique knowledge elements in the target firm’s knowledge base divided 
by the number of unique elements in the acquiring firm’s knowledge base. 
I also controlled for the industry of the acquiring firm. I included dummy variables for 
each industry at the 2-digit SIC level.  
Finally, I constructed a dummy variable called pre-acquisition citation dummy. 
The variable equaled one if the acquiring firm cited a target firm patent prior to the 
acquisition and equaled zero if no such citation occurred.  
Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics and correlations can be found in Table 4.1. Of the 246 acquisitions, 77 
acquisitions had at least one integrative innovation, and 142 acquisitions had at least one 
independent innovation. The mean time to the first integrative innovation was 20.58 months 
compared to a mean time of 15.13 months to the first independent innovation. By conducting a t-
test for differences in means, I find that the time to the first integrative innovation is significantly 
longer than the time to the first independent innovation (p = 0.0256). Table 4.2 presents 
descriptive statistics for geographic distance and target technological overlap for different 
subsamples of acquisitions and tests for significant differences in the means of the subsamples. 
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 The mean geographic distance between the target firms and the acquiring firms is 1,699 
miles with the median at 1,261 miles. The mean geographic distance for the 75 acquisitions that 
created only independent innovations is 1,906 miles while the mean geographic distance for the 
77 acquisitions that created integrative innovations is 1,580 miles. These distances are not 
significantly different (p = 0.1496) nor are any of the other comparisons of geographic distance 
in Table 4.2. 
 There are 61 cross-border acquisitions in the sample. There are 39 cross-border 
acquisitions that either creates an integrative innovation or an independent innovation. There are 
11 cross-border acquisitions that create an integrative innovation and 37 cross-border 
acquisitions that create an independent innovation.  
 The mean target technological overlap is 0.1638 while the median is 0.0575 for the 
complete sample. The mean target technological overlap is 0.1158 for the 75 acquisitions that 
created only independent innovations, 0.2801 for the 77 acquisitions that created integrative 
innovations, 0.1842 for the 142 acquisitions that created an independent innovation, 0.4096 for 
the 10 acquisitions that created only integrative innovations, and 0.1068 for the 94 acquisitions 
that did not create either an integrative innovation or an independent innovation. In Table 4.2 we 
can see that the mean overlaps in most of the subsamples are significantly different from each 
other. The integrative innovation acquisitions possess significantly greater target technological 
overlap than the independent innovation acquisitions. Another statistic to notice is that those 
acquisitions that did not innovate post-acquisition utilizing the target firm’s pre-acquisition 




Method of Analysis 
To test the hypotheses, I conducted a survival analysis using an accelerated failure time model. 
The accelerated failure time model allows me to test the effect that the independent variables 
have on the time to the first integrative innovation or the first independent innovation. 
Comparing various distributions through AIC analysis, the lognormal distribution provides the 
best fit for the integrative innovation models while the loglogistic distribution provides the best 
fit for the independent innovation models. The hypotheses are tested by entering the three 
independent variables and the interactions between target technological overlap and geographic 
distance and between target technological overlap and cross-border dummy in the right-hand 
side of the model. 
RESULTS 
Integrative Innovation 
Table 4.3 presents the results for the hypotheses on integrative innovation. Model 1 presents the 
results for the independent effects in Hypotheses 1-3. Model 2 presents the results for Hypothesis 
4 and Model 3 presents the results for Hypothesis 5.  Model 4 presents the results for the 
simultaneous test of Hypotheses 4 and 5. 
 Geographic distance does not have a significant impact on the amount of time that 
elapses until the first post-acquisition integrative innovation. Further, geographic distance does 
not significantly interact with target technological overlap. Therefore, the analysis provides no 
support for either Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 4.  
 The acquisition being a cross-border acquisition does significantly affect the amount of 
time elapsed until the first post-acquisition integrative innovation. The cross-border dummy is 
significant in all models for which it is included. Model 1 shows that a cross-border acquisition 
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increases the expected time elapsed until first integrative innovation by 458% (β = 1.7189). This 
supports Hypothesis 2. 
 Target technological overlap possesses a highly significant effect on the amount of time 
elapsed until the first post-acquisition integrative acquisition in all models. In Model 1, an 
increase in target technological overlap by one percentage point decreases the expected time 
elapsed until the first integrative innovation by 2.30% (β = -2.3308)9. Further, a one standard 
deviation increase in technological overlap (0.23) decreases the time elapsed until the first 
integrative innovation by 41%. This provides support for Hypothesis 3. 
Target technological overlap also significantly impacts the relationship between the 
acquisition being a cross-border acquisition and the amount of time elapsed until the first 
integrative innovation. When there is no technological overlap, crossing national borders 
increases the expected time to the first integrative innovation by 1657% in Model 4 (β = 2.8664). 
When technological overlap is held at its mean (0.16), crossing national borders increases the 
expected time to the first integrative innovation by 828% in Model 4 (βcross-border + βinteraction × 
(0.16) = 2.8664 + -0.6389 = 2.2275). When technological overlap is held at one standard 
deviation above the mean (0.38), crossing national borders increases the expected time to first 
integrative innovation by 285% in Model 4 (βcross-border + βinteraction × (0.38) = 2.8664 + -1.5173 = 
1.3491). Therefore, we see that an increase in technological overlap weakens the impact that 
crossing national borders has on extending the time to the first post-acquisition integrative 
innovation. This supports Hypothesis 5. 
                                                            
9
 All interpretations pertaining to the effects of target technological overlap are calculated by 
dividing the target technological overlap coefficient by 100 before exponentiation since a unit 
increase of target technological overlap (a percentage point) equals 0.01 instead of one. 
112 
 Alternatively, we can interpret the interaction as technological overlap possessing a 
greater impact on facilitating communication and, therefore, decreasing the amount of time that 
elapses until the first integrative innovation in cross-border acquisitions. In domestic 
acquisitions, an increase in target technological overlap by one percentage point decreases the 
expected time elapsed until the first integrative innovation by 2.72% in Model 4 (β = -2.7587), 
while in cross-border acquisitions, an increase in target technological overlap by one percentage 
point decreases the expected time elapsed until the first integrative innovation by 6.53% in 
Model 4 (βtarget_overlap + βinteraction = -2.7587 + -3.9929 = -6.7516). 
Independent Innovation 
Table 4.4 presents the results for the hypotheses on independent innovation. Model 5 presents the 
results for the independent effects in Hypotheses 6-8. Model 6 presents the results for Hypothesis 
9 and Model 7 presents the results for Hypothesis 10.  Model 8 presents the results for the 
simultaneous test of Hypotheses 9 and 10. 
 Geographic distance does not possesses a significant impact on the time elapsed to the 
first independent innovation either. Further, geographic distance does not significantly interact 
with technological overlap. Therefore, the analysis provides no support for either Hypothesis 6 
or Hypothesis 9.  
 The acquisition being a cross-border acquisition does significantly affect the amount of 
time elapsed until the first post-acquisition independent innovation. The cross-border dummy is 
significant in all models. Model 5 shows that a cross-border acquisition decreases the expected 
time elapsed until the first independent innovation by 63% (β = -1.0005). This supports 
Hypothesis 7. 
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 For this initial analysis, target technological overlap does not possess a significant impact 
on the amount of time elapsed until the first independent innovation. Further, target 
technological overlap does not significantly moderate the impact that the acquisition being a 
cross-border acquisition has on the amount of time elapsed until the first independent innovation. 
Therefore, the initial analysis provides no support for either Hypothesis 8 or Hypothesis 10. 
Robustness Tests 
I conducted robustness tests on both integrative innovations and independent innovations by only 
considering acquisitions where the post-acquisition firm innovates using the pre-acquisition 
knowledge of the target firm. That is, I drop all acquisitions from the survival analysis that 
neither create a post-acquisition integrative innovation nor create a post-acquisition independent 
innovation. While these models lose information from the non-innovating acquisitions, these 
non-innovating acquisitions may also possess characteristics that are not controlled for in the 
previous models that are affecting the results. For example, some technological acquisitions are 
undertaken to kill the target firm’s technology, therefore, the information included in these 
acquisitions could be confounding the results. The results for the robustness tests can be found in 
Table 4.5. 
For integrative innovations, the results are fairly robust. The cross-border dummy 
variable is significant in all four models. Target technological overlap possesses a significant 
main effect (Model 9) when no interactions are included. Further, the interaction between target 
technological overlap and the cross-border dummy is significant in Model 11. This provides 
further support for Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3, and Hypothesis 5. 
 For independent innovations, neither geographic distance nor the acquisition being a 
cross-border acquisition is significant. Contrary to the results in the first analysis, technological 
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overlap possesses a significant main effect on the amount of the time elapsed until the first 
independent innovation. The lack of significance in the initial analysis could be driven by the 
characteristics of technological overlap in the non-innovating acquisitions that were dropped in 
this robustness test. As can be seen in Table 4.2, the non-innovating acquisitions possess the least 
amount of target technological overlap. Therefore, there will be a high negative correlation 
between target technological overlap and the time elapsed since these non-innovating 
acquisitions are right censored. This can then confound the true effects of target technological 
overlap on independent innovation. From Model 13, an increase in a percentage point of target 
technological overlap increases the time to the first independent innovation by 1.83% (β = 
1.8166).  Further, a one standard deviation increase in technological overlap (0.23) increases the 
time elapsed until the first independent innovation by 52%. This provides some support for 
Hypothesis 8. 
 Table 4.5 presents a summary of the hypotheses and results. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I investigated the effects that geographic distance, cross-border acquisitions, and 
technological overlap have on the time elapsed until the initial post-acquisition innovation 
utilizing the target firm’s technological knowledge. Further, I have shown that whether and how 
these factors affect post-acquisition innovation depends on whether the acquiring firm integrates 
the target firm’s technological knowledge with its own or not. Through this study, I have 
advanced our understanding of what constrains and what facilitates a firm’s ability to overcome 
the time compression diseconomies of internal innovation through external technology 
acquisition. I will now further discuss the results and their implications. 
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 This study contributes to our understanding of the firm as a superior mechanism for 
knowledge flows. While Jaffe et al. (1993) with knowledge spillovers, Mowery and Ziedonis 
(2001) with licensing arrangements, and Rosenkopf and Almeida (2003) with alliances found 
that difficulties in knowledge transfer arise with geographic distance, this study does not find 
that geographic distance disadvantages post-acquisition knowledge integration
10
. Two 
complementary theses have been submitted that would explain why acquisitions do not 
encounter enhanced difficulties in knowledge flows from increased geographic distance. Kogut 
and Zander (1993) proposed that firms are superior vehicles for transferring knowledge as 
internalization facilitates coordination through mutual adjustment. Further, Transaction costs 
economics argues that internalizing the transaction would attenuate opportunism allowing for 
enhanced information disclosure, therefore, advantaging integrative innovation and further 
facilitating mutual adjustment. 
 While geographic distance did not significantly affect integrative innovation, crossing 
national borders did significantly affect integrative innovation. Cross-border acquisitions do 
encounter significantly greater difficulties in knowledge integration compared to domestic 
acquisitions. By simultaneously testing geographic distance and technological distance, we see 
that there is something beyond mere distance that creates difficulties in integrative innovations. 
This provides support for the proposition that knowledge resides in different environmental 
(national) contexts that provide obstacles to knowledge transfer (Lam, 2006; Phene et al., 2006; 
Williams, 2007).  
                                                            
10
 In trade both geographic distance and crossing borders matter (Ghemawat, 2001), and 
therefore, it is important to include both in empirical models. In the studies cited, Jaffe et al. 
(1993) independently tested the effects of distance and crossing borders, Mowery and Ziedonis 
(2001) only considered domestic licensing within the United States, and Rosenkopf and Almeida 
(2003) controlled for crossing borders but did not differentiate between crossing national borders 
and state borders. 
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 Technological overlap possessed the most significant effect on the time to post-
acquisition integrative innovation. This supports the argument that similar technical language 
and experience enhances the efficiency of integrative innovation (Grant, 1996a). Further, I find 
that technological overlap attenuates the difficulties arising in cross-border acquisitions. This 
extends Puranam et al. (2009) finding that ‘common ground’ facilitates distant communication 
and coordination by introducing the tension between the national context and the technical 
context of knowledge. With research showing that knowledge possesses unique characteristics 
specific to where it is located (Porter, 1990; Saxenian, 1994) which lead to enhanced synergistic 
possibilities in cross-border acquisitions (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999), this study shows that 
technological overlap can overcome the embeddedness of the knowledge in its national context 
allowing the acquiring firm to achieve unique location specific synergies. 
Similar to integrative innovations, crossing national borders rather than mere geographic 
distance significantly affects the time it takes to the first independent innovation. As predicted, I 
find that cross-border acquisitions are faster at creating the first post-acquisition innovation 
compared to domestic acquisitions. The key question that arises is why would borders increase 
the autonomy or create less target firm disruption compared to mere geographic distance. One 
explanation is that crossing borders entails enhanced difficulties in conducting on-site visits. 
Further, by integrating the evidence on knowledge residing in its national context, the additional 
asymmetries that arise lead to the acquiring firm’s managers to perceive that they do not possess 
superior knowledge compared to that of the target firm, therefore, reducing selective intervention 
and target disruption.  
Technological overlap did possess some negative effects on the efficiency of independent 
innovation. While not significant in the full sample analysis, technological overlap did increase 
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the amount of time that elapsed until the first independent innovation when only considering 
those acquisitions that did produce some type of innovation that utilized the target firm’s pre-
acquisition knowledge. Therefore, for those that did utilize the target firm’s technological 
knowledge, increased relatedness in knowledge delayed independent innovation.  
This study provides implications for the management of acquiring firms. When 
considering the acquisition of a firm for innovative purposes, management must consider 
whether the target firm is located in a similar national environment and how technologically 
related the two firms’ knowledge bases are. While this has been addressed in prior research, I 
further show that management must recognize their intent. Do they intend to collaborate with the 
target firm in post-acquisition innovation or rather maintain the autonomy of the target firm? For 
managers that would like to maintain the target firm’s pre-acquisition innovative trajectory while 
simultaneously creating collaborative efforts, this paper shows that management must find a 
balance of geographic distance and technological overlap that facilitates communication but does 
not create excessive opportunities for selective intervention that will hamper the innovative 
productivity of the target firm. 
This study is not without its limitations. One limitation that provides opportunities for 
interesting future research is the inability to perceive intent. I was unable to observe what the 
acquiring firm intended to do or what motivated the acquiring firm to purchase the target firm. 
While I was able to observe integrative innovations and independent innovations, I do not know 
if these innovations were the pre-acquisition intentions of the acquiring firm or not. Further, I am 
unable to observe the communication difficulties or selective intervention. This is where future 
studies using survey analysis could shed light. Finally, there are always limits to patent data as 
the acquisition itself may affect the patenting activity.  
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In conclusion, this study has advanced our understanding of technological acquisitions as 
a means for overcoming the time compression diseconomies of internal innovation. It shows the 
significant effects that crossing national borders has on both integrative innovation and 
independent innovation. Further, it extends our knowledge about how technological overlap 
creates ‘common ground’ that facilitates distant knowledge exchange. On the other hand, it 
shows that technological overlap can possess negative effects on independent innovation. 
Therefore, this study on a whole shows the necessity for the acquiring firm to not only account 
for the location of the target firm and its technological relatedness but also the manner in which 











Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
variables obs mean sd min max
1. Time to 1st integrative innovation
a 77 20.58 22.45 0.07 103.20
2. Time to 1st independent innovation
a 142 15.13 17.13 0.03 80.07
3. Geographic distance (1000 miles) 246 1.70 1.76 0.001 10.85
4. Cross-border acquisition 246 0.25 0.43 0 1
5. Target technological overlap 246 0.16 0.23 0 1
6. Acquirer technological overlap 246 0.03 0.08 0 0.73
7. Target technological capabilities 246 4.59 1.65 0.69 8.94
8. Acquirer technological capabilities 246 6.89 2.24 0 10.99
9. Relative size (knowledge bases) 246 0.55 1.99 0.0001 22.90
10. Relative size (employees) 246 -2.72 2.08 -8.39 3.50
11. Acquisition experience 246 5.70 9.00 0 54
12. Pre-acquisition citation dummy 246 0.23 0.42 0 1
variables 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
3. Geographic distance (1000 miles)
4. Cross-border acquisition 0.6370*
5. Target technological overlap 0.0018 -0.0546
6. Acquirer technological overlap -0.0032 0.0491 0.3120*
7. Target technological capabilities 0.0073 -0.1198 0.1774* 0.2194*
8. Acquirer technological capabilities 0.0271 -0.1166 0.2708* -0.2270* 0.2359*
9. Relative size (knowledge bases) -0.0226 0.0142 -0.1256* 0.0636 0.1063 -0.4303*
10. Relative size (employees) -0.0436 0.0511 -0.1390* 0.2291* -0.0066 -0.6370* 0.2617*
11. Acquisition experience 0.0376 -0.0900 0.1971* -0.1701* 0.0789 0.4238* -0.1102 -0.4723*
12. Pre-acquisition citation dummy -0.0817 -0.1321* 0.2762* 0.1134 0.4184* 0.3011* -0.0687 -0.0794 0.1572*




Table 4.2. Comparisons of subsample means 
 
a. Geographic Distance (1000 miles)
Subsample obs. mean s.d. min max 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Complete sample 246 1.70 1.76 0.001 10.85
2. Integrative or Independent 152 1.74 1.92 0.001 10.85 0.416
3. Integrative 77 1.58 1.63 0.001 7.73 0.291 0.254
4. Integrative only 10 1.74 1.56 0.29 5.31 0.468 0.499 0.382
5. Independent 142 1.74 1.95 0.001 10.85 0.418 0.500 0.258 0.499
6. Independent only 75 1.91 2.18 0.001 10.85 0.228 0.289 0.150 0.386 0.292
7. neither 94 1.63 1.47 0.001 5.50 0.363 0.311 0.412 0.419 0.315 0.178
b. Technological overlap
Subsample obs. mean s.d. min max 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Complete sample 246 0.16 0.23 0 1
2. Integrative or Independent 152 0.20 0.25 0 1 0.077
3. Integrative 77 0.28 0.29 0 1 0.001 0.018
4. Integrative only 10 0.41 0.36 0 1 0.030 0.050 0.150
5. Independent 142 0.18 0.23 0 1 0.199 0.296 0.006 0.041
6. Independent only 75 0.12 0.15 0 0.60 0.020 0.001 0.000 0.015 0.005
7. neither 94 0.11 0.19 0 0.80 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.013 0.003 0.367
p -values for t -test of significant difference in means
p -values for t -test of significant difference in means
121 
Table 4.3. Survival analysis on time to first integrative innovation 
 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4
Geographic distance -0.2448 -0.261 -0.2593 -0.4293
(0.20) (0.23) (0.21) (0.27)
Cross-border dummy 1.7189* 1.7283* 2.4011** 2.8664**
(0.93) (0.94) (1.10) (1.29)
Target technological overlap -2.3308*** -2.4435** -1.8931** -2.7587***
(0.76) (1.05) (0.80) (1.01)
Geographic distance 0.0658 0.6396
     x Target technological overlap (0.40) (0.53)
Cross-border dummy -2.5887 -3.9929*
     x Target technological overlap (1.78) (2.15)
Acquirer technological overlap -6.2958* -6.3130* -5.7656* -5.6235*
(3.25) (3.25) (3.42) (3.37)
Target technological capabilities -0.4380** -0.4386** -0.4682*** -0.4894***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Acquirer technological capabilities -0.4731*** -0.4718*** -0.4612*** -0.4408**
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Relative size (knowledge bases) 0.3346 0.3388 0.344 0.3863
(0.30) (0.31) (0.29) (0.30)
Relative size (employees) -0.4118*** -0.4127*** -0.4250*** -0.4413***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Acquisition experience -0.0031 -0.0035 -0.0022 -0.0051
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Pre-acquisition citation dummy -1.9346*** -1.9279*** -1.9942*** -1.9627***
(0.55) (0.55) (0.56) (0.56)
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included
Intercept 14.8372*** 14.5319*** 14.8417*** 14.7568***
(2.41) (2.17) (2.40) (2.23)
ln_sig 0.8166*** 0.8161*** 0.8191*** 0.8159***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Wald chi-square 128.39 129.21 128.03 131.25
Observations 246 246 246 246
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Lognormal Accelerated Failure-Time
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Table 4.4. Survival analysis on time to first independent innovation 
 
VARIABLES 5 6 7 8
Geographic distance 0.1479 0.035 0.1492 0.0516
(0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14)
Cross-border dummy -1.0005** -0.9864** -1.3678** -1.1062*
(0.49) (0.49) (0.59) (0.61)
Target technological overlap 0.1782 -1.1321 -0.2381 -1.0897
(0.74) (0.97) (0.84) (0.95)
Geographic distance 0.7605 0.6608
     x Target technological overlap (0.47) (0.48)
Cross-border dummy 2.4326 0.7606
     x Target technological overlap (1.91) (1.98)
Acquirer technological overlap 0.154 -0.1611 -0.5621 -0.3343
(3.08) (3.01) (2.97) (2.99)
Target technological capabilities -0.9663*** -0.9605*** -0.9453*** -0.9546***
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
Acquirer technological capabilities -0.0589 -0.0757 -0.07 -0.0778
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Relative size (knowledge bases) 0.0198 0.0172 0.0106 0.0142
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Relative size (employees) -0.1075 -0.1195 -0.1003 -0.1154
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Acquisition experience -0.0245 -0.025 -0.0236 -0.0246
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Pre-acquisition citation dummy 0.0152 0.1096 0.055 0.1113
(0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36)
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included
Intercept 8.2381*** 12.6198*** 8.3378*** 12.5996***
(1.38) (1.56) (1.34) (1.56)
ln_gam 0.1835*** 0.1766** 0.1809*** 0.1765**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Wald chi-square 142.38 156.01 149.15 155.96
Observations 246 246 246 246
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Loglogistic Accelerated Failure-Time
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Table 4.5. Robustness tests 
 
VARIABLES 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Geographic distance -0.3143 -0.2144 -0.3238 -0.3174 0.0892 0.067 0.0939 0.0891
(0.20) (0.24) (0.21) (0.27) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13)
Cross-border dummy 1.9704** 1.9129** 2.6513** 2.6336** -0.1836 -0.1801 -0.3568 -0.3436
(0.88) (0.90) (1.03) (1.17) (0.41) (0.41) (0.55) (0.58)
Target technological overlap -1.2010* -0.5206 -0.7073 -0.675 1.8166*** 1.5906** 1.6753*** 1.6396**
(0.70) (0.92) (0.78) (0.90) (0.58) (0.73) (0.59) (0.72)
Geographic distance -0.3907 -0.0243 0.1394 0.0286
     x Target technological overlap (0.33) (0.44) (0.38) (0.40)
Cross-border dummy -2.6719** -2.6171 0.9726 0.9021
     x Target technological overlap (1.26) (1.67) (1.79) (1.83)
Acquirer technological overlap -8.4831*** -8.4641*** -8.0821*** -8.0897*** -1.9725 -2.0208 -2.2386 -2.23
(2.89) (2.95) (3.04) (3.05) (1.29) (1.30) (1.42) (1.40)
Target technological capabilities -0.0341 -0.0196 -0.0606 -0.0591 -0.5049*** -0.5096*** -0.5002*** -0.5014***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Acquirer technological capabilities -0.5065*** -0.5232*** -0.4894*** -0.4908*** -0.0539 -0.0553 -0.0607 -0.0606
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Relative size (knowledge bases) 0.3782 0.3378 0.3806 0.3781 0.0191 0.0187 0.0144 0.0146
(0.30) (0.32) (0.30) (0.32) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Relative size (employees) -0.3657*** -0.3580*** -0.3734*** -0.3727*** -0.0026 -0.0048 0.0024 0.0016
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Acquisition experience -0.0062 -0.0029 -0.005 -0.0048 -0.0081 -0.0084 -0.0073 -0.0074
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Pre-acquisition citation dummy -1.6082*** -1.6323*** -1.6605*** -1.6609*** 0.5650* 0.5801* 0.5851* 0.5869*
(0.53) (0.53) (0.55) (0.54) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33)
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Intercept 9.4025*** 9.2767*** 9.2977*** 9.2923*** 6.0862*** 6.1878*** 6.2043*** 6.2167***
(1.88) (1.92) (1.94) (1.95) (1.05) (1.11) (1.06) (1.11)
Lognormal Accelerated Failure-Time Loglogistic Accelerated Failure-Time
Failure = 1st post-acquisition integrative innovation Failure = 1st post acquisition independent innovation
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ln_sig 0.6551*** 0.6564*** 0.6583*** 0.6583***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
ln_gam -0.2104*** -0.2118*** -0.2121*** -0.2122***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Wald chi-square 110.32 106.53 104.61 105.21 73.92 74.65 75.25 77.86
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.6. Summary of hypotheses and results. 
Hypotheses Results 
Hypothesis 1. The amount of time that elapses until the initial post-acquisition integrative innovation 
increases with increases in geographic distance. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 2. The amount of time that elapses until the initial post-acquisition integrative innovation 
increases with the acquisition being a cross-border acquisition rather than a domestic acquisition. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3. The amount of time that elapses until the initial post-acquisition integrative innovation 
decreases with increases in technological overlap. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 4. Increases in technological overlap weaken the positive relationship between geographic 
distance and the amount of time that elapses until the initial post-acquisition integrative innovation. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 5. Increases in technological overlap weaken the positive relationship between cross-border 
acquisitions and the amount of time that elapses until the initial post-acquisition integrative innovation. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 6. The amount of time that elapses until the initial post-acquisition independent innovation 
decreases with increases in geographic distance. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 7. The amount of time that elapses until the initial post-acquisition independent innovation 
decreases with the acquisition being a cross-border acquisition rather than a domestic acquisition. 
Partial support 
Hypothesis 8. The amount of time that elapses until the initial post-acquisition independent innovation 




Table 4.6. Continued. 
Hypothesis 9. Increases in technological overlap weaken the negative relationship between geographic 
distance and the amount of time that elapses until the initial post-acquisition independent innovation. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 10. Increases in technological overlap weaken the negative relationship between cross-
























The objective of this dissertation was to advance our understanding of the factors that affect the 
performance of the acquisition of small technology firms with an emphasis on the overlap in the 
technological knowledge possessed by the target firm and the acquiring firm. In the three essays, 
I advanced our understanding of technological overlap as a concept and measure, showed how it 
can be used to understand the rationale behind the acquisition which matters for how the 
capabilities of the target firm and acquiring firm will be utilized, and finally, advanced our 
knowledge on how technological overlap and the physical location of the target firm in relation 
to the acquiring firm affects the ability of the acquiring firm to utilize the target firm’s 
knowledge in independent and integrative innovations. I summarize the main findings Table 5.1. 
In the first essay, I submitted that the current conception of technological overlap is 
incomplete. First, I extended technological overlap to encompass both target and acquirer 
overlap, which may be asymmetric. Most empirical constructions of technological overlap have 
measured what I call “target overlap”, the portion of the target’s knowledge already known by 
the acquirer (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Kapoor and Lim, 2007).  However, 
acquisitions also vary in the degree to which the acquirer’s existing knowledge is duplicated by 
the target’s knowledge, what I call “acquirer overlap”. Second, while previous research has 
tested the direct effect of either technological overlap (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 
2006; Kapoor and Lim, 2007; Makri et al., 2010) or technological capabilities on acquisition 
performance (King et al., 2008), I examined these factors jointly.  By doing so, I showed how 
acquirer and target overlap affect the acquirer’s ability to generate value post-acquisition from 
both its own technological capabilities and those it acquires from the target firm. 
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The findings showed that acquirer and target overlap affect value creation separately and 
jointly. High target overlap decreased the value created by the target’s technological resources 
due to knowledge redundancy.  High acquirer overlap diminished the value created by the 
acquirer’s technological capabilities by exposing more of the acquirer’s knowledge workers to 
disruption and conflict with the target’s knowledge workers. Indeed, for many firms, the negative 
effects of high acquirer overlap exceeded any value created from acquiring new technological 
resources and capabilities.  High acquirer overlap also reduced the value created by the target’s 
technological capabilities, but only when target overlap was also high, leading to conflict rather 
than potential synergies.  
In the second essay, I submitted that we must consider the rationale for the technological 
acquisition as the lack of differentiation can explain prior conflicting results on whether the 
target firm’s technological capabilities complement (e.g., Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Makri 
et al., 2010; Veugelers, 1997) or substitute (e.g., Blonigen and Taylor, 2000; Hitt et al., 1990; 
King et al., 2008) the technological capabilities of the acquiring firm. I considered whether the 
acquiring firm was a technological leader or laggard and the degree of overlap between the 
technological knowledge of the target firm and the acquiring firm. By creating a two-by-two 
matrix, I identify the following four general rationales: strategic renewal (technological 
laggard/low technological overlap), capability upgrading (technological laggard/ high 
technological overlap), capability diversification (technological leader/low technological 
overlap), and capability deepening (technological leader/high technological overlap). 
I found that the target firm’s technological capabilities had a greater positive impact on 
the creation of novel resource recombinations when there was less technological overlap between 
the target firm and the acquiring firm. I also found that the acquiring firm’s technological 
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capabilities have an increasingly positive impact on the creation of novel resource 
recombinations as the acquiring firm’s technological capabilities increased. Further, I found that 
the acquiring firm created more shareholder value from the capabilities of the target firm and the 
acquiring firm when there was less technological overlap between the target firm and the 
acquiring firm and when the acquiring firm was a technological leader. Finally, and most 
importantly, I found that an acquiring firm must be technologically capable for shareholders to 
value the acquisition of external technology. 
In the third essay, I addressed the effects that geographic distance, technological overlap, 
and whether the acquiring firm and the target firm domicile in different countries have on the 
amount of time it takes the post-acquisition firm to innovate utilizing the target firm’s pre-
acquisition technological knowledge. Further, I differentiated between two roles the target firm’s 
knowledge workers play in terms of innovative activity within the post-acquisition firm: 
integrative innovation and independent innovation. I found that crossing national borders has a 
greater impact compared to geographic distance on the time elapsed until both the initial post-
acquisition integrative innovation and the initial post-acquisition independent innovation. While 
I found that cross-border acquisitions take a longer amount of time to create an integrative 
innovation compared to domestic acquisitions, technological overlap attenuates the negative 
effect of crossing national borders. On the other hand, I found that cross-border acquisitions take 
a shorter amount of time to create the first independent innovation compared to domestic 
acquisitions. I also found evidence that technological overlap impedes independent innovation 
while I found no evidence that technological overlap significantly interacts with either 
geographic distance or cross-border acquisitions with independent innovation. 
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The emergence of acquisitions of small technology firms has allowed for the empirical 
testing of the link between novel resource recombination creation and acquirer value 
appropriation (Barney, 1988). In Appendix B, I duplicated the analysis on acquirer CAR in Essay 
1 with the percentage change in patenting intensity as the dependent variable. The findings shed 
light on the differences in measuring acquisition performance using patents instead of acquirer 
CAR. The main difference in the results is that with simultaneous high target overlap and high 
acquirer overlap there is a significant increase in patenting intensity but a significant decrease in 
acquirer CAR. One explanation is that while the similarities allow for continuity in patenting 
activity or the maintenance of a particular technological trajectory, the innovations (patents) 
occurring in these acquisitions create only marginal added value compared to the innovations 
(patents) created pre-acquisition. This explanation concurs with the Barney (1988) proposition. 
While the hypotheses in the second and third essays focus on target overlap, the results of 
acquirer overlap as a control variable give a more complete understanding of how acquirer 
overlap differs from target overlap. In Essay 2, acquirer overlap was actually significant more 
often than target overlap. This was seen in both patenting and abnormal returns analyses. 
Additionally, acquirer overlap was only significant in the technological leader subsamples. In 
both the patenting and abnormal returns analyses, acquirer overlap was significantly positive in 
the high overlap/leader subsample (capability deepening). In Essay 3, acquirer overlap was 
significant in all integrative innovation models. In the robustness tests of the integrative 
innovation models, acquirer overlap was highly significant while target overlap was not 
significant in three out of four models. Theoretically, the significance of acquirer overlap and 
integrative innovation timing makes sense. The more central a role the target firm’s technology 
is to the acquiring firm’s technology, the more importance the acquiring firm should put on 
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creating integrative innovations. The sum of the three essays lays out a nice foundation of how 
acquirer overlap differs from target overlap in its effect on acquisition performance. The 
following is a summary of the main findings on acquirer overlap: 
1. Negatively impacts the value creation from both the target firm’s and the acquiring 
firm’s technological capabilities (Essay 1), 
2. Positively impacts patenting intensity and value creation when the acquisition is 
characterized by both the acquiring firm being a technological leader and there being 
high target overlap, and 
3. Decreases the time elapsed to the initial post-acquisition integrative innovation. 
LIMITATIONS 
While I was able to build upon a large theoretical literature and rich empirical findings in 
developing the hypotheses, I did not directly observe the underlying mechanisms. In particular, it 
would be helpful to see how the levels of acquirer and target overlap influence the probability of 
employees departing from the target and, especially, the acquiring firm (cf. Karim, 2006). The 
same observation could be undertaken for asset divestitures at different levels of acquirer and 
target overlap.  
 The analysis on acquirer CAR in the first two essays suffered the limitation of small 
sample sizes. While currently there is not much that can be done as this is a limitation due to the 
newness of the phenomenon, future studies will be able to overcome this shortcoming. Further, 
the use of patents to construct the independent variables limited to sample. Therefore, future 
studies could utilize alternative measures that could increase the sample size. 
In the second essay, the main limitation was the inability to observe the rationale of the 
acquisitions. I had to infer the general rationale from the target technological overlap and the 
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technological capabilities of the acquiring firm. Future work could systematically identify the 
rationale using content analysis of the acquisition announcements. Further, the study does not 
observe the resource recombination process. While patents do provide empirical evidence of 
combining prior knowledge, I was unable to observe the reorganization and integration of 
capabilities that a survey study would be able to observe. These limitations do provide 
opportunities for future research to take a look inside the integration process to observe how 
different rationales lead to different resource utilizations. 
In the third essay, I was unable to observe the intent of the acquisition. While Mario 
Mazzola stated that Cisco seeks to utilize the target firm’s knowledge workers in both 
independent and integrative innovations, the acquisition announcements show that not all 
acquiring firms have the same intent with how the target firm’s knowledge workers will be 
utilized. While I was able to observe integrative innovations and independent innovations, I do 
not know if these innovations were the pre-acquisition intentions of the acquiring firm.  
I was also unable to observe the communication difficulties or selective intervention in 
the third essay. This is where future studies using survey analysis could shed light. Another 
method of measuring communication or selective intervention would be to track the 
communication that takes place between the acquiring firm and the target firm. In respect to 
selective intervention, excessive communication can be taken as a signal of excessive 
intervention. Allatta and Singh (2011) were able to measure email communication post-
acquisition which could be utilized to measure excessive intervention and how it affects 
innovation. 
Finally, there are always limits to patent data as the acquisition itself may affect the 
patenting activity. As patenting is part of a firm’s strategy, patenting activity may change due to 
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the change in decision makers in charge of whether and what to patent. Therefore, a spike in 
target patenting could occur due to a change in ownership. 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
The dissertation as a whole makes significant contributions to the cumulative knowledge on the 
why some technology acquisitions succeed and some do not. Further, the dissertation takes a 
holistic view of success. I investigated acquisition success in terms of acquirer value creation, 
knowledge creation, and the amount of time it takes to create new knowledge using the target’s 
prior knowledge. Further, I used acquirer value creation and knowledge creation in identical 
analyses which provided a picture of how knowledge creation and acquirer value creation are 
linked. 
 One of the main contributions is the bifurcation of the technological overlap construct 
into target overlap and acquirer overlap. From the results, we can see that these are indeed two 
distinct constructs with their own unique effect on performance. Therefore, future research needs 
to not only consider how much of the target firm the acquirer already knows, but also how much 
of the acquirer the target firm already knows. 
 Another main contribution is that researchers and managers must recognize the rationale 
for the acquisition to understand potential success for the acquisition. While prior research 
differentiated by technological overlap (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Karim and Mitchell, 
2000; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999), I simultaneously introduced the classification of whether 
the acquirer was a technological leader or laggard. By identifying four general rationales from 
prior literature and testing for differences in how the target firm’s and the acquiring firm’s 
technological capabilities are utilized, I show that not all rationales are equal in their use of 
capabilities. This provides an explanation for conflicting results in prior studies into whether the 
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target firm’s capabilities complement (e.g., Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Makri et al., 2010; 
Veugelers, 1997) or substitute (e.g., Blonigen and Taylor, 2000; Hitt et al., 1990; King et al., 
2008) the acquiring firm’s capabilities. Further, by differentiating between leaders and laggards, 
I showed that it is only the laggards that significantly destroy value. Therefore, firms must 
already possess sufficient technological capabilities to be able to utilize the capabilities they 
acquire from the target firm. 
Another contribution is the differentiation between integrative and independent 
innovation. I show that whether and how technological overlap, geographic distance, and cross-
border acquisitions affect the time it takes to post-acquisition innovation utilizing the target 
firm’s pre-acquisition knowledge depends on the type of innovation, integrative or independent. 
This has implication for researchers and managers. For researchers, results could be confounded 
due to a mix of intent for the use of the target firm’s knowledge workers. As the sample shows, 
there are acquisitions that only develop independent innovations using the target firm, only 
develop integrative innovations using the target firm, and those that develop both independent 
and integrative innovation using the target firm. For managers, the results suggest that the 
acquiring firm’s management must recognize how they plan to utilize the target firm’s 
knowledge workers when considering the appropriateness of the target firm. 
Finally, the dissertation contributes to our understanding of how distance affects 
knowledge transfer. I show that acquisitions do not suffer the same intensity of frictions in 
knowledge flows that market mechanisms and spillovers incur from geographic distance. Rather, 
knowledge flows are impeded by the knowledge residing in different national contexts. I further 
show that technological overlap can provide a commonality in the sources of knowledge that can 
attenuate these difficulties. 
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In conclusion, the dissertation made numerous contributions to our understanding of what 
leads to the success or failure of acquisitions of small technology firms. Technological overlap is 
shown to be more than a one-dimensional construct. By broadening our understanding of 
technological overlap and simultaneously considering other relevant variables (e.g., acquirer 
technological capabilities, geographic distance, and crossing national borders), the dissertation 





Table 5.1. Summary of findings. 
 
 
Research Question Main Finding 
Essay 1 
Does target overlap and acquirer overlap possess 
their own unique effects on acquisition 
performance? 
 Target  capabilities create less value the greater the target 
overlap 
 Target capabilities create less value the greater the 
acquirer overlap only when target overlap is also high 
 Acquirer capabilities create less value the greater the 
acquirer overlap 
Essay 2 
Do the target’s and the acquirer’s technological 
capabilities contribute differently to post-
acquisition knowledge creation and value creation 
depending on the rationale for acquisition? 
 Target and acquirer capabilities create value in capability 
diversification rationale 
 Target capabilities create value and acquirer capabilities 
lose value in strategic renewal rationale 
 Target capabilities lose value and acquirer capabilities 
create value in capability deepening rationale 
 Target and acquirer capabilities lose value in capability 
upgrading rationale 
Essay 3 
How does distance (technological, geographic, 
and cultural) between the target firm and the 
acquiring firm impact the amount of time it takes 
the acquiring firm to utilize the target firm’s 
technological knowledge? 
 Integrative innovations occur quicker in domestic 
acquisitions and when there is greater target overlap 
 Target overlap can substitute for locational proximity in 
integrative innovations 
 Independent innovations occur quicker in cross-border 
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CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
The Scholes-Williams coefficients were calculated by estimating three OLS regressions: 
                    for j = 1, 2, …, T    (A.1) 
                              for j = 1, 2, …, T-1         (A.2) 
                       for j = 2, 3, …, T           (A.3) 
where 
    Rij = the rate of return for firm i on day j of the estimation window, 
   Rmj = the rate of return of the equally-weighted market index from the CRSP database on day j       
           of the estimation window, 
Rmj+1 = the rate of return of the equally-weighted market index from the CRSP database on day  
j+1 of the estimation window, 
 Rmj-1 = the rate of return of the equally-weighted market index from the CRSP database on day  
j−1 of the estimation window, and 
      T = number of days in the estimation window. 
I calculated the Scholes-Williams betas as: 
     (           ) (    )⁄      (A.4) 
where ρ is the serial correlation of market returns during the estimation window. The Scholes-
Williams intercept is calculated as: 
     (    ⁄ )∑    
   
        (    ⁄ )∑   
   
     (A.5) 
The abnormal returns using the Scholes-Williams alphas and betas are computed as: 
         (            )     (A.6) 
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where 
ARit = the abnormal return received by firm i on day t of the event window, 
  Rit = the rate of return on the share price of firm i on day t of the event window, and 
 Rmt = the rate of return of the equally-weighted market index from the CRSP database on day t       
           of the event window, 
I then created CARi which is the sum of firm i’s ARit from t = -1 to t = +1. This is the dependent 
variable in the regression models on value creation. 
An additional step that is widely practiced as well as advised by McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997) is to test whether the sample CARs are significantly different from zero. The first step to 
this procedure is to standardize the abnormal returns: 
               ⁄        (A.7) 
with 
        (  
 
 
 [(     ̅ )
 ∑ (     ̅ )
  
   ⁄ ])
     (A.8) 
where 
  sift = the standard error of the forecast for firm i on day t in the event window, 
  sie = the standard error of the estimate for firm i over the estimation window, 
 ̅  = the mean rate of return of the equally-weighted market index from the CRSP database. 
Next I cumulate the SARs to get the standardized cumulative abnormal returns (SCARi): 
      (
 
    ⁄
)∑      
 
        (A.9) 
where k is the number of days in the event window. 
It is assumed that the SCARs have the same distributions and are independent. I divided 
them by their standard deviation to make them identically distributed and then averaged them to 
get the average standardized cumulative abnormal return (ASCAR): 
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     (A.10) 
where n is the number of firms in the sample. The test statistic to evaluate whether the ASCAR is 
significantly different from zero is computed as: 
                     (A.11) 
which has a standard normal distribution. To test for differences in the subsamples, the following 
test statistic was computed: 
  
             
√(   ⁄  
 
  ⁄ )
⁄
    (A.12) 

























ESSAY 1 ANALYSIS USING PATENTING AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Following the call for the use of multiple measures of acquisition performance (Zollo and Meier, 
2008), I provide the following analyses using patenting data to construct the dependent variable 
instead of acquirer CAR. While many prior studies have constructed a post-acquisition 
innovation performance measure using post-acquisition patent counts (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; 
Cloodt et al., 2006; Kapoor and Lim, 2007; Makri et al., 2010), I construct a dependent variable 
that measures how the acquisition affects the patenting rate by accounting for change in the pre- 
versus post-acquisition patenting rates. I constructed the following dependent variable: 
                                     
(       )
    
⁄ , 
where 
    PP = the count of patents applied for and later granted by the post-acquisition firm in the 
3-year window following the acquisition effective date, and 
        PT+A = the count of patents applied for and later granted by both the target firm and the 
acquiring firm in the 3-year window preceding the acquisition effective date. 
A positive number represents positive synergies as the post-acquisition firm creates more patents 
in the post-acquisition window than the pre-acquisition target firm and the pre-acquisition 
acquiring firm did in the pre-acquisition window combined. A negative number represents 
negative synergies as the post-acquisition firm creates fewer patents than that of the combined 
pre-acquisition target firm and the pre-acquisition acquiring firm. 
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Reproduction of Analysis I with Patenting Dependent Variable 
Table A.1 presents the findings for the additional analysis that replicates Analysis I using the 
percentage change in patenting rate as the dependent variable instead of acquirer CAR. Model 1A 
through Model 5A correspond to Model 1 through Model 5 in Table 2.2 for the original Analysis 
I. The analysis using patenting data does not closely imitate that of the analysis using acquirer 
CAR. Consistent with Model 5 in Table 2, I find in Model 5A of Table A.1 that target overlap 
negatively moderates the relationship between the target’s technological capabilities and the 
percentage change in patenting rate. Beyond this finding, both overlap measures and both 
technological capabilities measures did not significantly affect the percentage change in 
patenting rate.  
Reproduction of Analysis III with Patenting Dependent Variable 
Table A.2 and Table A.3 present the findings for the additional analysis that replicates Analysis 
III using the percentage change in patenting rate as the dependent variable instead of acquirer 
CAR from Table 2.4 and Table 2.5. While the results are not identical to the analysis on acquirer 
CAR, the results do show that target overlap and acquirer overlap each possess its own distinct 
effect.  
Given low acquirer overlap, increases in target overlap decreased the impact that the 
target’s technological capabilities had on the change in patenting rate, consistent with acquirer 
CAR. On the other hand, given high acquirer overlap, increases in target overlap increased the 
impact that the target’s technological capabilities had on the change in patenting rate, contrary to 
acquirer CAR. 
Given low target overlap, increases in acquirer overlap decreased the impact that both the 
target’s and the acquirer’s technological capabilities had on the change in patenting rate. For 
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acquirer CAR, increases in acquirer overlap only significantly moderated the impact of the 
acquirer’s technological capabilities. Given high target overlap, increases in acquirer overlap 
increased the impact that the target’s technological capabilities had on the change in patenting 
rate while increases in acquirer overlap did not significantly affect the impact that the acquirer’s 
technological capabilities had on the change in patenting rate. For acquirer CAR, increases in 
acquirer overlap negatively moderated the impact that both the target’s and the acquirer’s 
technological capabilities had.  
These findings shed light on the differences in measuring acquisition performance using 
patents instead of acquirer CAR. The main difference in the results is in the Quadrant 4s of Table 
2.5 and Table A.3. In Quadrant 4 of Table A.3, the target’s technological capabilities’ impact on 
the change in patenting rate is significantly greater than in Quadrants 2 and 3. On the other hand 
in Quadrant 4 of Table 2.5, the target’s technological capabilities’ impact on acquirer CAR is 
significantly less than in Quadrants 2 and 3. One explanation is that the similarities between the 
target and the acquirer indicate that the acquirer is not changing its technological trajectory; 
therefore, there will be less disruption in the patenting activity that takes place in the acquiring 
firm. Another explanation is that while the similarities allow for continuity in patenting activity 
or the maintenance of a particular technological trajectory, the innovations (patents) occurring in 
these acquisitions create only marginal added value compared to the innovations (patents) 









TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table A.1. Duplication of Table 2.2 with patenting data 
 
 
Dependent variable = % ∆ in patenting rate
Target technological overlap -0.166 -6.995 -0.170 -0.195 -8.172
(0.64) (4.90) (0.64) (0.68) (5.66)
Acquirer technological overlap -0.685 -0.357 0.713 -1.770 11.697
(1.50) (1.62) (4.01) (3.15) (8.71)
Target technological capabilities 0.124 -0.057 0.130 0.118 -0.038
(0.17) (0.10) (0.18) (0.18) (0.10)
Acquirer technological capabilities -0.156 -0.136 -0.151 -0.161 -0.111
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Target technological capabilities 1.367 1.556
     x Target technological overlap (1.06) (1.20)
Target technological capabilities -0.286 -3.789 *
     x Acquirer technological overlap (0.98) (2.02)
Acquirer technological capabilities 0.244 1.460
     x Acquirer technological overlap (0.82) (1.27)
Transaction value (100 million) -0.138 -0.490 -0.149 -0.112 -0.535
(1.99) (2.24) (2.01) (2.01) (2.33)
Pharma -0.524 -0.596 -0.520 -0.530 -0.590
(0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44)
% stock -0.159 -0.288 -0.153 -0.168 -0.270
(0.36) (0.42) (0.36) (0.36) (0.41)
Relative size (employees) -0.074 -0.016 -0.066 -0.082 0.043
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)
(5A)(4A)(3A)(2A)(1A)
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Relative size (knowledge bases) -0.083 * -0.072 * -0.084 * -0.083 * -0.077 *
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
4-firm concentration ratio 1.173 1.016 1.205 1.135 1.201
(1.57) (1.49) (1.58) (1.59) (1.41)
Acquisition experience 0.011 0.007 0.011 0.011 0.009
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Relative market share 1.427 2.415 1.457 1.409 2.852
(1.99) (1.96) (2.02) (2.01) (2.10)
Pre-1998 -0.223 -0.208 -0.221 -0.223 -0.187
(0.53) (0.48) (0.53) (0.52) (0.51)
Post-2000 0.063 0.060 0.076 0.054 0.172
(0.36) (0.34) (0.38) (0.37) (0.39)
Intercept 0.514 1.491 0.458 0.578 1.256
(1.02) (1.30) (1.08) (1.07) (1.21)
Observations 97 97 97 97 97
F-statistic 1.98 ** 1.80 ** 1.91 ** 1.88 ** 1.58 *
R-squared 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.18
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Quadrant from Figure 1
Target overlap
Acquirer overlap
Dependent variable = % ∆ in patenting rate
Target technological capabilities 0.051 -0.314 -0.534 0.696
(0.11) (0.20) (0.36) (0.65)
Acquirer technological capabilities -0.009 -0.508 ** 0.277 0.045
(0.09) (0.22) (0.36) (0.38)
Transaction value (100 million) -0.018 0.026 -0.022 -0.036
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
Pharma -0.027 -0.123 -0.781 -0.977
(0.54) (0.42) (0.71) (1.67)
% stock 0.428 1.063 * -0.958 -1.521
(0.62) (0.55) (0.67) (1.76)
Relative size (employees) -0.035 -0.081 -0.620 0.228
(0.21) (0.22) (0.62) (0.37)
Relative size (knowledge bases) -0.034 -0.027 4.527 0.924
(0.06) (0.43) (4.85) (1.92)
4-firm concentration ratio 3.610 0.915 -11.207 -13.139
(3.03) (2.79) (9.98) (10.44)
Acquisition experience -0.073 0.079 0.040 0.103
(0.06) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09)
Relative market share 5.209 8.596 ** -8.369 1.143
(6.82) (3.52) (8.65) (5.27)
Pre-1998 2.166 *** 0.529 -0.812
(0.69) (0.70) (0.76)
Post-2000 -0.033 -0.657 -0.700 0.471
(0.54) (0.48) (0.85) (1.16)
Intercept -1.515 4.053 3.815 2.704
(2.45) (2.53) (3.18) (6.05)
Observations 25 24 24 24
F-statistic 2.76 ** 16.15 *** 1.44 0.44
R-squared 0.6478 0.7324 0.4867 0.3913
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1






































































































chi-square = 5.13 
 
p-value = 0.0235 
 
chi-square = 4.35 
 




chi-square = 9.42 
 
p-value = 0.0022 
H3 
chi-square = 0.40 
 
p-value = 0.5251 
H2 
chi-square = 5.47 
 
p-value = 0.0193 
H2 
chi-square = 5.46 
 
p-value = 0.0194 
Q1 Q2 
Q3 Q4 
    * p < .10 
  ** p < .05 




H2 & H3 
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APPENDIX C 
INTERACTION INTERPRETATIONS USING ABNORMAL RETURNS AS THE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The traditional purpose for regressing independent variables on the abnormal returns was to 
explain the cross-sectional variance in the abnormal returns among the sample (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 1997). A model that regresses the independent variables on some form of abnormal 
returns can be interpreted as an interaction model. To explain the logic, consider a base model 
seen in Equation A.1: 
                                (A.1) 
where, 
 CAR = Cumulative abnormal returns, 
 ATC = Acquirer technological capabilities, and 
 TTC = Target technological capabilities. 
With Equation A.1, I am able to test the impact that the targets’ technological capabilities and the 
acquirers’ technological capabilities have on the size of the abnormal returns. If β1 is positive, 
then the traditional view would interpret this result as cumulative abnormal returns increase with 
increases in the acquirers’ technological capabilities. An alternative way to interpret this result 
would be that the acquisition of the target firm increases the value of the acquiring firm’s 
capabilities. Further, by creating a sample of target firms that only bring technology and 
knowledge to the acquiring firm, this alternative interpretation is actually an interaction between 
the acquisition of external technology and the valuation of the acquirers’ technological 
capabilities. 
 Now consider the fully constituted interaction model below: 
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                  (      )       (      )                    (A.2) 
where Event is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquisition occurs. Since all the 
acquisitions occur in the sample, the Event dummy variable is always equal to one. Assuming an 
efficient market (Fama, 1970), an acquirer’s stock price should already reflect the value of all 
prior public information which includes the acquirer’s technological capabilities. Therefore, 
since β3 and β4 represent the impact that the capabilities have on an acquirer’s stock price when 
there is no acquisition, β3 and β4 equal zero as no new information has been released that would 
cause either of these variables to be revalued since no acquisition occurred. This reduces 
Equation A.2 to Equation A.1 because Event is always equal to one leaving β0 as the intercept or 
the amount of value the acquisition creates when the target firm and the acquiring firm both 
possess zero technological capabilities; β1 and β2 are reduced to reflecting the impact of ATC and 
TTC, respectively, as Event always equals one; and β3 and β4 are dropped since no new 
information is provided when the acquisition is not announced leaving β3 and β4 to always equal 
zero. 
 What does this mean? And, why is this important? This allows researchers to test 
interactive models without interacting variables. In this paper, since the sample is carefully 
selected to only include small technology firms that are not contributing significant market share 
that will affect the valuation of the acquisition, I am able to interpret the coefficients of the 
acquirers’ technological capabilities and the targets’ technological capabilities as a test of 
interaction. Therefore, a positive coefficient for the ATC would mean that acquiring the external 
technology complements an acquirer’s own capabilities and a negative coefficient would mean 
that acquiring the external technology substitutes an acquirer’s own capabilities (Siggelkow, 
2002). Further, the TTC coefficient can be interpreted as increases in the technological 
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capabilities of the target firm increases the amount of acquirer shareholder value created from the 
external technology. 
